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Over the course of this dissertation, I introduce the idea of the true self construct as a 
personalized route to individual meaning and stability at a time in history when external 
direction regarding values and purpose is in decline. Setting aside the question of the 
ontological status of the true self, I emphasize that beliefs about and representations of 
the true self have distinctive psychological impact and cite research supporting this 
assertion. I then review evidence of the aptness of such true self-orientations in 
supporting well-being, fulfillment of basic psychological needs, and resilience against 
threat. Across two studies, I investigated the effectiveness of connecting with one’s true 
self-orientations for defending against three levels of personal morality threat severity. 
Compelling support arose for well-being being positively related to participants’ belief in 
having a true self. Evidence consistently suggested this to be the case across threat 
severity, but moderate evidence also supported the possibility that true self-orientations 
are ineffective against strong threat (Study 1). Participants highly preferred to engage 
with their true self-concepts across threat condition, and in doing so reported significantly 
higher subjective vitality than those who explored self-flexibility. Other well-being 
outcomes were unaffected by threat and connection to different self-conceptualizations 
(Study 2). I then consider theoretical implications and propose multiple pathways for 
fruitful future exploration. In particular, trait-level true self-orientations seem most 
effective for predicting well-being, and people may need additional guidance to 
effectively utilize their true self-orientations for active coping support. 




True Self as Resilience Anchor: 
Using Essentialist Self-Views to Neutralize Personal Morality Threats 
Like most theories, the self theory is a conceptual tool for accomplishing a 
purpose. The most fundamental purpose of the self theory is to optimize the 
pleasure/pain balance of the individual over the course of a lifetime. Two other 
basic functions, not unrelated to the first, are to facilitate the maintenance of self-
esteem, and to organize the data of experience in a manner that can be coped with 
effectively (emphasis in original; Epstein, 1973, p. 4). 
Over the course of the past decade of research in psychology, interest has been 
growing for studying the ‘true self’ as a construct. Theorists have increasingly taken note 
of the prevalence with which lay narratives assert the usefulness of the true self and its 
inherence as the core self inside each person. As I will outline, the truth of the true self’s 
existence is difficult to ascertain yet does not preclude beliefs about its existence and 
traits from being relevant for positive psychological functioning. In fact, a building 
literature suggests that these beliefs might be uniquely adaptive for navigating today’s 
challenges. 
Two trends have developed throughout human history to now converge and bring 
to bear certain pressures on a great number of people alive today. Modern life in 
thoroughly-developed Western countries, in part due to changes in shared traditions, 
professions, and religiosity in the 20th century, struggles to provide a consistent and 
compelling set of values by which to live and relate to others meaningfully (Baumeister, 
1991; Baumeister & Vohs, 2002). In concordance with this change, from about the 11th 




societal tensions and a source of dynamic individuality (for review, see Baumeister, 
1987). The result is that at the time of weakened direction supplied by modern Western 
societal structures, a centuries-long consideration of human life has elevated the self as a 
potential locus of gravity. Baumeister and Vohs (2002) argued that as a response to the 
“value-gap” left by modern life, a greater emphasis has been placed on the importance of 
the self and the pursuit of self-knowledge, placing the search for values squarely on the 
shoulders of each individual and framing it as their birthright for self-actualization. These 
authors illustrate the significance of this development: 
This is a remarkable change from the traditional moral system, which usually 
arrayed moral injunctions against anything that was self-serving. Indeed, the 
restraint of selfish pursuits is arguably the essential core of previous morality and 
the reason that morals emerged in the first place. Shifting the cultivation of self 
from the enemy of moral values to one of the staunchest bases of moral values is a 
fundamental and far-reaching realignment (Baumeister & Vohs, 2002, p. 612). 
While searching for one’s personal set of values it seems natural to guess that they must 
lay somewhere within oneself, for who else could say what one’s own values are? Thus, 
the individual is presented with a complex puzzle with no guide as valid as themselves, 
and no guide for how to listen to the knowledge they supposedly contain. A person could 
be forgiven for being confused by the questions of who they are and what they value, and 
indeed psychologists seeking to fully understand the self empirically have been similarly 
confounded. Since the beginning of psychology as a field, different definitions of the self 
and its contents have been forwarded, but from within these divisions an 




organizing self-related information and motivating behavior—has emerged (Epstein, 
1973). If the self serves as our own theoretical frameworks for navigating life, it would 
seem that it might be up to the task of providing guidance that history has charged it with. 
In light of the existential challenges faced by recent generations, research into the 
self-theory as a personalized tool that is available for resolving the value-gap meaning 
vacuum is a promising area for further investigation. How might the self-theory be 
applied to perform such a function? In recent years, psychologists have recognized that 
people report relying on their true selves—“who they really are deep down”—for self-
worth, purpose, and guidance. If true, such beliefs, assumptions, and attributions 
organized around the true self appear to represent precisely the sorts of resources that can 
serve as personal headings against uncertain seas. I will here review evidence in support 
of this encouraging possibility prior to outlining a research plan designed to directly 
assess the true self as a conceptual pillar of psychological stability. 
Structure of Review 
I begin this exploration of beliefs and attributions surrounding the true self, as 
well as their functional implications, by first defining the true self as different from the 
self construct broadly. Following will be a thorough consideration of the major lines of 
research into people’s thoughts about the true self, how their true self-concepts are 
defined and organized, and the extent to which valence is commonly attached to the true 
self. At this point I will unite these beliefs, conceptual organizations, and valence 
attributions under the umbrella term “true self-orientations” as I explore the evidence for 
their well-being relevance. Thus, moving forward from this foundation, I will examine 




question of how apt these orientations are for actively benefiting people. I conclude this 
review by proposing how particular true self-orientations might best perform such a role. 
I then proceed to outline three experimental studies to test this claim, in each case 
leveraging false feedback about participants’ personal morality as a self-relevant stressor 
that they might cope with using true self-orientations. 
The Self at the Core? Distinguishing the True Self from the Self 
Due to its name, speaking about the true self implies a boundary between the self 
generally and its truest aspects, but this is misleading and is an inaccurate understanding 
of the relationship between the self and the true self as psychological constructs. To 
distinguish between the two, it is useful to consult the leading definitions psychology has 
developed for each. According to Swann and Bosson (2010), the primary definition of the 
self is as a “representation or set of representations about oneself, parallel to the 
representations people have of other individuals. […] It is the “me,” or self-as-object, 
about which James (1890) wrote—the entire set of beliefs, evaluations, perceptions, and 
thoughts that people have about themselves” (p. 591). We can have a wide variety of 
these cognitions about ourselves, and like other cognitions they can be more or less active 
at a given time (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987; McGuire et al., 1978), 
contain semantic and episodic self-related knowledge (Kelley et al., 2002; Klein & 
Loftus, 1993; Klein et al., 1992), and be malleable to serve our goals in the present 
situation (Swann et al., 2002). 
By contrast, for those of us that believe we possess a true self, we seem to develop 
a concept of what our true self is like. This true self-concept comes to be complexly 




and are most central to who we think we are (Schlegel et al., 2009). As we will see, true 
self-concepts frequently apply a high degree of psychological essentialism to the true 
self. I emphasize that true self-concepts belong, for scientific purposes, only to those who 
engage in the belief that they have a true self. This is because to all but a subgroup of 
psychologists the true self is in reality a folk belief referred to as the veridical account of 
true selves (Rivera et al., 2019). Further, the true self is an unscientific concept as it is 
both up to each person’s subjective definition and unverifiable (Strohminger et al., 2017). 
Beliefs about the true self are, by contrast, psychological realities compatible with and 
worthy of scientific study. The utility of this point is already being noted. Baumeister 
(2019) recently likened this non-veridical understanding of the true self to the idea of a 
unicorn: 
“Thus, people might have a true self-concept but they might still not have a true 
self. The unicorn is a standard example for which there exists a concept without a 
reality. Rivera et al. (2019) make a compelling case for the true self as like a 
unicorn, that is, a concept without a reality behind it. For them, the true self 
functions not as a representation of how one is but rather as a guide to how one 
wants to be.” (p. 145).  
While the true self may be by its nature insensitive to measurement and verification, 
belief in it is so common that a wide variety of narratives and explanatory conclusions 
have accumulated around the true self with not insignificant impact. Considering that 
each person who believes they have a true self can choose how to define it, the types of 
things people believe about true selves is remarkably consistent across cultures. For 




Singapore (De Freitas et al., 2018), and morally good traits are thought of as most core to 
a person among Hindu Indians and Buddhist Tibetans (Nichols et al., 2018). To ascertain 
whether a person can benefit from their orientation to the true self, it is first appropriate 
to further describe these commonalities in true self beliefs and conceptual organizations 
and review their associated outcomes for other psychological constructs. 
Having the True Self in Mind: True Self-concept Accessibility 
Research indicates that processing and reasoning about the true self is distinct 
from the self broadly. People make a distinction between their everyday qualities and 
their true nature in open-ended responses (Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021a). These 
everyday self qualities and the true self have been shown to differ in how quickly and 
accurately they’re cognitively processed (Baldwin et al., 2014; Schlegel et al., 2011; 
Schlegel et al., 2009). Writing prompts designed to elicit feelings of nostalgia have been 
shown to only make participants’ ideas about who they really are more accessible and not 
increase the accessibility about their everyday qualities (Baldwin et al., 2014). 
The speed and accuracy with which a person can describe their true self is 
referred to as true self-concept accessibility and has been shown to relate to other 
psychological constructs differently than the accessibility of other self-conceptions. 
Specifically, true self-concept accessibility is related to higher meaning in life while 
actual self-concept accessibility is not (Schlegel et al., 2009) and compassion inductions 
have been shown to induce selflessness through decreased public self accessibility while 
true self-concept accessibility was unimpacted (DeLury et al., 2020). These patterns lend 
credence to the true self-concept as distinct. The perception of true self-knowledge 




shares different relationships with other psychological constructs than does the 
subjectively-judged availability of knowledge about one’s actual everyday self (Schlegel 
et al., 2011). 
True Self as an Essence: Self-essentialism 
The above reviews evidence that true self-concepts consist of traits and 
representations about a person’s true self which are specific to the person that holds them, 
and that these true self-concepts differ from other self-conceptions a person might hold 
such as the everyday self. Despite these person-specific variations on what true self-
concepts contain, true selves tend to be reasoned about in very consistent ways across 
people. True selves are widely portrayed in lay narratives to be stable in nature, inherent 
to each person, and informative for knowing who a person is and how they will act 
(Dulaney et al., 2019). This reasoning is strong in psychological essentialism throughout. 
Psychological essentialism refers to the idea that members of observable 
categories in the world share an underlying essence that are the source of the categories’ 
distinguishing qualities (Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Newman & 
Keil, 2008). Studies show that people readily infer essences underlying social categories 
(Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) and doing so is associated with believing stereotypes about 
these social groups (Haslam et al., 2000; Yzerbyt & Rocher, 2002). While it may seem 
unintuitive to consider each person their own essential category, findings suggest people 
do hold these beliefs about people in general (Bastian & Haslam, 2007; Bastian & 
Haslam, 2008; Haslam et al., 2006). Multiple studies have found compelling evidence 
that it is common for people to apply psychological essentialism when thinking about 




Dulaney et al., 2019). Self-essentialism involves belief that one possesses an inherent 
unchanging true self that is deeply-seated, genetically-linked, and influential over 
behavior (Dulaney et al., 2019). American participants have been shown as significantly 
more likely to agree that the true self exists for each person to discover, a self-essentialist 
metaphor, than with a metaphor portraying the true self as something each person can 
create for themselves, which is consistent with a flexible and less veridical view of the 
true self (Schlegel et al., 2012). Further, while interdependent societies tend to take the 
more flexible view of the self in general (Ng & Hynie, 2014, Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 
2004; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004), there is indication that interdependent societies are 
just as likely to think about true selves in essentialist terms, with Japanese undergraduates 
reporting almost the same means and standard deviations on self-essentialism as United 
States samples (Dulaney et al., 2021).  
The Morality of the True Self 
A robust group of findings has now gathered to show that, in addition to 
widespread beliefs that the true self is a stable essence, people also consistently believe 
the true self is inherently morally good. People seem to view the ideal of “being yourself” 
as an ethical imperative that shapes their moral reasoning (Knobe, 2005). Further, when 
asked to qualitatively describe one aspect of themselves that they valued more than any 
other, a large portion of participants reported most valuing an aspect that was moral 
(38.2%), nearly as many as the number of participants who most valued an aspect 
involving their intelligence (41.1%) and each of these former aspect categories were 
vastly more endorsed than personality (17.6%) or physical traits (3.0%; De Freitas & 




being the most important part of themselves. Paralleling these findings, having a highly-
internalized sense of personal morals and directives has been shown to predict high 
schoolers’ use of moral concepts as a way to describe themselves and their qualities as 
well as actual moral behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002). People do not only consider their 
moral qualities as being of central significance to who they are, following a moral-
therefore-central line of reasoning. Rather, evidence also demonstrates a central-
therefore-moral sequence: In dominantly independent and interdependent cultures as well 
as in people who scored highly on holding negative views towards humanity in general, 
participants consistently assumed moral goodness about that which was most core to a 
person’s identity (De Freitas et al., 2018). 
People also seem to project their own moral assumptions when labelling the 
appearance of others’ true selves. Participants rated vignette characters undergoing belief 
or behavior change to be changing in accordance with their true selves if the change was 
from morally bad to morally good, compared to when the changes proceeded in a good-
to-bad pattern (Study 1, Newman, et al., 2014). Establishing that people use their own 
moral beliefs rather than simply using social norms to decide when true selves are being 
reflected, participants rated politically-enmeshed changes (e.g., unpatriotic to patriotic, 
denying global warming to supporting the environment) as revealing characters’ true 
selves when these changes would be seen as following a bad-to-good pattern in alignment 
with participants’ own political identifications (Study 2).  
While the persistent belief in the true self as morally good appears to be a separate 
branch of beliefs than those that portray the true self as an essential entity, in fact the 




our tendency to essentialize the true self (De Freitas et al., 2017a). Since the true self is a 
compatible target onto which essentialist frames can be projected, our moralization about 
the true self has developed to follow essentialist lines as well. For instance, mirroring 
psychological essentialism’s assertion that essential qualities are interwoven with an 
entity’s fundamental identity, changes to a person’s moral qualities are seen as more 
disruptive to a person’s identity than changes to personality, nonmoral, or immoral 
qualities (De Freitas et al., 2018; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Morality notions are so 
integral in true self beliefs that feedback about our own immorality seems to lead us to 
feel more alienated from and less aware of who we really are (Christy et al., 2016). That 
psychological essentialism underlies the belief that the true self is inherently moral is 
easy to understand considering that projecting permanent positive moral valence onto the 
true self is itself making a claim about something that is universal, unchanging, and 
inherent about true selves. 
Now that the true self-concept has been defined, and essentialist and moral beliefs 
about true selves have been outlined and shown to be incredibly interlinked, it is possible 
to assess the aptness of these “true self-orientations” for performing supportive functions 
in service of happiness and meaning in life. Using this label will be useful for discussing 
evidence of benefits associated with the variety of representations and beliefs people hold 
regarding the true self. 
Is it Beneficial to Believe in a True Self? 
People seem to engage in seeing essences and goodness simultaneously in the true 
self in flexible, logically inconsistent ways that imply effortful attempts to maintain these 




self and are comparatively less willing to embrace examples of a person’s decline as 
being true to their core (Molouki & Bartels, 2017). This parallels the tendency to see 
larger essentialized entities such as countries as maintaining their fundamental identity 
when making improvements as opposed to deteriorating (De Freitas et al., 2017b). Such 
acceptance of improvements, while matching the goodness assumption, violates the 
assumption of stability over time. People seem to apply the discovery metaphor to resolve 
this, in other words claiming that by improving a person is further discovering and 
realizing their true nature (Bench et al., 2015). It is a curiosity of essentialist thinking that 
an essence can be a causal agent in behavior while also being capable of being obscured, 
at times a mystery to its owner who can behave in ways that mismatch their true essence. 
 Considering that people so readily engage in motivated reasoning to maintain 
their true self-beliefs, one might ask what the root of this motivation is. That is, what is 
the function of these beliefs we so strongly and prevalently cling to? Despite the logical 
inconsistencies that underlay seeing a dynamic, situationally-sensitive person (Fleeson & 
Wilt, 2010) as having an unchanging and moral essence, a large body of evidence now 
reflects benefits associated with entertaining this theory and will now be reviewed. 
True Self-orientations and Subjective Well-being 
Significant bivariate correlations have emerged between self-essentialism and 
variables commonly used to capture subjective well-being (SWB). Such a link was hinted 
at by the finding of a medium-sized positive correlation between endorsement of a single 
item “The true self is real” and meaning in life (Schlegel et al., 2012). As a first endeavor 
to assess this connection using a complete measure of self-essentialism, Dulaney et al. 




satisfaction in life, meaning in life, and happiness in a student sample and small- to 
medium-sized positive correlations with these variables in a sample of Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers. An extension and replication study again found a 
medium-sized positive correlation between self-essentialism and satisfaction with life 
(Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021b). A cross-cultural extension of this work showed that for 
Japanese undergraduates, self-essentialism also correlated moderately positively with 
satisfaction with life, meaning in life, and self-esteem (Dulaney et al., 2021). While the 
true self is highly-esteemed cross-culturally (Kim et al., 2018b as cited in Rivera et al., 
2019; Schlegel at al., 2013a), such findings of parallel well-being patterns between self-
essentialism and well-being for participants in the United States and Japan is striking 
considering their different cultural heritages. Specifically, Westerners are traditionally 
inclined to view the self as stable and distinct from the environment (De Freitas et al., 
2017a; Newman et al., 2014), while traditions in Japan and many East Asian countries 
take a dialectical view, depicting the self as full of contrasts and permeable to social and 
environmental influences (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). It has 
further been proposed that taking an essential view of the self can incur well-being costs 
due to its inflexibility in self-beliefs (Boyraz et al., 2019), a contrasting view suggesting a 
limit to true self-orientations’ adaptiveness that I will return to in a later section. 
True Self-orientations and Fulfillment of Basic Psychological Needs 
Having one’s fundamental psychological needs fulfilled is thought to be highly 
important and central for a person’s well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Williams, 1997, 
2001), with cross-cultural support (Church et al., 2012). In keeping with self-




been shown to have a small positive correlation with meaning need fulfillment, a 
medium-sized positive correlation with belonging need fulfilment, a medium-sized 
positive correlation with control need fulfillment, and a medium-sized positive 
correlation with self-esteem need fulfillment (Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021b). The 
findings of self-essentialism being positively correlated with fulfillment of meaning in 
life needs parallel the evidence that it is positively associated with scores on meaning in 
life questionnaires (Dulaney et al., 2019; Dulaney et al., 2021; Schlegel et al., 2012) in 
particular. 
Meaning in life implications have additionally emerged for true self-orientations 
in research examining true self-concept accessibility. Higher true self-concept 
accessibility has been demonstrated to repeatedly predict higher meaning in life scores 
(Schlegel et al., 2009), and subjective reports of how easily available true self-knowledge 
is have also been related to higher meaning in life when controlling for mood and self-
esteem (Schlegel et al., 2011). Relatedly, when assessing goal motivations, Zhang et al. 
(2018) found that even failed attempts to achieve a goal can be experienced as full of 
meaning if the goal in question is self-concordant. The implications of this emerging link 
between true self-orientations and meaning in life will be discussed in further detail in a 
following section. Prior to this, let us turn to consider the aptness of true self-orientations 
for serving well-being more directly. 
Digging Deep: How Might True Self-orientations Provide Strength and Resilience? 
In response to this converging evidence linking strong and accessible beliefs in a 
true self with psychological flourishing, one might wonder whether the true self as a 




Keeping in mind that the true self is most likely to be “evidence-insensitive” 
(Strohminger et al., 2017), empirically probing the true self’s supportive fitness must 
instead focus on asking whether true self-orientations can provide strength. In pursuing 
these questions, it is useful to first review what we know about how people regard the 
true self in everyday life given the subjective and personal nature of the true self. The 
connected literatures for research on authenticity and the self-concept have also revealed 
relevant patterns that will be informative to consider before focusing directly on possible 
active functions of true self-orientations. 
Indications Found Within Lay-beliefs 
Lay narratives hold the true self to be a valuable guide in times of trial and 
uncertainty by virtue of its unchanging nature. In such an essentialist vein of reasoning, 
possessing a stable core allows a person to remain intact, steady, and on-course in life’s 
tumultuous ocean. Participants repeatedly volunteer such narratives, reporting their belief 
that they look inside themselves for strength and guidance (Dulaney & Graupmann, 
2021a). 
Cross-cultural examinations have revealed the international prevalence of belief 
in the true self as this kind of support resource, referring to said beliefs as the “true-self-
as-guide” lay theory. Survey studies on this topic asked participants in the United States 
(Schlegel et al., 2013a) as well as in China, India, Singapore, and South Korea (Kim et 
al., 2018b, as cited in Rivera et al., 2019) to rate how useful various decision-making 
strategies were for resulting in satisfying decisions. In each country surveyed the true self 
was consistently rated as among the most valuable guides for decision-making. In the 




rated sources of guidance such as seeking information from others, intuition, religion, and 
rational processing (Rivera et al., 2019; Schlegel et al., 2013a). Participants in China, 
India, and South Korea rated the true self in the top three most useful resources for 
decision-making (Rivera et al., 2019). 
Feelings of Being Yourself: Considering Authenticity 
While remarkable in light of the societal and philosophical differences between 
these countries, worldwide cross-cultural belief in the true self as decision guide does not 
fully establish whether the true self can effectively serve this function in reality. That is, 
are these beliefs simply culturally-inherited narratives, or do people actively rely on their 
true self-orientations in moments of uncertainty? Findings within the companion 
literature on authenticity point to such a role. 
Kernis and Goldman’s (2006) influential article on the components of authenticity 
describe it as “the unobstructed operation of one’s true or core self in one’s daily 
enterprise” (p. 32). Heavily concordant with our discussion, it has been argued that 
psychological essentialism underpins each dimension of authenticity (Newman, 2019) 
and that an essentialist account of authenticity best explains the patterns revealed by 
research into authenticity (van Gerven et al., 2019). Researchers in this literature are 
currently striving to arrive at an adequate complete definition of authenticity considering 
its subjectivity and the difficulty in measuring the authenticity of a given action (Hicks et 
al., 2019; Jongman-Sereno & Leary, 2019), an endeavor that has thus far spanned 
multiple decades (Harter, 2002). Acknowledgements of true self-orientations laying at the 
root of authenticity theory have long surfaced in this debate, with Vannini and Franzese 




to understand authenticity, a researcher must then take into consideration at least two 
things: people’s emotional experiences of being true or untrue to one’s self and people’s 
ideas about what their true self is” (p. 1621). A simple working definition for our 
purposes can be taken from the published development of the most widely used self-
report scale of authenticity. Therein a “person-centered view” of authenticity is adopted 
and subsequently defined as being composed of a person’s feelings of their own self-
alienation, living consistently with their values and beliefs, and degree of acceptance of 
external influence (Wood et al., 2008). 
Relevant to evaluating the active benefits of true self-orientations, assessing the 
authenticity of oneself, a person, or an object has been argued to be achieved by 
evaluating the target’s match with a particular essence (Newman, 2016). As such, 
authenticity as a construct is debated due to its apparent requirement of the veridical 
account of the true self being accurate. A partial solution to this obstacle for authenticity 
research mirrors the recent acknowledgement that true self-orientations may be important 
for psychological health. In recent years, increased attention has focused on 
distinguishing between assessing a target’s veridical authenticity and the 
phenomenological experience of feeling authentic (Lenton et al., 2013). The terms 
“perceived authenticity” and “state authenticity” have gained popularity for referring to 
these felt experiences in order to specify the facet of authenticity under discussion. 
Considering that much of personal authenticity measurements have relied on self-





Making this distinction can perhaps facilitate measurement refinement, as some 
authenticity items are more relevant for representing in-the-moment authentic feelings 
(e.g., “I feel that I am doing the things that are right for me”, “I feel as if I don’t know 
myself very well”, Wood et al., 2008) than others (e.g., general behavior: “I always stand 
by what I believe in”, social preferences: “I dislike people who pretend to be what they 
are not”, daily affordances: “My daily behavior reflects ‘the real me’”, values: “I think it 
is better to be yourself, than to be popular”, Wood et al., 2008; ease of self-
understanding: “I find it very difficult to critically assess myself”, Kernis & Goldman, 
2006). In addition, perceived authenticity items need to clarify for participants whether 
they should respond about their in-the-moment feelings or opinions of their overall 
authenticity, since phrases like “I feel…” can be interpreted as asking about feeling states 
or simply as an alternate expression of “I think…”. It may be that phenomenological 
feelings of authenticity warrant dedicated scales or subscales to capture their unique 
contribution. Clearly highlighting the phenomenological component of assessing one’s 
own authenticity also furthers the whole field of authenticity research by prompting 
researchers to ask what the antecedents and benefits of the in-the-moment feeling of 
being authentic and true to oneself might be (Rivera et al., 2019; Sedikides et al., 2019; 
Sedikides et al., 2017). Solutions to puzzles about authenticity arise from this 
consideration. For example, adding to a robust heritage of research on behavior and trait 
mismatch (Mischel, 1968), people report feeling most authentic when acting in particular 
ways (e.g., more extraverted, more agreeable) even when these behaviors are inconsistent 
with their Big Five personality trait scores (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010). By directly 




define and measure) actual authenticity, we can now appreciate such conflicts in a 
person’s perceptions and behavior as providing us information about the antecedents of 
perceived authenticity. 
One could predict that, following the essentialist description of authenticity as the 
unobstructed operation of the true self and the acknowledged primacy of subjective 
experience and beliefs in the authenticity and true self constructs, a merging of the two 
lines of theory and research may be fast approaching. This represents a compelling case 
for using the research on perceived authenticity’s connection to well-being to enrich our 
review despite the inconsistent measurement of perceived authenticity already discussed. 
Paralleling the positive associations detected between true self-orientations and well-
being, a strong link has emerged between higher authenticity self-ratings and positive 
well-being outcomes (Bryan et al., 2017; Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Heppner et al., 2008; 
Ito et al., 2009; Ito & Kodama, 2007; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Liu & Perrewe, 2006; 
Ryan et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2008). The absence of authentic feelings shows the 
opposite associations with optimal functioning, with a longitudinal design suggesting a 
bidirectional relation between academic amotivation and feelings of self-alienation, a 
subscale of Wood et al.’s (2008) authenticity scale (Kim et al., 2018a). 
Perceived authenticity research also reveals relevant implications for the possible 
threat resilience and coping readiness of true self-orientations. In a daily diary study, after 
experiencing interpersonal conflicts, participants with higher authenticity did not report 
lower general well-being (Wickham et al., 2016). Participants higher in authenticity 
additionally have demonstrated lower tendency to distort the realities of threatening life 




reporting higher perceived authenticity experienced less loss of hope in the face of 
limited future time perspective manipulations (Davis & Hicks, 2013). Resonating with 
this, self-rated authenticity has been shown to be most strongly positively related to self-
esteem after limited future time manipulations, indicating that feelings of authenticity 
might serve a protective role against such a stressor (Davis et al., 2015). Longitudinal 
work has revealed self-reported levels of authenticity to predict later increased 
satisfaction with life and decreased feelings of distress (Boyraz et al., 2014). Separate 
longitudinal work has also found lower self-reports of living authentically to be 
associated with higher stress at a second timepoint when controlling for coping strategies 
(Maffly-Kipp et al., 2020). 
Strength in the Self-concept 
Encouraging support for a bolstering function true self-orientations also arises in 
another related literature focused on the self-concept broadly. Probes into understanding 
the self-concept in terms of its organization, complexity, and perceived clarity have 
yielded a few patterns that connect particular configurations of the self-concept with 
being well-positioned for threat coping and as such are relevant to highlight here. Studies 
have repeatedly found a more elaborate and multifaceted self-concept, referred to as self-
complexity, to be associated with better stress coping (Campbell et al., 1991; Dixon & 
Baumeister, 1991; Gramzow et al., 2000; Niedenthal et al., 1992; Rothermund & 
Meiniger, 2004), although a negative relationship between self-complexity and coping 
has occasionally been found by others (Brown & Rafaeli, 2007; Koch & Shepperd, 2004; 
Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). Importantly, it has been suggested that high self-




structure unifying the various facets of their self-concept (i.e., high self-concept 
differentiation, Donahue et al., 1993; Lutz & Ross, 2003). 
Paralleling this, coping implications have also been demonstrated for self-concept 
clarity, defined as having clear and confident definition, consistency, and stability in 
one’s perceived self-aspects. Higher self-concept clarity is related to better coping with a 
romantic breakup (Slotter et al., 2010) and bereavement (Boelen et al., 2012). Together, 
these findings suggest that a coherent self-concept, and the confidence with which one 
feels their self-concept to be stable and clearly-outlined, to be positively related to coping 
success. People higher in self-concept clarity have also been shown to be more likely to 
utilize information about themselves as a touchstone for guiding information-relevant 
behavior (Guadagno & Burger, 2007). These combined findings represent an encouraging 
sign that people with elaborated and certain self-concepts are both better able to cope 
with stress and access their self-knowledge in an actionable way. Perhaps most 
relevantly, participants experiencing a self-concept clarity threat reported higher tendency 
to reflect on their autobiographical pasts which in turn was marginally related to higher 
self-continuity, suggesting the ability to voluntarily use self-knowledge to regain self-
related stability (Jiang et al., 2020). I will now turn to address the possibility that true 
self-orientations can be similarly relied on for resilience directly.  
Re-centering Ourselves: Considering the True Self’s Functions 
Reviewing this collection of connected literatures elucidates a consistent pattern 
that feeling in touch with yourself and possessing a sense of self-understanding seems to 
be associated with better resilience, a pattern that is echoed in everyday narratives 




on the adaptive function of true self-orientations. To address how orienting to the true 
self might be useful for psychological flourishing, we should be clear about what it 
means to be useful in such a way. Psychological health could be most readily supported 
by fostering its growth or bolstering its defenses. 
Fostering Psychological Health 
The link between meaning in life and both self-essentialism and true self-concept 
accessibility, reviewed above, suggests a possible pathway by which these constructs 
might be useful in actively increasing psychological health. Given that meaning in life is 
considered a basic psychological need, if there existed a direct causal influence of self-
essentialism and true self-concept accessibility on increasing meaning in life this would 
demonstrate a strong case that particular orientations to the true self can benefit 
psychological health. Even prior to the detection of a link between self-essentialism and 
meaning in life, theorists suggested that believing in the true self grants an individual a 
personalized route to forming a framework of meaning structures, framing it poetically as 
a “wellspring of meaning” (Schlegel et al., 2013b, p. 180). Despite this compelling 
theoretical argument, it may be difficult to empirically establish a causal link of true self-
orientations facilitating meaning development due to the complex lifelong process of 
building a sense of meaning. 
If this causal hypothesis were true, this would at least partly explain meaning’s 
positive associations with both self-essentialism and true self-concept accessibility. This 
assertion also dovetails with the literatures on self-affirmation (Sherman & G. Cohen, 
2002; Sherman & G. Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) and meaning maintenance (Heine et al., 




domain, people are able to gain stability and defend the self by connecting with an 
unrelated central identity or group of values such as a meaning framework. Meaning’s 
buffering of stressor impact has been demonstrated repeatedly in adults (Appel, 2020; 
Krause et al., 2017; Larner & Blow, 2011; Park, 2010; Park, 2005; Park et al, 2008) and 
adolescents (Aviad-Wilchek & Ne’eman-Haviv, 2018; Dulaney et al., 2018). These 
findings suggest that, if beliefs, traits, and identities projected onto one’s idea of their true 
self can help them construct personal meaning frameworks, these true self-orientations 
may also indirectly protect psychological health from threats. 
Defending Psychological Health 
True self-orientations have also recently been linked with directly protecting 
psychological health. Psychological health might be at risk when a person encounters a 
threatening or uncertain situation that unbalances them, spurring them to restabilize and 
potentially seek decision guidance or coping support. In the case of seeking decision 
guidance, when called to make a major decision a person can feel uncertain, as discussed 
previously. If they subscribe to the true-self-as-guide lay theory, this person might seek 
connection with “who they really are” for direction. Insights from the qualitative 
responses mentioned suggest that at the very least this theory is ready-to-mind enough for 
people to endorse consulting their true selves when needing to make a decision or get in 
touch with their ‘core values’ for information (Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021a). The true 
self is consistently rated as a more important guide for satisfying decision-making than 
other strategies (Schlegel et al., 2013a). Selecting goals consistent with the true self has 
been shown to mediate the pathway to actual goal attainment among people high in self-




stronger belief in the true self as something a person discovers (i.e., an extant but 
undiscovered core nature) rather than creates for themselves (Schlegel et al., 2011). 
Further, using daily diary methods, perceived true self-knowledge has been shown to 
covary with decision satisfaction and manipulations of true self-knowledge or decision-
satisfaction have been shown to affect feelings of decision satisfaction or true self-
knowledge respectively (Schlegel et al., 2013a). While facsimile recreations of major life 
decisions are difficult to construct experimentally, Kim et al. (2021) have found positive 
correlations between true self-knowledge and decision satisfaction (Study 1) in addition 
to higher reported decision satisfaction among participants using the true-self-as-guide 
for decision-making than among those using other strategies (Studies 2 & 3). Taking 
these findings together, it appears that believing in a true self and having confidence in it 
as a decision guide might help a person select a problem-solving strategy for dealing with 
uncertainty. While compelling, clear conclusions are obfuscated by methodological 
limitations. In-lab decision-making generally employs smaller decision tasks, such as 
asking participants to choose between pairs of hypothetical occupations or plan their days 
(and actually follow their plans) using different possible guides (Kim et al., 2021), and it 
remains unclear whether the decision referents used in laboratories are appropriate for 
generalizing to reasoning about major real decisions. 
 In contrast with times of important decision making, a scenario in which a person 
might seek support and which lends itself better to being validly reproduced 
experimentally is the aforementioned threat-coping process. It can be very stressful for a 
person when they are caused to question their stability in important life arenas. In 




when facing threats to their worth (Heine et al., 1999; Sherman & G. Cohen, 2002; 
Sherman & G. Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988), moral character (Mulder & Aquino, 2013; 
Steele, 1988), basic psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Heine et al., 2006; 
Williams, 1997; Williams, 2001), sense of self-continuity (Sedikides et al., 2008), and 
social comparisons (Heine et al., 1999; Leonardelli et al., 2010) to form an extensive but 
non-exhaustive list. Depending on the nature of this threat, solutions might include 
reframing it, neutralizing it, or seeking a source of support to aid in coping with it; 
thereby regaining stability in each case. This presents another opening for true self-
orientations to possibly serve a protective function by way of helping to reinterpret and 
resolve these threats. Indeed, in the context of the personal upheaval associated with 
changes in the self over time, Bench et al. (2015) have proposed that taking an essential 
view of the true self as a stable unchanging core might help diffuse such threats to self-
continuity and foster a sense of coherence in one’s life-story. Such life story coherence 
has been shown to be linked to increased well-being (Baerger & McAdams, 1999). 
Dialectical Self-views: A Contrasting Case 
Promising evidence is emerging to suggest just such a role for true self-
orientations in buffering threats to psychological security. This evidence is thus far 
incomplete, representing an exciting prospect for new research to contribute to scientific 
knowledge. At this important juncture, it is appropriate to consider arguments for the 
benefits of taking flexible, permeable, and dialectical views of the self rather than our 
essentialist case of focus as a means of predicting important boundaries of self-




Multiple findings in the literature on dialectical self-views suggest that allowing 
for internal flexibility, evolution, and change is associated with better stressor reactions 
and outcomes. Dialectical self-views have been shown to moderate the process of coping 
with high betrayal traumas, an example of extreme stress, such that these views allowed 
trauma survivors to maintain their self-compassion and thereby experience less post-
traumatic stress (Boyraz et al., 2019). Further, dialectical self-beliefs have been shown to 
buffer the threat of evidence of incompatibilities between two of one’s most central 
identities (Rabinovich & Morton, 2016). In this research, only participants high in naïve 
self-dialecticism were spared from decreased well-being in the face of such evidence. 
Compellingly, Boyraz and colleagues (2019) discuss the coping aptness of both self-
essentialism and self-dialecticism: 
“compared to individuals who have a high need of maintaining stable and 
consistent self-perceptions, those with dialectical self-beliefs may feel less 
threatened and experience less disruption in their sense of self-coherence and self-
continuity when their self-perceptions are challenged by traumatic events. In 
addition, having a dialectical self-view may reduce maladaptive responses that 
can result from an inability to tolerate or integrate contradictions” (p. 3). 
In contrast, these researchers proposed that essentialist self-beliefs may limit 
trauma survivors’ ability to reframe their past experiences in efforts to generate self-
compassion because such flexibility is not allowed by portrayals of the self as 
unchanging (Boyraz et al., 2019). In my view, this is a compelling argument for the 
boundaries of the ability of self-essentialism to usefully serve a person under stress. 




hypotheses following from it, as well as including elements related to self-dialecticism in 
two of my planned studies. I will now discuss the theoretical case for these studies as 
situated in the larger literature on true self-orientations and their potential functions. 
Rationale 
The question of whether true self-orientations can help a person more effectively 
cope with and recover from a troubling threat, and what the limits of such a role might 
be, provides a potentially fruitful avenue for understanding true self-orientations’ utility. 
Lay narratives signal this role as a pillar of psychological stability. The directive that one 
should “dig deep” to push through times of hardship, confusion, or challenge—while 
possibly gesturing towards the inner strength or courage to be found in emotion 
regulation and grit—may also be a call to discover “what you’re made of”, to reveal 
“who you really are” (Dulaney et al., 2019; Rivera et al., 2019). Qualitative work reveals 
lay belief in such a role for true self-orientations in these sorts of uncertain moments. 
(Dulaney et al., 2021a). Among the central life arenas that can be threatened in order to 
test this function, there are compelling reasons to think true self-orientations would be 
most apt for assuaging threats to a person’s moral character. People are motivated to see 
themselves as moral (Miller & Effron, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001), and seek to 
maintain these self-views when confronted with evidence to the contrary by using 
counter-evidence to shore up their moral credentials (Effron, 2014). People also cope 
with self-threats by portraying themselves as more highly moral, a promising interlinking 
of self-threat coping and strengthening connection to one’s sense of morality (Jordan & 
Monin, 2008). Considering this motivated search to reassure and re-secure one’s moral 




good, a threat to one’s moral character may be precisely the type of destabilizing 
experience that can be effectively coped with by engaging the true self-concept. 
No efforts have directly tested the role of the true self in recovering from a threat 
to one’s moral character, however some relevant evidence has emerged. While not 
precisely targeting the questions at hand here, Baldwin et al. (2014, Study 6) found that 
among participants experiencing threats to their true selves (writing prompts about 
situations, experiences, and relationships that make it difficult or impossible to truly be 
themselves, p. 11), participants who were given the opportunity to reflect on a nostalgic 
personal memory did not experience decreased feelings subjective well-being and being 
able to express their true selves in response to the threat. Importantly, these authors 
proposed that nostalgia is capable of buffering threats to the true self-concept “by 
bringing to mind past experiences in which controlling and extrinsic influences on one’s 
self were (or are perceived to have been) minimal and that highlight one’s core and 
authentic traits” (p. 3) and that having these experiences and central traits in mind offers 
“a clear picture of the intrinsic and authentic self, which is then assimilated into the 
current self-concept” (p. 3). If this proposed mechanism were true, this work signifies 
that people can benefit from following pathways towards activation of their true self-
concepts and that this can help assuage direct true self-concept threats at least. While it 
would be important to know that people feel defensive of their true self-concepts and 
Baldwin and colleagues’ (2014) work is a step towards establishing this, our aims lay in 
tackling the broader task of evaluating true self-orientations as a self-affirming resource 




Closer to our line of inquiry, experimentally activating the true self-concept 
before giving participants intelligence test failure experiences or asking them to describe 
a time when they hurt someone’s feelings led to decreased shame (an emotion arising 
from global devaluations of the self) in response to these unpleasant tasks, while these 
participants remained free to experience guilt (negative evaluations of the provoking 
behavior, Vess et al., 2014). Feelings of shame are not themselves a metric of well-being, 
they are related to variables with implications for well-being such as psychological 
distress (Velotti et al., 2017). Further, while the authors do not report on qualitative 
themes contained in participants’ descriptions of their past experiences with hurting 
another’s feelings, it is plausible that many of these guilt- and shame-evoking 
experiences had an element of being morally unseemly. It is also useful to again recall 
Christy and colleagues’ (2016) findings that evidence of our own immorality leads us to 
feel more alienated from and less aware of who we really are as measured by the self-
alienation and awareness subscales of Wood et al.’s (2008) Authenticity Scale. Together, 
these research lines indicate that true self-orientations can dampen the emotional impact 
of troubling personally relevant feedback, and that threats to moral character affect 
people in a way that activates their concept of the self. The time is thus appropriate to test 
the extent to which activating a person’s particular orientations to having a true self might 
partly determine threat response trajectories. As discussed, threats to one’s moral 
character seem to be highly relevant stressors for testing the utility of the true self as a 
defense resource in many regards. This gap in the literature represents a promising 
opportunity for making progress in understanding the connection between true self-




The Current Research  
In the research outlined here I endeavor to assess across two studies how true self-
orientations might aid the coping response process among participants facing threats to 
their moral character. I will now introduce my theoretical foundations before presenting 
the research to follow. 
Theoretical Framework 
Herein I use a specific theoretical framework, gathering from psychology, 
philosophy, and lay ideas, in constructing hypothesized outcomes for both studies. I 
theorize that true self-orientations allow an individual to maintain a sense of core stability 
during times of moderate stress because, while one’s environment and circumstances may 
feel disorienting and chaotic, a strong sense of true self provides a plausible route to feel 
that there is an organization underlying the confusion and be confident in the worth of the 
“real me” despite the moment’s discouraging challenges. In this way, true self-
orientations can act as a self-theory for explaining our experiences to ourselves and 
remaining secure in our self-narratives. Times of extreme conflict and stress, by contrast, 
may be so threatening or confusing as to challenge the applicability of the true self theory 
or challenge the integrity of the true self-concept as a whole. In these times I predict 
strong belief in the true self to be less effective in coping with the stressors at hand, and 
perhaps even burdensomely rigid, preventing one from finding creative and pragmatic 
alternative solutions. This idea has been poetically described by eminent Heideggerian 
philosopher McNeill in his analysis of Heidegger’s 1939 lecture course regarding his own 
contemplations of Nietzsche. In McNeill’s (2006) interpretation, the convergent 




and schematizer of the world, as a wave in the river of chaos that assaults our 
comprehension at all times but from which we originate and in which we are constantly 
re-constituted. McNeill writes: 
Withstanding the excessive force of chaos, coming to stand fast in it, being 
propelled toward stability and steadfastness—this is nothing alien to life, notes 
Heidegger, but corresponds to the very essence of bodying life. It is the way in 
which a living body, rising like a wave, perhaps, first emerges, comes to a stand, 
stabilizes and establishes itself—erects itself. Not in such a way as to oppose life, 
but in a way ‘suited to its nature,’ as Heidegger just expressed it—namely, to the 
nature of life as the torrential urge of streaming chaos (p. 159). 
We can think of the self, which is capable of believing it contains a true self at its core, as 
holding onto and applying its true self theories to help it maintain its structural integrity 
in the face of stressful threats, to metaphorically stand and assert itself briefly as a wave 
and force the assimilation of the chaos it confronts into its own shapes and schemas. If 
the stressors or conflicts confronted are large or powerful enough, the fragile wave-like 
true self theory will collapse and instead be accommodated into the larger river.  
The idea that a true self theory might be beneficial for moderate stressor coping 
but less effectual or deleterious in the face of extreme challenge mirrors Proulx and 
Inzlicht’s (2012) description of the process in which a person might seek to assimilate or 
accommodate a threat to their meaning structures. Applying Piaget’s (2000) theory of 
cognitive development to responses to meaning threats they write, “(meaning-
threatening) experiences that are inconsistent with our schemata will arouse a sense of 




matches our schemata, or an accommodation of our schemata so that they account for the 
experience” (p. 325). Dovetailing with Schlegel and colleagues’ (2013b) assertion that 
the true self is a personalized meaning framework, I theorize that the true self-concept is 
precisely such a meaning-making schema that can assimilate but sometimes must 
accommodate stimuli. 
Research on the true self-orientations have largely focused on the prevalence, 
content, and benefits of beliefs in the true self. In line with my theoretical framework, the 
cross-cultural psychology literature complements the examinations of true self-
orientations by providing support for the prediction that rigid essentialist true self beliefs 
will fail to provide support in the face of high stress. In these instances, dialectical self-
views may be more appropriate for facilitating accommodation of troubling information 
or experiences. In instances of moderate stress, self-essentialism may be most useful for 
addressing the threat. In the sequence of research studies outlined below, I attempt to 
bring into concert the coping predictions that have arisen from the research literatures on 
true self-orientations and dialectical self-views by investigating true self-orientations as 
coping supports at different degrees of personal morality threat extremity, in other words 
exploring the boundary conditions of belief in the true self as an anchor in rocky seas. 
Outline of Studies 
To test the aptness of true self-orientations as a coping support in response to 
moral character threat, first I examined baseline self-essentialism beliefs as a potential 
moderator of coping success in response to personal morality threat (Study 1). I then 
tested the extent to which people, when under personal morality threat, sought stability 




success (Study 2). To test my theoretical framework, personal morality threat was 
manipulated experimentally and took on low, moderate, or high threat levels. Given the 
intertwining of moral beliefs and true self-orientations, I hypothesized that true self-
orientations would emerge as helpful at moderate levels of threat and less-so at high 
levels of threat. A figure accompanies hypotheses, described in turn below, to illustrate 
how this theoretical framework was predicted to apply to the specifics of each design. 
Study 1 
As a first step towards understanding how baseline, latent true self-orientations 
might relate to threat response processes and trajectories, this study assessed self-
essentialism as a moderator of self-reported well-being following a morality threat 
exposure. 
Hypothesis I 
I predicted there would emerge an interaction of threat level and self-essentialism 
predictors, such that self-essentialism would help buffer the impact of moderate personal 
morality threat on measured well-being outcome variables. To investigate this prediction, 
separate moderated regression analyses were performed to probe the main effect of threat 
level and self-essentialism as well as a possible two-way interaction between threat level 
and self-essentialism in predicting meaning, meaning searching, each psychological need 
fulfillment subscale, satisfaction with life, and subjective vitality. As threat level is a 
categorical variable, dummy coding was employed with participants in the low morality 
threat group as the reference group. A follow-up simple slopes analysis was planned 




significant predictor of a given outcome variable. The predictions outlined have been 
visualized graphically, see Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
Hypothesized Pattern of Well-being Outcomes for Study 1, Using Self-essentialism and 
Morality Threat Level as Predictors 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through DePaul University’s Sona online platform 
which displayed its recruitment posting to students in the Introductory Psychology 
Subject Pool, showed a brief description of the study, and allowed students to register for 
a participation slot in exchange for the standard amount of course credit. Recruitment 
yielded a total N of 153 participants. Following noncompliance and manipulation 
screening discussed in Study 1’s Analyses and Results section, I arrived at a final 






















ideology (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) M = 5.09, SD = 1.46; religiosity 
(1 = not religious at all to 7 = very religious) M = 3.35, SD = 1.87; 0.7% Arab, 8.7% 
Asian, 0.7% Asian and Black, 1.4% Asian and White, 9.4% Black, 1.4% Black and 
Latino/a, 2.8% Black and White, 0.7% Jewish, 21.7% Latino/a, 1.4% Latino/a and White, 
2.1% Middle Eastern, 0.7% North African, 0.7% Pacific Islander, 46.4% White, 0.7% 
White, Black, & Native).  
Procedure 
Upon a participant’s registration to take part in the research, they were provided 
with a link to an external Qualtrics survey containing the tasks and measures contained in 
this study. As the link’s viability would not expire until the conclusion of the research but 
would allow only a single use per participant, participants were advised to use the link at 
a time when they had an uninterrupted space of time to completely finish the study. Once 
a participant used the link, they were greeted with the first page of the study presenting a 
general outline of the associated research topics, risks, and benefits; and asked them to 
indicate their willingness to take part in the study by advancing to the next page as 
opposed to closing the browser window. Participants were asked on this page to minimize 
distractions and silence their electronic devices. 
On the following survey pages, participants responded on self-essentialism items. 
At this point, they were each randomly assigned to one of three levels of a personal 
morality false feedback threat manipulation, followed by another series of self-report 
measures targeting satisfaction with life, psychological need satisfaction, subjective 
vitality, and demographic items. The study then concluded by debriefing them and 




Morality Threat Manipulation. Participants completed a series of 40 items 
asking them to report their frequency of performing specific moral (20 items) and 
immoral behaviors (20 items) in the past. Afterwards, they received false feedback about 
their performance with regards to their peers. This manipulation was inspired by one 
employed by Christy et al. (2016), in which participants were sorted into three conditions, 
such that one condition involved them endorsing 20 moral, 20 nonmoral, or 20 immoral 
modified items from the Conventional Morality Scale (Tooke & Ickes, 1988), the 
Moralization of Everyday Life Scale (Lovett et al., 2012), and the Aggression 
Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992). In this present study, participants answered all 40 
randomized moral and immoral items to ensure the false morality feedback received has 
the highest chance of being believed due to the length of the list and different response 
patterns that could be plausibly judged at a certain level of morality (e.g., an immoral 
grade could be plausibly created by either high endorsement of immoral behaviors or low 
endorsement of moral behaviors). Also, for the sake of believability I expanded the 
original 2-point response scale, including “I have not done this” and “I have done this”, 
to instead read “I have not done this”, “I have done this on occasion”, “I have done this 
often”, and “I have done this very often.” Participant response patterns were planned for 
comparing against their condition to detect any drastic variation of scores from condition. 
Nonmoral items were omitted as they all referred to grocery shopping behaviors and 
would be out of place when interspersed with immoral and moral behavior items. 
Although the items’ prompt asks the frequency with which the participant has performed 




taken on some degree of moral valence in participants’ mid-pandemic context at the time 
of study data collection. 
As in Christy et al. (2016), albeit modifying the false feedback slightly, 
participants were provided with a mock “visual representation” of their supposed 
personal position among the range of scores obtained by all participants. Participants 
were randomly assigned to receive false feedback that was either low in personal 
morality threat severity: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this 
study, you scored in the 90th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher 
on moral qualities than 90% of DePaul students”; moderate in personal morality threat 
severity: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study, you scored 
in the 45th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities 
than 55% of DePaul students”; or high in personal morality threat severity: “Compared to 
the other students who have participated in this study, you scored in the 15th percentile of 
behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities than 85% of DePaul 
students.” The corresponding visual representation of their position appeared below the 
feedback statement the participant received. 
Measures 
 Funnel Debriefing. To allow for checking the manipulation’s success and 
detecting participant suspicion regarding the nature of the false feedback, immediately 
prior to the true debriefing survey page participants proceeded through a funnel 
debriefing sequence. This component consisted of seven pages, each containing one free-
response question probing participants’ thoughts about the study, progressively 




questions proceeded as so: “Do you have any initial thoughts or reactions about this 
study?”, “Did you notice anything unusual in the study? If so, what?”, “Did you notice 
anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors questionnaire?”, “Why do 
you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire?”, “What do 
you remember your morality score being?”, “Do you think your morality score was 
accurate?”, and “To what extent did you believe the feedback of your morality score 
relative to all other participants?”. 
Meaning in Life. Meaning in life was assessed using the ten-item Meaning in 
Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger et al., 2006). Sample items of the MLQ include “I have 
a good sense of what makes my life meaningful” (Presence of Meaning subscale) and “I 
am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful” (Search for Meaning 
subscale). The MLQ uses a seven-point scale (-3 = Completely Untrue to 
+3 = Completely True), and internal reliability for the Presence of Meaning subscale in 
the original publication was very good (Cronbach’s  = .82, .86, & .86) across three 
studies, as was the internal reliability for the Search for Meaning subscale ( = .86, .87, 
& .87). 
 Psychological Need Fulfillment. Fulfillment of four basic psychological needs; 
self-esteem needs fulfillment, meaning needs fulfillment, control needs fulfillment, and 
belonging needs fulfillment; were assessed using 20 items developed by Zadro et al. 
(2004). Sample items include (self-esteem; original publication  = .70 – .76) “I feel 
good about myself”, (meaning;  = .66 – .69) “I feel meaningless”, (control; 




 = .71 – .74) “I feel I belong”. These questions use a five-point scale (1 = Not At All to 
5 = Extremely). 
 Satisfaction with Life. To capture their satisfaction with life, participants 
completed the five-item Satisfaction with Life questionnaire (e.g., “If I could live my life 
over, I would change almost nothing”, “I am satisfied with my life”; Diener et al., 1985). 
This questionnaire uses a seven-point Likert-type scale (-3 = Disagree Completely to 
+3 = Agree Completely). Internal reliability in the original publication was very good 
( = .87). 
 Self-essentialism. Self-essentialism was measured using an adapted version of 
Bastian and Haslam’s (2008) Essentialism Scale. The modifications; first outlined in 
Dulaney et al., (2019); include five items not in the original Essentialism Scale as well as 
altered language to refer to participants’ own selves. This self-essentialism measure 
contains 20 items using a seven-point Likert-type scale (-3 = Disagree Completely to 
+3 = Agree Completely) and is comprised of three subscales (for full discussion of 
measure factor structure and comparisons with the Essentialism Scale’s factor structure, 
see Dulaney et al., 2019). The 11-item Self Entitativity subscale measures belief that the 
participant’s true self exists and has defined, stable boundaries (e.g., “I have a true self”, 
“I am either a certain type of person or I am not”). The four-item Biological Basis 
subscale measures belief that the participant’s true self is determined by their personal 
genetic makeup (e.g., “Whether I am one kind of person or another is determined by my 
biological make-up”, “There are different types of people and with enough scientific 
knowledge the ‘type’ of person I am can be traced back to genetic causes”). The five-item 




in determining their behavior, and that knowledge about their true self can be used to 
predict their future behavior (e.g., “It is possible to know about many aspects of me once 
you become familiar with a few of my basic traits”, “When getting to know me it is 
possible to get a picture of the kind of person I am very quickly”). Internal consistency 
for the overall measure in the original study was very good ( = .88 MTurk sample; 
 = .85 student sample), was very good for the Self Entitativity subscale (MTurk: 
 = 0.85; students:  = 0.83), was excellent for the Biological Basis subscale (MTurk: 
 = 0.93; students:  = 0.89), and was good for the Informativeness subscale (MTurk: 
 = 0.82; students:  = 0.75; Dulaney et al., 2019).  Higher scores represent stronger 
endorsement of self-essentialism beliefs. 
Subjective Vitality. Subjective vitality was assessed using items from the seven-
item Subjective Vitality Scale (Ryan & Frederick, 1997). Example items include “I feel 
alive and vital”; “I don’t feel very energetic” ( = .84, .84, & .86; 1 = Not At All True, 
7 = Very True). 
Analyses and Results 
Assessment for Response-Level Noncompliance 
Each participant record was checked to identify participant noncompliance. For 
example, participants who chose the same response option for every item on a measure 
containing reverse-scored items would have their item responses deleted for said measure 
as this indicates an unengaged participant. Data from participants who did not complete a 
substantial amount of the questionnaire (e.g., multiple entire measures not completed) 
would also not have been used, but this behavior did not occur. Non-extreme cases, such 




qualification and usage in pairwise analyses. Two participants were eliminated from 
analyses entirely for submitting scale responses in runs of the same digit within each 
measure, with the exception of one of said participants providing varying data for the 
satisfaction with life and subjective vitality questions. Each of these participants 
submitted responses in runs for standard- and reverse-scored items alike, and took 
between two-and one-half minutes and four-and-one-half minutes to submit their full 
survey answers. A further four participants showed similar, but less egregious, study 
noncompliance involving answering one or more variables in sequences of runs of a 
single digit. Commonly this digit was the corresponding scale’s neutral point (e.g., 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree), indicating fence-sitting. In these cases, the participants 
were removed from both scale-level analyses, such as when computing bivariate 
correlations, or item-level analyses, such as when computing internal reliability estimates 
or performing factor analyses to assess subscale structure, for the affected variables. 
Overview of Main Data Analysis 
At the conclusion of this screening for noncompliance, I then thoroughly 
evaluated the efficacy of the morality threat manipulation. I did this by screening 
participants’ funnel debriefing scores for signs of suspicion, and also by comparing 
participants’ moral behavior item endorsement to detect anyone who was an obvious 
mismatch to their assigned threat condition, detailed below. Once this screening was 
complete, I built all Study 1 continuous scale means using scale and subscale 
construction driven by factor analysis results. Upon scale construction I calculated 




post-hoc sensitivity analysis decision criteria for evaluating detected effect sizes. Finally, 
I proceed with the main analyses for investigating the predictions under Hypothesis I. 
Manipulation Check: Morality Threat Naivete and Fit 
 Assessing responses to the sequential funnel debriefing required balancing 
between being overly-permissive and overly-restrictive in which answers signaled 
removal from analyses. For instance, by the nature of the funnel debriefing’s increasing 
emphasis on the morality questionnaire, many participants likely realized the 
manipulation for the first time while answering said questions. An example of a likely 
occurrence of this was an answer given to the fourth question in the sequence “Why do 
you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire?” by a 
participant who was in the highest threat condition and mentioned no suspicion in the 
three prior questions in the funnel debriefing, “A possible guess is to influence or see how 
it could affect my future answers.” While this participant might be screened out under the 
strictest guidelines to remove the chance that they had this realization prior to being 
questioned, such an approach would also be likely to screen out participants from the 
threatening conditions due to the intended surprise associated with these experiences. I 
approached screening for manipulation suspicion with the plan to consider participants 
who reported suspicion within the first three questions, as this would be a good sign of 
their having had the realization during the study, and as the third question explicitly gives 
them the opportunity to comment on the morality questionnaire experience. Later 
answers would also be assessed for content that could reinforce earlier vague mention of 
suspicion, particularly when these later answers involved participants’ strong claims of 




retained in the dataset following noncompliance screening, a further thirteen participants 
were excluded from analyses after manipulation check screening. Five of these 
participants reported problems viewing the morality score graphic and were removed due 
to the risk of this complicating the manipulation’s impact for them. The remaining nine 
participants volunteered thoughts of suspicion early in the debriefing, with statements 
such as imagining researchers’ likely goals: “I think it was about showing you if you had 
bad morals and seeing how you felt about yourself after” (response to funnel question 
#1), and questioning the accuracy of the results: “I feel like the morality histogram was a 
random thing not based on anything I actually picked” (response to funnel question #2). 
Remaining participants’ morality questionnaire responses were then compared 
against their condition to ensure no analysis retention for participants whose condition 
was impossible. As an extreme hypothetical for illustration, had a participant sorted into 
the highest threat condition not endorsed having done any of the twenty immoral 
behaviors, and had endorsed the highest rate of performing all twenty moral behaviors, 
mathematically they could not be rated below any single other participant on morality, 
much less 90% of all other participants. No such impossible matches to condition 
occurred. As a result, the manipulation screening process yielded a final overall N of 138, 
with a by-condition N distribution of 49 participants in the low threat condition, 44 
participants in the moderate threat condition, and 45 participants in the high threat 
condition. 
Scale Construction 
 To ensure confidence in scale construction as regards appropriate factor structure 




confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were employed for all measures using the following 
analytic plan. Should any measure have demonstrated poor fit, evidenced by a 
comparative fit index (CFI) of < .90, a Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) of < .90, a root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) of > .08, and a significant chi-square test with 
large test value far from zero, a follow-up exploratory factor analysis (EFA) would be 
employed in pursuit of obtaining scales with the best factor structure possible. Such an 
EFA would be performed using principal axis factoring with a direct oblimin rotation 
with a default delta value of zero, retaining Eigenvalues greater than one, with the goal of 
a solution with coherent simple structure that explained at least 50% total between-item 
variance and fair factor item loadings of > .40 (Comrey & Lee, 1992). Should multiple 
factor solutions explain more than 50% total between-item variance, item factor loadings 
would be scrutinized for optimal simple structure. Additional solution confidence would 
be lent by Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity emerging as significant and the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) score of ideally reaching .90 but accepted 
at > .70 (< .60 = “unacceptable”, >.70 = “middling”, > .80 = “meritorious”, > 
.90 = “marvelous”; Kaiser, 1974, p. 35). 
 Confirmatory Factor Analyses. 
 Meaning in Life. Confirmatory factor analysis of the MLQ items, with five 
Presence of Meaning items and five Search for Meaning items, indicated fairly good fit 
(CFI = .92, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .11, RMSEA 90% CI [.087, .142], χ2 = 95.2, df = 34, 
p < .001). As the RMSEA value was higher than ideal, and the chi-square test was 
significant, an EFA was performed to understand whether stronger evidence would 




of the MLQ, as shown in Appendix Table A1, with Bartlett’s test being significant 
(χ2 = 789.63, df = 45, p < .001) and a KMO score =.84. As such, the outcome variable 
meaning was built using all Presence of Meaning subscale items, and the outcome 
variable meaning searching was built using all Search for Meaning subscale items. 
Reliability for the meaning items was very good (α = .90; McDonald’s ω = .91), and was 
good for the meaning searching items (α = .87; ω = .87). 
 Satisfaction with Life. Satisfaction with life items were tested for the degree to 
which all five items were represented appropriately by a single factor, which the CFA 
strongly supported (CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .066, RMSEA CI [.00, .148], 
χ2 = 8.00, df = 5, p = .16). No follow-up EFA was thus deemed necessary and the 
expected configuration was retained for constructing satisfaction with life outcome 
variable scale means. Reliability among satisfaction with life items was very good 
(α = .89; ω = .90). 
 Subjective Vitality. The single-factor configuration of subjective vitality items 
gained fair support for a good fit with the data (CFI = .92, TLI = .87, RMSEA = .15, 
RMSEA 90% CI [.11, .19], χ2 = 57.6, df = 14, p < .001). As with the MLQ’s factor 
structure, a follow-up EFA strongly supported subjective vitality items’ single-factor 
structure as shown in Appendix Table A2, Bartlett’s test emerging as significant 
(χ2 = 522.22, df = 21, p < .001) and KMO = .88. It may be that indications of good model 
fit in the MLQ’s and Subjective Vitality Scale’s corresponding CFAs responded to the 
presence of a reverse-scored item, of which both the MLQ and the Subjective Vitality 




Subjective Vitality Scale items. Subjective vitality items shared very good assessments of 
internal reliability (α = .90; ω = .90). 
 Exploratory Factor Analyses.  
 Psychological Need Fulfillment. The CFA performed on Psychological Need 
Fulfillment items to assess the presence of the four basic needs subscales indicated poor 
fit with the tested structure (CFI = .72, TLI = .67, RMSEA = .14, RMSEA 90% CI 
[.13, .15], χ2 = 628, df = 164, p < .001). Displayed in Table 1, the EFA yielded a 
four-factor solution with coherent simple structure. Bartlett’s test emerged as significant 
(χ2 = 1598.88, df = 190, p < .001) and KMO = .89. 
Table 1 
Psychological Need Fulfillment Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory 
Factor Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 1 
 Factor 
I II III IV 
Item 
(B5) I feel positive 
acknowledgement. 
.57 .21 .14 .18 
(SE5) I feel satisfied. .48 .10 .31 .14 
(B4) I feel I belong. .46 .18 .27 .14 
(SE3) I feel liked. .44 .25 .25 .20 
(M1) I feel invisible. 
(reversed) 
.08 .86 .01 -.10 
(M3) I feel non-
existent. (reversed) 
.03 .82 -.03 -.03 
(M2) I feel 
meaningless. (reversed) 
.13 .80 -.04 -.01 
(B2) I feel rejected. 
(reversed) 




(B3) I feel like an 
outsider. (reversed) 
.08 .74 .04 .03 
(B1) I feel 
“disconnected". 
(reversed) 
.07 .61 .04 .15 
(C4) I feel unable to 
influence the actions of 
others. (reversed) 
-.10 .39 -.01 -.00 
(C3) I feel I have the 
ability to determine my 
actions. 
-.06 -.01 .79 -.03 
(C2) I feel I have 
control over the current 
situation. 
.09 -.03 .69 .04 
(C1) I feel powerful. .05 -.09 .63 .31 
(M5) I feel useful. .35 .16 .53 -.03 
(M4) I feel important. .27 -.03 .50 .27 
(C5) I feel other people 
decide on the events in 
my life. (reversed) 
-.32 .30 .38 -.01 
(SE2) My self-esteem 
is high. 
.01 -.07 .08 .90 
(SE1) I feel good about 
myself. 
.29 .04 -.07 .77 
(SE4) I feel insecure. 
(reversed) 
-.28 .27 .08 .58 
     
Factor Correlations     
I 8.52(40.75%)    
II          .07 2.59(11.02%)   
III          .28  .46 1.24(4.04%)  
IV .33  .40 .52 1.10(3.81%) 
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and 
by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are 
emphasized in bold. (B) = Belonging Need Fulfillment Subscale; (SE) = Self-esteem 




(C) = Control Need Fulfillment Subscale, with corresponding original subscale 
number. Solution converged after 37 iterations. 
Factor I, termed “Comfort Fulfillment,” seems to represent feelings of overall 
good social standing, acceptance, and simple contentment. Factor II, termed “Meaning 
Fulfillment,” strongly consisted of themes pertaining to feelings of nothingness, such that 
these items asked people to endorse feeling invisible, non-existent, and ignored. This 
naming was chosen not only because this factor contained items originally designed to 
capture fulfillment of meaning needs, but also because it appears that as entire group the 
items loading on Factor II may capture variation on feelings of “mattering”, a theorized 
third component of meaning in life not assessed by the MLQ (George & Park, 2016). A 
point of caution lays in the observation that the Meaning Fulfillment factor contained 
only negatively-worded items and all but two of the total psychological need fulfillment 
items—suggesting the possibility that negatively-worded items tended to hang 
together—however the conceptual coherence of the Meaning Fulfillment items as well as 
the loading of two negatively-worded items onto other factors strengthens confidence in 
this factor structure being thematically significant. Factor III, termed “Control 
Fulfillment,” contains items assessing participants’ feelings of efficacy and ability to 
enact their desires with agency. Finally, Factor IV, termed “Self-esteem Fulfillment,” 
contains items specifically targeting participants’ self-esteem directly. Internal reliability 
among all psychological need fulfillment items was very good (α = .93; ω = .93) and was 
good-to-very good for its subscales (Comfort Fulfillment α = .86; ω = .86; Self-esteem 
Fulfillment α = .82; ω = .84; Meaning Fulfillment α = .89; ω = .89; Control Fulfillment 




 Self-essentialism. The initial CFA of self-essentialism items signified poor fit 
(CFI = .78, TLI = .75, RMSEA = .10, RMSEA 90% CI [.09, .12], χ2 = 416, df = 167, 
p < .001), and thus a follow-up EFA was performed. 
 The EFA, unconstrained in number of factors and allowed to iterate based on 
achieving Eigenvalues greater than one, produced a six-factor solution. Scrutinizing the 
solution revealed that items on Factors V and VI—which combined together explained 
5.7% of the total variance—also loaded well on another factor within Factors I–IV, which 
explained a combined 52.87% of the total variance. Further, assigning those items to 
Factors I–IV yielded more conceptually coherent simple structure. The four-factor 
solution was supported by a significant Bartlett’s test result (χ2 = 1177.01, df = 190, 
p < .001) and meritorious KMO = .80. Pattern matrix loadings of this solution when 
constrained to four factors are displayed in Table 2. Pattern loadings of the initial six-
factor solution can be found in Appendix Table A3. 
Table 2 
 
Self-essentialism Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor 
Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 1 
 Factor 
I II III IV 
Item 
(E3) I am either a 
certain type of person 
or I am not. 
.88 -.04 -.07 -.10 
(E5) The kind of 
person I am is clearly 
defined, I either am a 
certain kind of person 
or I am not. 
.83 .01 .03 .11 
(E2) I either have a 
certain attribute or I do 
not. 




(E4) There are certain 
‘types’ of people and 
the ‘type’ of person I 
am can be easily 
defined. 
.61 -.08 -.06 .29 
(E6) I have a distinct 
personality type. 
.49 .13 .22 .11 
(E1) The boundaries 
that define the 
differences between 
myself and others are 
clear-cut. 
.32 .04 -.04 -.03 
(E18) I have a true self 
even if I don’t always 
act in accordance with 
it. 
-.03 .79 -.11 -.11 
(E16) I have a true self. .04 .76 -.03 -.11 
(E17) Even if parts of 
me change over time, 
who I really am deep 
down stays the same. 
.01 .68 -.07 .06 
(E20) My actions are 
guided by who I really 
am deep down. 
.11 .47 -.01 .22 
(BB14) With enough 
scientific knowledge, 
the basic qualities that I 
have could be traced 
back to, and explained 
by, my biological 
make-up. 
-.02 -.02 -.90 .00 
(BB13) Whether I am 
one kind of person or 
another is determined 
by my biological make-
up. 
.11 .06 -.84 -.09 
(BB15) The kind of 
person I am can be 
largely attributed to my 
genetic inheritance. 




(BB12) There are 
different types of 
people and with enough 
scientific knowledge 
the ‘type’ of person I 
am can be traced back 
to genetic causes. 
.09 .07 -.67 .11 
(E19) The person I am 
deep down changes 
from situation to 
situation. (reversed) 
-.04 .22 .23 -.05 
(I8) It is possible to 
know about many 
aspects of me once you 
become familiar with a 
few of my basic traits. 
.03 .07 -.09 .79 
(I10) Knowing about a 
few of the basic traits 
that I have can lead to 
accurate predictions of 
my future behavior. 
.00 .09 -.09 .78 
(I9) When getting to 
know me it is possible 
to get a picture of the 
kind of person I am 
very quickly. 
.05 .11 -.10 .69 
(I7) Generally 
speaking, once you 
know me in one or two 
contexts it is possible 
to predict how I will 
behave in most other 
contexts. 
.06 -.05 .09 .68 
(I11) Although I may 
have some basic 
identifiable traits, it is 
never easy to make 
accurate judgments 
about how I will 
behave in different 
situations. (reversed) 
-.04 -.10 .01 .33 
     
Factor Correlations     




II .24 2.56(10.70%)   
III -.26 -.05 2.32(9.61%)  
IV .35 -.01 -.20 1.77(6.78%) 
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and 
by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are 
emphasized in bold. (E) = Self Entitativity Subscale, (BB) = Biological Basis subscale, 
and (I) = Informativeness Subscale with corresponding original scale number in 
parentheses. Solution converged after 8 iterations. 
The factor solution supported building Biological Basis (III) and Informativeness 
(IV) subscales as planned, and item I11’s lower-than-desired loading on the 
Informativeness factor is consistent with past work (Dulaney et al., 2019) where it also 
demonstrated slightly lower Informativeness loading which was attributed to the reverse-
scoring of the item. Its inclusion in the Informativeness factor was further bolstered by its 
absence of loading on any other factor. The factor solution supported splitting the original 
Self Entitativity factor into two, Person Kind (I) and True Self (II), which consisted of 
modified items belonging to the analogous factor of Bastian and Haslam’s (2008) 
Essentialism Scale and four of the five items written for measuring self-essentialism 
directly (Dulaney et al., 2019). The reverse scored item (E19) loaded weakly onto the 
True Self factor, and caused internal reliability to suffer, so it was excluded from 
computing True Self subscale scores. Scores for all other subscales were computed as 
described. Overall reliability among all self-essentialism items was good (α = .83; 
ω = .84), and was also good for its detected subscales (Person Kind α = .83; ω = .84; 
Biological Basis α = .88; ω = .88; Informativeness α = .80; ω = .81; True Self α = .78; 




While interpretation of differences between this factor solution and past findings 
is limited by the sub-optimal 6.9:1 participant-to-item ratio in Study 1, comparing the 
themes covered in Person Kind items and True Self items suggests that people make a 
meaningful distinction between person/personality types and true selves outright. It may 
be that the existence of “types of people” is conceptualized in lay understanding by self-
essentialists as another consequence to the existence of true selves, a potentially fruitful 
area for further exploration.  
Initial Analyses 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for all continuous variables measured, as 
reported in Table 3. In addition, Table 4 displays by-condition descriptives to serve as 
companion referents for informing regression findings. No cases of outlier concern were 
identified for removal. To begin understanding how measured variables related to one-
another in this study, bivariate correlations were calculated and are displayed for all 













Descriptive Statistics for All Study 1 Variables; Overall 
 M(SD) Listwise N 
Self-essentialism 4.46(0.70) 130 
Meaning 4.44(1.45) 135 
Meaning Searching 5.25(1.15) 130 
Psych. Need Fulfillment 3.40(0.73) 128 
Comfort Fulfillment 3.22(0.87) 135 
Meaning Fulfillment 3.75(0.92) 132 
Control Fulfillment 3.27(0.82) 135 
Self-esteem Fulfillment 3.06(1.01) 135 
Satisfaction with Life 4.28(1.45) 132 
Subjective Vitality 4.38(1.27) 129 
Person Kind 4.66(1.07) 134 
True Self 5.41(0.98) 136 
Biological Basis 3.60(1.24) 133 




Descriptive Statistics for All Study 1 Variables; by Threat (Low, Moderate, High) 
 Low Moderate High 
Self-essentialism 4.17(0.63); 44 4.65(0.73); 44 4.58(0.66); 42 
Meaning 4.10(1.45); 47 4.56(1.45); 44 4.68(1.42); 44 
Meaning Searching 5.28(1.26); 47 5.33(0.94); 43 5.13(1.24); 40 
Psych. Need Fulfillment 3.34(0.84); 47 3.55(0.70); 43 3.32(0.61); 38 
Comfort Fulfillment 3.11(0.89); 48 3.41(0.90); 44 3.13(0.79); 43 
Meaning Fulfillment 3.64(1.01); 48 3.80(0.91); 43 3.84(0.82); 41 
Control Fulfillment 3.24(0.93); 48 3.45(0.76); 44 3.13(0.73); 43 
Self-esteem Fulfillment 3.06(1.08); 47 3.20(1.03); 44 2.92(0.92); 44 
Satisfaction with Life 4.07(1.44); 48 4.45(1.44); 44 4.34(1.49); 40 
Subjective Vitality 4.25(1.36); 47 4.45(1.28); 42 4.45(1.17); 40 
Person Kind 4.51(1.06); 47 4.80(1.19); 44 4.67(0.94); 43 
True Self 5.14(1.03); 48 5.43(0.93); 44 5.68(0.92); 44 
Biological Basis 3.27(1.10); 46 3.99(1.22); 44 3.57(1.32); 43 
Informativeness 3.86(1.18); 47 4.42(1.16); 44 4.33(1.06); 44 





Pairwise Bivariate Correlations for All Study 1 Variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. Self-essentialism ⎯              
2. Meaning .30**(129) ⎯             
3. Meaning 
Searching 




.18*(121) .65***(126) -.21*(124) ⎯           
5. Comfort 
Fulfillment 
.27**(128) .63***(133) -.21*(129) .82***(128) ⎯          
6. Meaning 
Fulfillment 
.03(124) .41***(129) -.19*(126) .82***(128) .51***(129) ⎯         
7. Control 
Fulfillment 
.28**(128) .66***(133) -.04(129) .84***(128) .70***(133) .48***(130) ⎯        
8. Self-esteem 
Fulfillment 
.14(128) .45***(133) -.16(128) .77***(128) .64***(133) .48***(130) .61***(134) ⎯       
9. Satisfaction with 
Life 
.32***(126) .63***(131) -.06(127) .61***(124) .65***(130) .37***(127) .59***(131) .43***(130) ⎯      
10. Subjective 
Vitality 
.33***(124) .71***(128) -.15(124) .72***(122) .72***(128) .49***(123) .64***(128) .62***(128) .67***(125) ⎯     
11. Person Kind .78***(130) .18*(132) .03(127) .11(124) .09(131) .01(128) .23**(131) .07(131) .19*(129) .20*(126) ⎯    
12. True Self .51***(130) .43***(134) .09(129) .26**(126) .28**(133) .15(130) .31***(133) .15(133) .26**(131) .32***(128) .23**(134) ⎯   
13. Biological Basis .63***(130) .19*(132) -.04(127) .11(124) .18*(131) -.00(127) .16(131) .06(131) .28**(129) .21*(126) .29**(131) .21**(133) ⎯  
14. Informativeness .69***(130) .09(133) .12(128) .08(125) .22*(132) -.03(129) .09(132) .14(132) .19*(130) .23**(128) .40***(133) .06(135) .26**(132) ⎯ 
Note. Pearson correlations are presented below the diagonal, with correlation test Ns in parentheses and df = (N-2). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Assessing Bivariate Correlations 
 Bivariate correlations lend further insight into how self-essentialism’s subscales 
relate to one-another. The idea that True Self is a related but distinct subscale among self-
essentialism items, which arose during EFA of the self-essentialism items is also 
supported here. True Self related to both Person Kind (r(132) = .23, p < .001) and 
Biological Basis (r(131) = .21, p < .001), but not Informativeness. Because people have 
autobiographical memory and therefore possibly some insight into their behavioral 
inconsistencies despite believing they have a true self, the Informativeness factor—which 
addresses participants’ beliefs that their behavior is cross-situationally consistent and 
predictable—may be less closely-connected to self-essentialism than informativeness 
notions are to other targets of essentialism. A hallmark of essentialist thought is the 
assumption that knowing an object’s essence informs your predictive power regarding 
what it can be expected to do in the future (Yzerbyt et al., 1997). As I have proposed in 
the past (Dulaney et al., 2019), Informativeness notions may be thought of as downstream 
consequences of the existence of essential entities. In other words, under psychological 
essentialism, a quality of entities is that their behavior is stable over time because they are 
themselves inherently stable. If so, informativeness might not be as central to essentialist 
self-thinking as concepts targeted by other factors that explained greater variance such as 
Person Kind and True Self. 
Bivariate correlations also support to the possibility that the Meaning Fulfillment 
factor of the Psychological Need Fulfillment items targets meaning in life in a different 
way than do the items from the MLQ. Consistent with the idea that the Meaning 




component, meaning fulfillment was positively correlated with meaning (r(127) = .41, 
p < .001). Paralleling findings elsewhere (Dulaney et al., 2019; Dulaney et al., 2021), 
meaning was related to self-essentialism (r(127) = .30, p = .001). Interestingly, meaning 
fulfillment was not related to self-essentialism scores (r(122) = .03, p = .72). To the 
extent that meaning fulfillment captures feelings of mattering, this adds greater 
specificity to the link between meaning and self-essentialism constructs. 
Turning to assess self-essentialism’s relationship to well-being outcomes in this 
study, self-essentialism again had a medium-sized positive association with meaning just 
as in Dulaney et al., 2019 (current r(127) = .30, p = .001, prior r(264) = .32, p < .001) and 
had a medium-sized positive association with satisfaction with life which had ranged 
from small- to medium-sized in the past research (current r(124) = .32, p < .001, prior 
r(262) = .25, p < .001, r(107) = .44, p < .001). Self-essentialism likewise showed a 
medium-sized positive relationship to subjective vitality (r(122) = .33, p < .001), 
theoretically consistent with subjective vitality’s positive association with feelings of 
being authentic (Thomaes et al., 2017). All correlations from the current endeavor 
exceeded the minimum detectable correlation with their test N’s (.045–.046) at a power 
of .80 testing against a null hypothesis correlation of zero. Post-hoc sensitivity analysis 
approaches in Study 1 are covered in more depth in the next section. 
Taken together, present and past work form a compelling case for a medium-sized 
correlation between self-essentialism and these measures of well-being. As psychological 
need fulfillment items evidenced a unique factor structure here, linking current 
correlations to past detections is dubious, but comfort fulfillment and control fulfillment 




p = .002; control r(126) = .28, p = .002), as did overall psychological need fulfillment 
scores (r(119) = .18, p = .042), supporting a small role of self-essentialism in feelings of 
one’s psychological needs being met following a threat induction. Of self-essentialism’s 
subscales, True Self was most consistently positively related to well-being outcomes, 
suggesting it may capture the most relevant beliefs for well-being among all 
self-essentialism items. 
Post-hoc Sensitivity Analysis 
 In the course of examining Hypothesis I, I employed post-hoc sensitivity analyses 
to check whether the research was sufficiently sensitive for detecting the effect sizes 
reported in the main analyses. This is done by calculating minimum detectable effect 
sizes and then comparing these criteria against their corresponding observed effect sizes. 
Global model sensitivity was assessed by calculating the sensitivity for a fixed linear 
multiple regression model’s R2 deviation from zero, with a power of 0.80, the by-test 
sample sizes reported alongside analyses, and five predictors. Local predictor sensitivity 
was also assessed by calculating the sensitivity, for a two-tailed test, of a fixed linear 
multiple regression’s single regression coefficient, a power of .80, the by-test sample 
size, and five predictors. Cohen’s f2 (J. Cohen, 1988) was obtained for these effects using 
a conversion of R2 to f2, with specific equations given for calculating both global model 
and local predictor effects by Selya et al. (2012). 
Hypothesis I 
Using multiple moderated regression, I examined the resilience of participants to 
the experience of morality threat based on their self-essentialism scores. While in my 




orientations, I expected that a particular subscale’s items may contribute more 
meaningfully to psychological resilience in the moment. For instance, questions 
comprising the Person Kind and True Self subscales in the detected factor structure may 
be most central to people’s essentialist self-beliefs, while other subscales may capture 
ideas of possible antecedents (Biological Basis) and consequences (Informativeness) 
associated with such beliefs. In this vein, should self-essentialism overall not emerge as a 
significant predictor in a model I planned to assess the involvement of self-essentialism’s 
subscales as predictors interacting with participants’ condition for explaining target 
outcomes. These would take place in separate analogous regression models with the same 
structure as the model testing the contribution of self-essentialism overall. That is, all 
models examined tested the contributions of the main effect term of self-essentialism or 
one of its subscale variables, the main effect term of participant condition, and their 
interaction term as predictors of one of the dependent variables targeted. In Hypothesis I, 
I stated my expectation that increases in self-essentialism would be more positively 
associated with increased well-being and positive feelings following a moderate threat as 
compared to following a high threat, and that in such an instance of a high threat firm true 
self-orientations may be conversely burdensome for well-being resilience. Still, people in 
the moderate threat condition were expected to feel lower mean well-being than in the 
low threat condition, considering the people in the low threat condition had not received 
feedback of being less moral than many of their peers. By referring to Table 4 it is 
possible to see that participants’ morality threat condition seemed to have a weaker than 
hypothesized impact on outcome variables, with all by-condition means per variable 




model contributions are discussed below along with visualizations of predictor effects to 
aid hypothesis assessment. Full model statistics are provided in Appendix B. 
Meaning. In the overall model testing for the main effect and interaction effect 
contributions of self-essentialism and participant condition predicting meaning, no 
predictor effects made significant contributions. Following this finding, subscale 
involvement tests were employed. When testing for the contributions of Person Kind, 
True Self, Biological Basis, and Informativeness in separate regression models, a 
significant main effect of True Self was detected as contributing to meaning (B = .51, 
SE = .19, t(128) = 2.75, p = .007, 95% CI [.14, .89], observed predictor local f2 = 0.21, 
meets criterion local f2 = .059 with test N = 134). For the overall model, F(5, 128) = 6.23, 
p < .001, adjusted R2 = .16, corresponding observed global model f2 = 0.19, meets global 
criterion f2 = 0.10 with test N of 134 and five predictor terms. The main effect of 
condition did not significantly predict meaning (intercept estimate B = 4.26, SE = .20, 
t(128) = 21.05, p < .001, 95% CI [3.86, 4.66]; moderate threat estimate B = .28, SE = .28, 
t(128) = 1.00, p = .32, 95% CI [-.28, .85]; high threat estimate B = .27, SE = .29, 
t(128) = .93, p = .35, 95% CI [-.30, .84]; predictor f2 = 0.022). Further, no interaction 
effects emerged as significant (True Self X moderate threat estimate B = .25, SE = .29, 
t(128) = .88, p = .38, 95% CI [-.32, .82]; True Self X high threat estimate B = .05, 
SE = .29, t(128) = .16, p = .87, 95% CI [-.52, .62]; predictor f2 = 0.0063). A depiction of 
this cross-condition main effect is displayed in Figure 2 for visual understanding. 
Including Biological Basis in the model instead revealed no new information, and 
including Person Kind and Informativeness resulted in a marginal main effect condition 





True Self Scores Significantly Predicting Meaning Across Conditions in Study 1 
 
 These results suggest that, across conditions, believing one has a true self 
substantially explains meaning. The lack of effect of condition makes it difficult to 
further interpret the extent to which self-essentialism served as a protective barrier 
against false feedback threat here. One interpretation is that self-essentialism was equally 
effective for buffering all levels of threat. Conversely, another interpretation is that the 
threat conditions were either not stressful enough, or not believable enough, to provoke 
observable differences in life meaning. Still another possibility is that personally-
threatening false feedback may not affect meaning in life at the moment it is received and 
may rather have downstream effects on meaning via self-doubt and negative self-
evaluations springing from the threatening information, with observable consequences for 




Meaning Searching. Turning to examine outcomes in meaning searching 
captured by the Search For Meaning subscale, the interaction between self-essentialism 
and participant condition significantly predicted meaning searching (intercept estimate 
B = 5.23, SE = .19, t(118) = 28.19, p < .001, 95% CI [4.87, 5.60], self-essentialism X 
high threat predictor estimate B = .82, SE = .38, t(118) = 2.13, p = .035, 95% CI 
[.06, 1.58], observed predictor f2 = 0.037, does not meet criterion f2 = .064 with test 
N = 124). The overall model did not significantly explain meaning searching, 
F(5, 118) = 1.04, p = .40, adjusted R2 = .002, observed model f2 = .002, does not meet 
criterion f2 = .11; suggesting that one or more predictor main effect terms may not be 
appropriate for model inclusion. There were no significant main effects in the model 
(self-essentialism B = -.30, SE = .27, t(118) = -1.10, p = .27, 95% CI [-.83, .24]; 
moderate threat estimate B = ., SE = .29, t(118) = -1.00, p = .32, 95% CI [-.87, .29]; high 
threat estimate B = -.07, SE = .26, t(118) = -.28, p = .78, 95% CI [-.59, .44]), and the 
remaining interaction predictor was also not significant (self-essentialism X moderate 
threat predictor estimate B = .38, SE = .36, t(118) = 1.07, p = .29, 95% CI [-.32, 1.09]). 
 Probing the significant interaction of self-essentialism and the high threat 
condition for predicting meaning searches, as significantly different from the low threat 
condition, yielded an intriguing pattern. For participants in the high threat condition, the 
simple slope of self-essentialism and meaning searching was positive (B = .52, SE = .27, 
t(118) = 1.91, p = .058, 95% CI [-.02, 1.06]), which reversed direction for participants in 
the low threat condition (B = -.30, SE = .27, t(118) = -1.10, p = .28, 95% CI [-.83, .24]). 




relationship between self-essentialism and meaning searching (B = .08, SE = .23, 
t(118) = .36, p = .72, 95% CI [-.37, .54]). This pattern is depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Self-essentialism Scores and Condition Significantly Predicting Differences in Meaning 
Searching in Study 1 
 
 
As none of these simple slopes achieved significance, it appears that data 
collection from additional participants may be necessary to establish confidence in the 
precise strength and magnitude of these relationships. An initial interpretation of this 
pattern is that the positive link between self-essentialism and meaning searching among 
participants under high threat suggests support for Hypothesis I. Searching for meaning is 
associated with decreased well-being in adults (K. Cohen & Cairns, 2012), and thus it 




high personal morality threat as hypothesized. Increased self-essentialism seems to 
increase participants’ vulnerability to the psychological weight of this personal stressor 
perhaps due to the rigidity strong self-essentialism implies about the true self’s ability to 
change for the better. As such, this result also indicates that a personal morality threat is 
threatening at least in part because it triggers self-doubt as suggested elsewhere (Christy 
et al., 2016). 
Under Hypothesis I, I also predicted that participants under moderate threat would 
find essentialist self-views to be useful in resisting the threat, and in this simple slopes 
analysis self-essentialism was unrelated to meaning searching under moderate threat. If 
we are to take seriously the small positive slope between self-essentialism and meaning 
searching in this condition, it may imply that the threat imposed by this manipulation 
level was sufficient for provoking a slight meaning search that self-essentialism was 
ineffective in buffering and potentially imposed a small burden in any attempts to resolve 
the meaning search. If self-essentialism actually holds no connection, of any direction, to 
meaning searching at this level of threat this would mean that it does not provide support 
in this circumstance but also that it is not disadvantageous. Participants in the low threat 
condition, rated above their peers on moral behavior, showed a negative relationship 
between self-essentialism and meaning searching. If the pattern indeed exists beyond this 
data collection where its simple slope did not reach significance, since true self-
orientations depict the true self as highly moral, stronger self-essentialists may be more 
likely to accept moral affirmation unquestioningly. Or, this negative association between 
self-essentialism and meaning searching could be another sign of self-essentialism’s 




Psychological Need Fulfillment. While Psychological Need Fulfillment is 
comprised of four groups of distinct needs, a preliminary analysis of all 20 Psychological 
Needs items as a global scale outcome found no involvement of self-essentialism or self-
essentialism subscales. Results of this regression with overall self-essentialism as 
predictor appear in Appendix Table B4. Psychological Need Fulfillment subscale 
behavior was subsequently examined, with scores on each subscale as individual 
outcomes. 
Comfort Fulfillment. Scores on the full self-essentialism scale had a significant 
main effect for predicting comfort fulfillment (B = .41, SE = .20, t(122) = 2.00, p = .047, 
95% CI [.005, .82], observed predictor f2 = 0.064, meets criterion f2 = 0.062 with test 
N = 128). For the overall model, F(5, 122) = 2.50, p = .034, adjusted R2 = .056, observed 
model f2 = .059, does not meet criterion f2 = 0.11. The main effect of condition did not 
significantly predict comfort fulfillment (intercept estimate B = 3.23, SE = .14, 
t(122) = 22.79, p < .001, 95% CI [2.95, 3.51]; moderate threat estimate B = .11, SE = .19, 
t(122) = .55, p = .58, 95% CI [-.28, .49]; high threat estimate B = -.08, SE = .20, 
t(122) = -.39, p = .70, 95% CI [-.46, .31]), and there were no significant interaction 
effects as well (self-essentialism X moderate threat estimate B = -.01, SE = .27, 
t(122) = -.05, p = .96, 95% CI [-.55, .52]; self-essentialism X high threat estimate 
B = -.29, SE = .29, t(122) = -1.00, p = .32, 95% CI [-.87, .29]). On their own, self-
essentialism subscales were not significant contributors to comfort fulfillment in their 
corresponding models. The main effect of self-essentialism predicting comfort fulfillment 






Self-essentialism Significantly Predicting Comfort Fulfillment Across Condition in Study 
1 
 
 This main effect of self-essentialism in predicting comfort fulfillment indicates 
that self-essentialism is beneficial for general feelings of satisfaction and positive social 
standing, even among people who have received a threat designed to destabilize these 
feelings. Again, much interpretation is limited here due to the lack of significant effects 
of threat condition. Hypothesis I predicted positive relationships between self-
essentialism and well-being in the low and moderate threat conditions, and this was 
supported. The negative relationship between self-essentialism and well-being in 
participants under high threat was not evident here when measuring comfort fulfillment. 
If we consult Figure 4, it is interesting that self-essentialism did not predict comfort 




disadvantages predicted for self-essentialism in this condition. However, this is again 
speculative in the absence of a significant interaction effect. 
Self-esteem Fulfillment. The model assessing self-esteem fulfillment showed no 
significant main effects for self-essentialism or condition, and no significant interaction 
effects. Model estimates are visualized in Figure 5. Models including self-essentialism 
subscales as predictors similarly showed no significant main or interaction effects. 
Figure 5 
Self-esteem Fulfillment was Not Significantly Predicted by Self-essentialism or Condition 
in Study 1 
 
While visually the estimates map onto Hypothesis I, such that increases in self-
essentialism were paired with decreased self-esteem fulfillment under high threat and 
with increased self-esteem fulfillment in participants under moderate and low threat, we 




these estimates would not differ. Still, it would be worth returning to these patterns again 
in follow-up work to confirm or disconfirm such an interaction. 
Meaning Fulfillment. Turning to address meaning fulfillment, models containing 
self-essentialism or alternately its subscales found no significant main effects or 
interaction effects predicting meaning fulfillment. As discussed above, items in this 
subscale appear to capture participants’ perceptions that their life matters, and the lack of 
a significant role for self-essentialism in predicting meaning fulfillment parallels there 
being no detected significant correlation between these variables. Estimates from the 
model containing self-essentialism are displayed in Figure 6, and visual patterns cohere 
with those described above for other outcomes such that the estimate in the high threat 
condition shows a negative self-essentialism to meaning fulfillment association. 
Additionally, in the low threat condition meaning fulfillment visually increased together 
with self-essentialism, suggesting the possibility that these variables may share 
significant positive correlations in paradigms not employing threat. Without a significant 













Meaning Fulfillment was Not Significantly Predicted by Self-essentialism or Condition in 
Study 1 
 
Control Fulfillment. Finally, examining control fulfillment, no regression 
sequences found significant main or interaction effects for predicting control fulfillment 
values. In the regression that included True Self as the self-essentialism-related predictor, 
it had a marginal main effect (B = .19, SE = .11, t(127) = 1.71, p = .090, 95% CI 
[-.03, .40], observed predictor f2 = .094, meets criterion f2 = .060 with test N = 133; overall 
model: F(5, 127) = 4.27, p = .001, adjusted R2 = .11, observed model f2 = .12, meetst 
criterion f2 = .10), and accordingly this is the model for which estimates are displayed in 
Figure 7 below, and which was highly similar in direction and magnitude to analogous 






True Self Marginally Predicting Control Fulfillment Across Condition in Study 1 
 
 Interpretation of marginal effects is best approached with caution. The direction 
of the main effect is in line with True Self’s overall correlation with (r(131) = .31, 
p < .001) control fulfillment. As with all main effects of self-essentialism and its 
underlying subscales, in the absence of interaction effects it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which the measured variable—control fulfillment in this case—was 
unresponsive to the threat induction as opposed to self-essentialism being so protective 
against the threats that no level of threat manipulation was strong enough to observably 
overcome the buffering. 
Satisfaction with Life. Satisfaction with life was marginally explained by overall 
self-essentialism scores (B = .59, SE = .34, t(120) = 1.76, p = .081, 95% CI [-.07, 1.26], 




F(5, 120) = 3.01, p = .013, adjusted R2 = .074, observed model f2 = .080, did not meet 
criterion f2 = .11). Examining self-essentialism subscale behavior, the inclusion of 
Biological Basis scores in the model significantly explained satisfaction with life 
(B = .41, SE = .19, t(123) = 2.14, p = .03, 95% CI [.03, .78], observed predictor f2 = .071, 
meets criterion f2 = .062 with test N = 129; overall model: F(5, 123) = 2.74, p = .02, 
adjusted R2 = .064, observed model f2 = .068, does not meet criterion f2 = .10). Condition 
did not show a significant main effect or significant interaction effects (intercept 
B = 4.23, SE = .22, t(123) = 19.51, p < .001, 95% CI [3.80, 4.66]; moderate threat 
estimate B = .18, SE = .31, t(123) = 0.60, p = .55, 95% CI [-.43, .80]; high threat estimate 
B = .21, SE = .31, t(123) = .69, p = .49, 95% CI [-.40, .83]; Biological Basis X moderate 
threat estimate B = -.32, SE = .26, t(123) = -1.24, p = .22, 95% CI [-.83, .19]; Biological 
Basis X high threat estimate B = .04, SE = .25, t(123) = 0.15, p = .88, 95% CI [-.46, .54]). 
No other self-essentialism subscale contributed significantly in a main effect or 
interaction, so it may be that the Biological Basis contribution explains the marginal main 
effect of self-essentialism overall. The main effect of Biological Basis is depicted across 












Biological Basis Significantly Predicting Satisfaction with Life Across Conditions in 
Study 1 
 
 Reviewing Figure 8, it is first visually apparent that the same pattern of blunted 
positive association between self-essentialist ideas (specifically Biological Basis here) 
and well-being under high threat again emerged here. Hypothesis I is partially supported 
by these findings, as a positive link between self-essentialism and satisfaction with life in 
both low and moderate threat conditions was predicted, however the moderate threat 
condition did not show an appreciably weaker relationship between the two compared to 
the low threat condition. The visual weakening of this relationship under high threat 
would be consistent with Hypothesis I’s prediction of an attenuated effectiveness for self-
essentialism in threat resilience in this condition. Still, only the positive main effect of 




these true self-orientations positively predicted well-being here, but it is less clear why 
only the Biological Basis subscale—measuring participants’ beliefs that who they are is 
stamped into their genetic makeup—contributed to satisfaction with life as a predictor in 
this model, particularly as all self-essentialism subscales positively correlated with 
satisfaction with life in bivariate analyses. 
Considering that data were collected in November of 2020 and January of 2021, 
participants’ national context was one of increased complexity, both in overall 
assessments of life satisfaction due to the pandemic and also in people’s relationship to 
their personal identities due to ongoing national conflict and disagreement surrounding 
issues of social class, oppression, and election integrity. It is possible that in such a 
context participants drew new satisfaction or pride from their own genetic identity, or the 
idea that a person’s nature is biologically-based, as satisfaction with life has in the past 
been unrelated to Biological Basis scores (Dulaney et al., 2019). If so, the implications 
are not altogether positive, as tying one’s identity to genetics may heighten the extent to 
which one makes distinctions between in- and out-groups, and essentializing social group 
members has been linked with increased stereotype endorsement (Haslam et al., 2000; 
Yzerbyt & Rocher, 2002). 
Subjective Vitality. Subjective vitality was significantly explained by a main 
effect of self-essentialism (B = .61, SE = .29, t(118) = 2.08, p = .040, 95% CI [.03, 1.18], 
observed predictor f2 = .11, meets criterion f2 = .064 with test N = 124; overall model: 
F(5, 118) = 3.10, p = .011, adjusted R2 = .079, observed model f2 = .086, does not meet 
criterion f2 = .11). No other main or interaction effects were significant (intercept 




estimate B = -.14, SE = .28, t(118) = -0.52, p = .60, 95% CI [-.69, .40]; high threat 
estimate B = -.03, SE = .28, t(118) = -0.09, p = .93, 95% CI [-.58, .53]; self-essentialism 
X moderate threat estimate B = .12, SE = .39, t(118) = 0.31, p = .76, 95% CI [-.64, .88]; 
self-essentialism X high threat estimate B = -.14, SE = .42, t(118) = -0.34, p = .73, 95% 
CI [-.97, .69]). This significant main effect was echoed by a marginal main effect of the 
Biological Basis subscale (B = .33, SE = .17, t(120) = 1.91, p = .058, 95% CI [-.01, .66], 
observed predictor f2 = 0.042, does not meet criterion f2 = .063 with test N = 126; overall 
model: F(5, 120) = 1.29, p = .27, adjusted R2 = .012, observed model f2 = .012, does not 
meet criterion f2 = .11), while no other significant subscale involvement appeared. Figure 
9 portrays the significant contribution of self-essentialism for explaining subjective 

















 Self-essentialism Significantly Predicting Subjective Vitality Across Conditions in Study 
1 
 
 This finding of a main effect of self-essentialism in predicting increased 
subjective vitality builds on the pattern observed throughout Study 1 that, across 
conditions, self-essentialism was associated with positive well-being. The implications 
here parallel the above detections of analogous main effects in other outcomes 
(i.e., meaning, control fulfillment) with no model contribution of condition, either 
significant or visual: For all participants, even those given threatening feedback, self-
essentialism was related to positive well-being as represented by subjective vitality. It 
may be that no group of participants was sufficiently threatened to show subjective 
vitality differences, that subjective vitality is not an aspect of well-being that responds to 




given in the moderate and high threat false-feedback conditions that participants in these 
conditions had well-being scores that were statistically indistinguishable from 
participants who were not threatened. After considering the analysis-wise implications 
for these findings, I now assess Study 1’s observed patterns as a whole for further 
informing and evaluating Hypothesis I. 
Discussion 
Under my theoretical framework, I consider true self-orientations to be bountiful 
resources for constructing personal meaning and for pragmatic coping responses to 
destabilizing stimuli. This led me to predict people’s baseline self-essentialism 
differences to show a buffering effect of moderate threat. Acknowledging that true self-
orientations highly essentialize the true self, portraying it as inherent, immutable, stable, 
and informative, I also predicted that self-essentialism would pose a well-being risk in 
cases of high personal threat. This, I argued, was due to self-essentialism’s assumed 
inability to assimilate the threatening information of immorality and inability to 
accommodate new possibilities of alternate selves. 
Variable patterns in the low and moderate threat conditions were largely 
consistent with Hypothesis I, with slope estimates of self-essentialism or its subscales 
increasing together with most well-being outcomes, many of which supported by 
significant main effects of self-essentialism as a model predictor of positive well-being 
(i.e., meaning, lower meaning searching, comfort fulfillment, control fulfillment, 
satisfaction with life, subjective vitality). As covered in by-analysis interpretations, the 
extent to which this signifies effective coping with moderate threat is unclear given the 




Hypothesis I’s variable predictions in the high threat condition were less 
consistent to emerge, but specific analyses yielded important results supporting the 
theoretical model. In the model predicting meaning searching self-essentialism interacted 
with threat condition, with participants in the high threat condition reporting more 
searching for life meaning the more they endorsed essentialist self-views. By comparison, 
participants in the low threat condition showed less meaning searching related to higher 
self-essentialism, indicating less motivation to search for meaning during times of 
stability for people who believe they have a true self. Associated with well-being costs 
(K. Cohen & Cairns, 2012), this increased searching for meaning among strong self-
essentialists under high threat signifies evidence that rigid self-views are inconsistent 
with judgments of immorality and consequently elicit motivations to resecure meaning. 
Additional support for Hypothesis I’s expected patterns in high threat arose visually, but 
usually not significantly, in regression models: under high threat specific positive well-
being outcomes of self-essentialism were attenuated (i.e., comfort fulfillment, satisfaction 
with life), or even inverted (i.e., meaning searching, meaning fulfillment, self-esteem 
fulfillment). Together, the emergence of Hypothesis I’s expected patterns for search for 
meaning while other well-being variables did not respond as conclusively to the threats 
suggests that meaning searching may be the most sensitive among the well-being 
variables measured here to these types of threat reactions. 
Following Study 1’s analyses and questions over manipulation efficacy, I 
reviewed the personal morality threat manipulation materials to identify potential areas 
for improvement. Given that some participants in the low and high threat condition 




for Study 2 I adjusted these conditions’ feedback and in turn also adjusted the feedback 
given in the moderate threat condition to maintain its position between the extremes. 
Beyond the scope of this investigative sequence, Study 1’s conclusions could be further 
informed by collecting baseline measurements of all outcome variables measured here 
prior to administering the threat, and without administering self-essentialism items in the 
design, to lend more conclusive strength regarding the effects of the threat manipulation 
alone. I return to the indications and conclusions of Study 1 in the General Discussion, 
where I evaluate them in broader terms alongside the findings of Study 2, which I discuss 
next.  
Study 2 
This study was designed to directly examine true self-orientations as in-the-
moment adaptive coping supports. As in Study 1, participants’ moral characters were 
threatened, with some adjustments for this study. After this personal morality threat, 
participants were instructed to choose between three distinct activities they would 
undertake next. These activities have been designed to represent an option to reflect on 
and connect with their true self, an option to reflect on the flexible nature of their self, or 
an option to reflect on the qualities of who they are in daily life. The goal of this design 
was to explore the extent to which participants would desire and pursue connection with 
their true self following low, medium, and high levels of personal morality threat. 
This study examined participants’ in-the-moment use of their true self-
orientations for threat processing support following a personal morality threat. Study 2 
aimed to first assess variation in participant preference to connect to their true 




activities: reflective descriptions of their true self, consideration of flexible aspects of 
their self, and reflective descriptions of their everyday qualities, following low, moderate, 
and high personal morality threat. Complementarily, this study investigated how effective 
each of the three activities might be for helping participants cope with evidence of 
personal morality threat by randomly assigning participants to one of the activities, 
having them actually perform the assigned activity task, and subsequently self-report on a 
variety of well-being outcome measures. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis II 
I expect participants under moderate morality threat to preferentially select the 
task in which they describe their true self to help them adjust to the threat. An aspect of 
my hypotheses which is less certain to emerge is the possibility that participants under 
high morality threat would preferentially select the flexible self-description task as a way 
to escape from overly rigid true self-orientations as suggested by the literature on self-
dialecticism (Boyraz et al., 2019), and would seek to avoid describing their true selves 
accordingly. However, it might be that the true self is seen as so fundamentally moral and 
so positively valenced that even the highest threat condition here would not be enough to 
drive participants away from their attachment to their true self-orientations, producing 
similar levels of true self-description preference among participants in moderate and high 
threat. Additionally, I predicted that participants under low threat would most prefer 
describing their true self, next prefer describing their everyday self due to its familiarity, 
and least prefer describing their flexible self-aspects due to its relative unfamiliarity. 




self-description might fall substantially since it is feedback about their past behavior that 
was the source of this threat. A chi-square test of independence was planned to compare 
the three groups of personal morality threat on their prevalence of selecting each of the 
three activity choice options. A visualization of these predictions appears in Figure 10, 
which also depicts the possibility of participants under high threat choosing to describe 
their flexible self-aspects. 
Figure 10 
Hypothesized Pattern of Choice of Task for Each Level of Personal Morality Threat 
 
Hypothesis III 
Assessing participants’ degree of desire to perform each of the provided activity 
descriptions, measured continuously, allowed me to probe their preference for each 
activity beyond Hypothesis II’s analysis of the categorical activity choice. It was 









































the participants’ preference to engage in them at least to some degree, and express these 
rankings via the graphical sliders. This would mean that one task’s preference ratings 
would be partially dependent on the other tasks’ ratings, and a repeated-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was therefore employed to compare the low, medium, and 
high morality threat conditions on preference to engage in each of the three activities. 
Despite the different analytic approaches between Hypothesis II and III, the reasoning 
behind the predictions was the same. Hypothesis III consists of the expectation that 
participants would have a high desire to engage with the true self in states of low threat 
and especially states of moderate threat, and that this desire would decrease in states of 
high threat assuming they perceived the threat as sufficiently strong. Continuing, 
participants would most prefer to engage with flexible self-representations under the 
highest threat, and would seek to engage with their everyday selves the most under 
lowest threat. Approach towards the everyday self was predicted to fall as threat level 
rose. Planned comparisons were performed to assess the particulars of this hypothesis 
beyond the broad expectation that a significant main effect of threat condition would 












Hypothesized Pattern of Desire to Perform Each of the Three Activity Options by Level of 
Personal Morality Threat 
 
Hypothesis IV 
Corresponding to the theoretical framework in use, I anticipated that participants 
under moderate threat would most benefit from performing the true self-reflection 
activity and that participants under high threat were likely to most benefit from 
performing the flexible self-reflection activity. To evaluate this hypothesis, a 3 x 3 
ANOVA was performed with morality threat condition and assigned activity condition 
predicting each well-being score. I expected well-being to be highest in participants 
exposed to low morality threat since this was the least stressful and was in fact potentially 
affirming due to participants receiving the false feedback that they scored well on 
morality compared to their peers. A main effect of threat condition on well-being was 
















thus expected to emerge in addition to a significant interaction between threat condition 
and activity task assignment. An acknowledged area for potential failure of the 
theoretical framework was in the possibility that, due to the true self carrying such 
positive associations in everyday life and additionally being thought of as highly morally 
good, people assigned to both the high morality threat condition and the true self-
reflection condition might show higher well-being scores than expected. Figure 12 has 
been provided to illustrate both the hypothesized predictions and additional conceivable 
likely outcomes for non-hypothesized condition permutations. 
Figure 12 
Hypothesized Pattern of Well-being and Psychological Need-Fulfillment for Each Level 
























Participants belonging to Prolific’s paid participation pool were recruited via 
Prolific’s electronic platform. Recruitment yielded a total N of 444 participants. For all 
included participants following the noncompliance and manipulation check screening 
discussed in Study 2’s Analyses and Results section, the N was 388 (age 18–64, 
M = 31.47, SD = 9.97, three nonresponding, for participants who input a birth year to 
represent age (N = 4) their age was entered as their minimum age in years plus 0.5; 
57.00% male, 0.3% Intersex, 0.3% Non-Binary, 1.5% wishing not to indicate; political 
ideology M = 4.89, SD = 1.72; religiosity M = 1.93, SD = 11.72; 12.6% Asian, 0.3% 
Asian and European, 0.3% Asian and Latina, 1.5% Asian and White, 13.2% Black, 1.1% 
Black and White, 0.3% Hispanic/Latina, Native American, and White, 3.1% Latino/a, 
0.6% Latino/a and White, 0.3% Middle Eastern, 1.0% Native American, 0.3% Native 
American and European, 0.3% Native American, Pacific Islander, and White, 0.3% 
Native American and White, 62.9% White, 0.3% White, Black, and Native American, 
0.3% White Hispanic, 0.3% White and Hispanic, 0.3% White and Mexican, 0.3% White 
and Middle Eastern, 0.9% nonresponding). 
Procedure 
Mirroring the procedural plan outlined in Study 1 adjusted for delivery via 
Prolific, Prolific provided participants with a Qualtrics survey link containing all tasks 
and measures for this study. Upon using the survey link participants who wished to do so 
indicated their consent to take part in the study, they passed a page which served to 




string, this information allows researchers to remain blind to participant identity while 
also being able to pair their survey behavior with their study registration in Prolific for 
the purposes of rejecting payment. They then answered four demographic questions to 
confirm their fit with Prolific’s recruitment filters, and finally a page instructing them to 
minimize distraction prior to beginning. Any non-consenting or filter-divergent 
participants were routed away from the survey and instructed to withdraw from the 
research on these grounds. As in Study 1, participants who passed the preliminary pages 
were then randomly assigned to experience one of three levels of morality threat. 
Following completion of the morality threat manipulation, participants indicated which of 
three self-description activities they would most prefer to engage in if they had a choice 
before continuing on to further parts of the study. After expressing their preferences, 
participants were randomly assigned to complete one of the three written description 
tasks regardless of their choice, after which they completed identical well-being, need-
satisfaction, vitality, and demographic items as used in Study 1. The study concluded 
with participant debriefing and automatically redirected them to Prolific to receive 
participation payment of $3.63. 
Morality Threat Manipulation. Participants were again randomly assigned to 
experience one of three threat induction conditions (low personal morality threat, 
moderate personal morality threat, and high personal morality threat). Due to the absence 
of coherent task differences in Study 1’s findings, I modified these experiences to be both 
more believable and more in line with the modes in which the materials had been shown 
to be effective in other research (Christy et al., 2016). In this study, participants in the 




behaviors in randomized order, and participants in the high threat condition answered the 
20 items measuring past performance of immoral behaviors in randomized order. 
Participants in the moderate threat condition encountered 20 items, taken from both 
immoral and moral behavior lists and presented in random order, so as to more closely 
induce the sense of moderate morality threat targeted here. 
This combination of items included all but six of the immoral behavior items, 
selected to be most relevant for participants’ lives and likely to be endorsed. Six moral 
behavior items were selected for inclusion based on their low likelihood to allow 
participants to restore their feelings of personal morality. Additionally, to increase the 
chance of participants endorsing behaviors I expanded Study 1’s response scale to 
include a fifth option, becoming the new next-to-lowest option (1 = “I have not done 
this”, 2 = “I have done this once or twice”, 3 = “I have done this on occasion”, 4 = “I 
have done this often”, and 5 = “I have done this very often.”). Upon completing their 
conditions’ corresponding questionnaires, participants were again presented with a 
component that displayed false feedback morality scores. 
This false feedback phase differed slightly from its Study 1 analogue: due to the 
small number of participants excluded from Study 1 for reporting that the visual 
depiction of their score failed to load, to avoid this from recurring I omitted these 
graphics from Study 2. To increase believability in another way, the first page 
participants saw when advancing past their morality questionnaire was one containing the 
message “The study will proceed to the next page in one moment.” and which 
automatically advanced after five seconds to the page containing the message “As part of 




answers to the previous questions. The next page displays your score on these questions 
in the context of all other Prolific participants who have taken part in our research. Please 
proceed to the next page to view your results.” In this way, the page displayed for five 
seconds lent plausibility to the idea that scores were being calculated and compared 
against others during that time, more so than had participants been told their score was 
calculated or shown their score outright immediately upon advancing the page. 
On advancing the page, participants in the low morality threat condition saw the 
message “Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you 
scored in the 85th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher on moral 
qualities than 85% of Prolific participants.”; participants in the moderate morality threat 
condition saw “Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you 
scored in the 65th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral 
qualities than 35% of Prolific participants.”; and participants in the high morality threat 
condition saw “Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you 
scored in the 40th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral 
qualities than 60% of Prolific participants.” Differences in these reported percentiles 
compared to Study 1’s false feedback were integrated in hopes of producing more 
reliable condition differences compared to Study 1’s findings, and in hopes of reducing 
the likelihood of manipulation suspicion in both the low and high threat conditions 
evidenced by Study 1 participants’ shock at how strongly moral/immoral they had scored 
compared to their peers. 
Activity Selection Task. Participants were presented with descriptions of three 




task to reflect on and describe the flexible nature of their self, and a task to reflect on and 
describe their everyday self. Participants were asked to indicate their preferred task to 
engage in of the three, with instructions written so as not to suggest that their doing so 
would dictate the next step of the study: “Next, please choose between the following 
three options to select what activity you’d prefer to complete if you had a choice. Please 
choose based on what you most want to do at this time.” The following task descriptions 
were presented in random order: 
True Self-Reflection Activity Description. “Option: True Self-Description 
Activity. This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then 
describe your true self: Which aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who are you 
deep down?” 
Flexible Self-Reflection Activity Description. “Option: Flexible Self-Description 
Activity. This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then 
describe flexibility within yourself: Which aspects of you undergo change? How are you 
as a person different over time?” 
Everyday Self-Reflection Activity Description. “Option: Everyday Self-
Description Activity. This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on 
and then describe your usual self: Which aspects of you do you present to the world and 
in public? Who are you in everyday life?” 
One challenge to the activity options provided is that the label “true self” is one 
that exists in normal speech, while the idea of an everyday self is less elaborated, and as 
there is not a specific label for a dialectical self the term “flexible self” has been used. I 




possible to the true self construct that is at the heart of the line of inquiry here. To assess 
potential labeling and content differences, prior to administering these materials the 
wording of each task was pilot tested among 54 DePaul University graduate students and 
advanced undergraduates in the Psychology Department. 
Using a Qualtrics survey these students volunteered their ratings for the task 
descriptions to be used by participants to indicate their task selections. All students were 
naïve to this project’s specific research questions. Each student rated all task descriptions, 
which were presented in random order and on a separate page per task, on the questions 
“How interesting does this activity sound to complete?” and “How easy does this activity 
sound to complete?” (1 = Not At All to 5 = Extremely). A repeated-measures ANOVA 
detected no differences in activity interest (true self task M = 3.61, SD = 0.98; flexible 
self task M = 3.56, SD = 0.84; everyday self task M = 3.52, SD = 0.97; F(2, 106) = 0.34, 
p = .71, ηp² = 0.006, corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.078, criterion f = .16 for test N = 54, 
power = 0.80, average correlation among repeated measures = .60, nonsphericity 
correction ε = 1). 
Differences in activity ease were detected, such that the everyday self-description 
activity was perceived to be a bit easier to complete than either of the other tasks (true 
self task M = 2.94, SD = 1.09; flexible self task M = 2.98, SD = 0.92; everyday self task 
M = 3.50, SD = 0.88; F(2, 106) = 7.31, p = .001, ηp² = 0.12, corresponding Cohen’s 
f = 0.37, meets criterion f = .21 for test N = 54 and average correlation among repeated 
measures = .25). Post-hoc tests revealed that the everyday self-description task seemed 
easier to complete than both the true self-description task (t(106) = 3.42, familywise 




familywise Bonferroni adjusted p = .006). Perhaps by virtue of having more familiarity 
with the daily self, it appears that describing the everyday self is perceived as being easier 
than describing the true self and flexible self. Accordingly, I proceeded in carrying out 
data collection for Study 2 and approached analyses of participants’ choices with this in 
mind. 
After making their selection, on the following page participants rated all three 
activities in terms of their preference to engage in them via graphical sliders. This design 
allowed participants to provide both categorical choice responses and continuous desire 
ratings which could be separately analyzed for effects of condition. The order of choice 
selection options as well as the order of the rating sliders were constrained to the 
randomized order that each participant received the descriptions in. 
Written Self-Description Task Assignment. Upon rating all activities and 
advancing to the next page, participants were then randomly assigned to complete one of 
the written description tasks over the next five minutes regardless of their prior choice of 
task. Administering this component consisted of two survey pages; one containing 
instructions, and one containing the task itself. To ease the transition to assignment to 
tasks participants may not have chosen, the instructions page read, “In this next part of 
the study, you will be given one of the written description activities to complete; it may 
not be your top rated activity. Please proceed to the next page to begin.” The task page 
consisted of one of three task-descriptions appearing below, and automatically advanced 
after 5 minutes had elapsed so as to constrain the experiential written manipulation in 




True Self-Reflection Activity. “This activity collects your written thoughts on a 
topic. Specifically, over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your true self. Which 
aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who you are deep down? Describe your true 
self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the aspects of you that you feel are most central 
to who you are at your core, in as much detail as possible. After 5 minutes, the study will 
advance to the next component.” 
Flexible Self-Reflection Activity. “This activity collects your written thoughts on 
a topic. Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on flexibility within yourself. How might 
important aspects of you be able to undergo change? How might you as a person be 
different over time? Describe your self-flexibility as thoroughly as possible, reflect on 
how even central aspects to who you are can change, in as much detail as possible. After 
5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component.” 
Everyday Self-Reflection Activity. “This activity collects your written thoughts on 
a topic: Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your usual self. Which aspects of you 
do you present to the world and in public? Who are you in everyday life? Describe your 
everyday self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the parts of yourself that you most 
display publicly on a usual day when you are in usual situations, in as much detail as 
possible. After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component.” 
Assigning a share of participants to engage with flexible self-representations of 
the self allows us to assess whether, as asserted in the literature on self-dialecticism 
(Boyraz et al., 2019), this flexibility might facilitate pragmatic coping with extreme 
threats as opposed to rigid true self-orientations. The assignment of other participants to 




frequently contrasts the true self with the everyday self (Baldwin et al., 2014; Schlegel et 
al., 2011; Schlegel et al., 2009). It is meant to be a neutral baseline option that is neither 
particularly strongly located on the stability-flexibility continuum nor particularly 
morally valenced or useful for coping, but which still has to do with the self so as not to 
introduce potential uncertainties about participant choice that other options would like 
describing friendships or hobbies. 
Measures 
This study employed the identical measures used in Study 1 to assess meaning in 
life, psychological need fulfillment, satisfaction with life, subjective vitality, participant 
demographics, and funnel debriefing questions. Three graphical sliders also allowed 
participants to indicate their preferences for engaging in the three self-description writing 
tasks. The position of each slider started in the middle of the response scale (left extreme 
(0): Not At All; right extreme (100): Very Much), and the value of the slider’s position 
was not shown to participants. 
In keeping with Prolific’s recommendation and allowed grounds for rejecting 
participant payment, I added two attention-check questions in the latter half of the study 
(“Please indicate you are paying attention by selecting “Extremely””, interspersed 
randomly amongst items assessing psychological need fulfillment; & “To indicate you 
are paying attention to this study, please select “Agree””, appearing in the demographic 
questions). Prolific recommends adding at least two attention check questions for any 
study longer than approximately five minutes, and considers failure of both attention 




included in the latter half of the study as the first half is sufficiently interactive enough to 
establish attention compared to the Likert-type response format in the latter half. 
Analyses and Results 
Analysis for Response-Level Noncompliance 
 As a first step, responses were screened for the occurrence of answering in strings 
of single digit runs. This was not detected from any participant, which is understandable 
given that participants belonged to a workforce of survey takers on a platform allowing 
researchers to screen for compliance before approving payment. Upon reviewing 
participants’ written responses, one participant was removed for inserting strong, 
disorganized complaints—at being asked to write for five minutes—into the written task 
box, and ran out of time to complete their answer. Accordingly, their data in the latter 
half of the study were uninterpretable and they were removed from analyses due to their 
erratic response there and during the debriefing section. Participants who were only able 
to write a few words before the survey advanced (N = 5)—indicating inattention for five 
minutes, not understanding the instructions, or losing track of time to collect their 
thoughts—or who reported not wishing to volunteer that self-description information 
(N = 2) were additionally removed from analyses from that point forward as their answers 
on the subsequent Likert-type semantic differential questions were uninterpretable. This 
was due to doubt in the manipulation success and their potential for feeling surprise, 
worry about losing payment, or frustration at being interrupted that could have then 
affected their later question responses. An additional three participants were considered 
for exclusion due to writing very short responses (True Self Task: “I have followed my 




Everyday Self Task: “I am an American male who is married”) but were retained 
because it was expected that participants would show natural variation in their ability to 
describe these self-conceptualizations. Without a strong theoretical framework for 
response length and complexity criteria, removing participants on these grounds would be 
premature and imprudent. 
Overview of Main Data Analysis 
 On the conclusion of this noncompliance screening, a second stage of screening 
began for assessing manipulation naivete and degree of participants’ morality score fit 
with their assigned threat condition. Following this, I constructed scale means for all 
continuous variables measured, with item configurations informed by factor analysis 
procedures, and computed descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all scales. I 
then described my approach to determining post-hoc sensitivity analysis decision criteria, 
before commencing with main analyses to test Hypotheses II, III, and IV. 
Manipulation Check: Morality Threat Naivete and Fit 
 Participants were again checked for extreme mismatch between their morality 
score and assigned threat condition. Study 1’s design benefited from participants 
answering both immoral and moral behaviors and thus being less able to track their 
behavior endorsement patterns. Conversely, in Study 2 participants only answered 20 
questions, making it easier for them to maintain a general sense of how moral or immoral 
they were portraying themselves as being. There was thus the possibility that participants 
could endorse none of the 20 immoral behavior items in the high threat condition, or 
endorse none of the 20 moral behavior items in the low threat condition, but still be given 




to their peers respectively. To screen for this, participants who had low immoral behavior 
endorsement totals in the high threat condition, which if all items were answered could 
range from 20–100 and had an endorsement range of 19–82 (M = 41.62, SD = 10.79) if 
participants answered all items, were evaluated for how many items they endorsed and to 
what degree of strength. Participants with impossible totals (a score of 19 or 20; N = 2) 
were removed from analyses. Funnel debriefing responses of the remainder of low-
scoring (< 30) participants were consulted for signs of suspicion in these participants. 
Participant who reported suspicion or not believing their score (N = 6) were also excluded 
from analyses. 
 Participants assigned to the moderate threat condition were then screened for 
condition assignment fit. Endorsement totals of the Immoral Behavior questions, if fully 
answered, could range from 14–70 and had an endorsement range of 12–55 (M = 28.22, 
SD = 8.47). Endorsement totals of the Moral Behavior questions, if fully answered, could 
range from 6–30 with an endorsement range of 9–30 (M = 20.16, SD = 4.75). Funnel 
debriefing responses were reviewed for participants with low Immoral Behavior 
endorsement (< 25 in favor of casting a wide net for suspicion detection) and/or 
extremely high endorsement of Moral Behaviors (> 25). Among these participants, four 
reported suspicion or not believing their score feedback, one reported feeling their score 
was good and thus seem to have been affirmed rather than threatened, and two 
participants reported believing their feedback score but had scored the minimum possible 
on immorality and the maximum possible on morality. Consequently, these seven 




 Participants assigned to the low threat condition were also screened for low moral 
behavior endorsement. These scores could range from 20–100 and had an endorsement 
range of 32–100 (M = 72.66, SD = 13.04). Participants with low Moral Behavior 
endorsement totals (< 60) were then screened for reports of suspicion or disbelief in their 
funnel debriefing responses. This screening identified suspicion or skepticism among the 
five lowest-scoring participants on moral behavior (range 32–48), and one participant 
who reported inattention when asked about their score and its accuracy (i.e., Q5-What do 
you remember your morality score being?: “I don’t remember it;” Q6-Do you think your 
morality score was accurate?: “I don’t know either way;” Q7-To what extent did you 
believe the feedback of your morality score relative to all other participants?:”I really 
don’t know. I honestly didn’t pay much attention to the ‘results’ part at all, didn’t interest 
me”), who were then removed from analyses. 
 Following this screening for fit, I also screened to remaining participants for 
naivete regardless of score-threat match. To be consistent with Study 1’s procedure for 
funnel debriefing review, I again checked remaining participant mentions of suspicion 
regarding the personal morality threat in the first three segments of the funnel debriefing 
process, identifying and therefore excluding 24 participants with instances of early 
suspicion. In cases of ambiguity, such as when a participant made a statement that could 
either indicate suspicion or simply reactionary disagreement with their score (e.g., Q3-
Did you notice anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors 
questionnaire?: “Yes, I don’t think my morality score should have been that low”) 
answers to the remaining debriefing steps were reviewed for clarification. If participants 




participant: Q4-Why do you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors 
questionnaire? “For me to know my moral standards compared to others,” an answer 
which essentially describes rather than explains the manipulation procedure). In addition, 
responses to the latter four questions were reviewed, identifying people (N = 4) making 
claims about their state of mind during the study (e.g., Q6-To what extent did you believe 
the feedback of your morality score relative to all other participants?: “I immediately felt 
like it was false”), a single participant who reported extreme beliefs and colorful self-
deprecating claims leading them to question their threat assignment to the highest threat 
condition, and a single participant who said they did not see their score. At the conclusion 
of noncompliance, naivete, and threat fit screening, the final study N was 388 (Low 
Threat, True Self Task N = 50; Low Threat, Flexible Self Task N = 46; Low Threat, 
Everyday Self Task N = 45; Moderate Threat, True Self Task N = 32; Moderate Threat, 
Flexible Self Task N = 49; Moderate Threat, Everyday Self Task N = 48; High Threat, 
True Self Task N = 48; High Threat, Flexible Self Task N = 35; High Threat, Everyday 
Self Task N = 35). 
Scale Construction 
 Upon arrival at the final group of participants for inclusion in analyses, scale 
construction began by first assessing the extent to which each variable’s planned structure 
accurately fit the patterns of variance within the data. CFAs were performed on all 
measured variables using the goodness of fit criteria specified in Study 1, with the plan to 
be followed by an EFA—assessing factor solutions with guidelines also specified in 
Study 1—for any given variable that evidenced poor fit in CFA results. 




Meaning in Life. The CFA strongly supported retention of the planned scale 
structure of both the meaning and meaning searching variables (CFI = .97, TLI = .97, 
RMSEA = .07, RMSEA 90% CI [.06, .09], χ2 = 103.6, df =34, p < .001), with these 
scales being constructed using the five items from the MLQ’s Presence of Meaning 
subscale and the five items from its Search for Meaning subscale respectively. The 
meaning and meaning searching variables were thus built accordingly, and reliability was 
very good for each (meaning α = .92; ω = .93; meaning searching α = .90; ω = .90). 
 Satisfaction with Life. CFA techniques resulted in strong support for the 
Satisfaction with Life items belonging to a single satisfaction with life factor (CFI = 1.00, 
TLI = 1.01, RMSEA = .00, RMSEA 90% CI [.00, .03], χ2 = 1.75, df = 5, p = .88), and the 
satisfaction with life variable was thus constructed with all five items included. Internal 
reliability was indicated to be good for the five satisfaction with life items (α = .88; 
ω = .89). 
 Subjective Vitality. As theorized, items from the Subjective Vitality Scale were 
well-explained by a single factor, evidenced by CFA indication of good fit (CFI = .98, 
TLI = .97, RMSEA = .097, RMSEA 90% CI [.07, .12], χ2 = 65.6., df =14, p < .001). As 
the RMSEA value was a bit high, a follow-up EFA was used to lend credence to this 
factor solution, the results of which can be found in Appendix Table C1. The EFA 
strongly supported this single-factor solution; no additional factors were suggested, and 
solution assessment statistics were good (Bartlett’s test: χ2 = 2421.60, df = 21, p < .001; 
KMO = .94, “marvelous”). Internal reliability was indicated to be very good for the seven 
subjective vitality items (α = .94; ω = .95). 




 Psychological Need Fulfillment. As in Study 1, CFA support for the pre-planned 
subscale structure of Psychological Need Fulfillment items was lower than desired 
(CFI = .85, TLI = .83, RMSEA = .12, RMSEA 90% CI [.11, .13], χ2 = 1068.00, df = 164, 
p < .001). Consequently, an EFA was performed to ascertain the best factor solution for 
explaining between-item variance in the present study. The EFA designed to iterate for 
detection of solutions explaining Eigenvalues greater than one suggested a two-factor 
solution largely grouping positively and negatively worded items into separate item 
groups, supported by model assessment statistics (Bartlett’s test: χ2 = 5758.14, df = 190, 
p < .001; KMO = .97, “marvelous”). Given that a more complex solution emerged in 
Study 1, and my awareness of an ostensible four-factor intended design for these items, I 
also examined EFA support for three and four factor solutions. Adding a third factor 
explained an additional 2.04% item variance with an Eigenvalue total under one (.96), 
and largely matched the two factor solution’s loadings besides isolating two of the 
negatively-worded items together (C4 “I feel unable to influence the actions of others”, 
C5 “I feel other people decide on the events in my life”). Given the lack of statistical 
support and theoretical motivation for keeping these items separate from the other 
negatively-worded items, this three-factor solution was not considered further. 
The four-factor solution performed similarly, explaining an additional 1.44% of 
item variance and a small Eigenvalue total of .68. This solution again exhibited the two 
factors produced by the two-factor solution, the third factor produced by the three-factor 
solution, and a fourth factor consisting of two items (SE2 “My self-esteem is high”, SE 4 
“I feel insecure” (reversed)), which loaded more strongly onto Factors I and II 




the ability to determine my actions”), seemingly due to similar length, content, and 
overlap of specific words. This item loaded more strongly onto Factor I. Following this 
investigation, the four-factor solution was also judged to be statistically and theoretically 
unsupported and the initial two-factor solution was thus retained for scale construction. 
Examining the two-factor solution, the exception to the grouping into two factors 
by question valence was that one negatively-worded question (“I feel “disconnected””), 
when reversed as all negatively-worded questions were before the EFA was performed, 
loaded more strongly with the positively-worded questions for unclear reasons. Given the 
considerable difference in its loadings with the positive versus the negative items, it was 
kept with the positively-worded questions for scale construction. The positively-worded 
group of items and this single negatively-worded item in reversed form comprised Factor 
I, which was termed “Positive Feelings”, and the remaining negatively-worded items 
comprised Factor II, which was termed “Negative Feelings”. For the purposes of 
computing an overall Psychological Need Fulfillment variable all negatively-worded 
items were averaged in reverse-scoring form together with all positively-worded items. 
When kept separate, in acknowledgement that the main difference in the factors was 
positive and negative valence, the negative feelings variable was constructed in non-
reversed form. Internal reliability among all Psychological Need Fulfillment items was 
very good (α = .96; ω = .96), was also very good for the positive feelings subscale 
(α = ..96; ω = .96), and was good for the negative feelings subscale (α = .88; ω = .89). 







Psychological Need Fulfillment Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory 




(M4) I feel important. .94 -.09 
(SE1) I feel good about myself. .93 -.03 
(C1) I feel powerful. .91 -.15 
(SE5) I feel satisfied. .87 .00 
(SE2) My self-esteem is high. .83 .03 
(M5) I feel useful. .83 .05 
(B5) I feel positive acknowledgement. .82 .00 
(C2) I feel I have control over the current situation. .78 .01 
(B4) I feel I belong. .77 .12 
(SE3) I feel liked. .73 .14 
(B1) I feel “disconnected." (reversed) .52 .42 
(C3) I feel I have the ability to determine my 
actions. 
.48 .15 
(M1) I feel invisible. (reversed) .00 .80 
(M3) I feel non-existent. (reversed) .10 .75 




(M2) I feel meaningless. (reversed) .22 .61 
(B3) I feel like an outsider. (reversed) .28 .56 
(C5) I feel other people decide on the events in my 
life. (reversed) 
-.12 .51 
(C4) I feel unable to influence the actions of others. 
(reversed) 
-.00 .50 
(SE4) I feel insecure. (reversed) .42 .43 
   
Factor Correlations   
I 11.21(54.42%)  
II .58 1.96(7.71%) 
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and 
by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are 
emphasized in bold. In cases of multiple loadings > .40, the assigned factor is also 
underlined. (B) = Belonging Need Fulfillment Subscale; (SE) = Self-esteem Need 
Fulfillment Subscale, (M) = Meaning Need Fulfillment Subscale, and (C) = Control 
Need Fulfillment Subscale, with corresponding original subscale number. Solution 
converged after 5 iterations. 
Initial Analyses 
Descriptive statistics—overall as well as for each unique by-condition 
configuration—and bivariate correlations were again calculated for all continuous 
variables measured and can be found in Tables 7–10 and 11 respectively. Outlier 
presence was again assessed, and no instances of concerning outliers were identified for 
deletion. While predictor variables of interest were not measured continuously in this 
study, meaning correlated most strongly with preference for engaging in the true self-




interesting in that it represents another possible way of observing a connection between 
meaning and true self-orientations. As preference for each self-description task was 
measured continuously, these ratings were included in the descriptives and correlational 
tables to facilitate maximum insight into relationships between all continuous variables 
captured in ways such as this. However, these ratings’ interactions with other dependent 
variables of interest can only be interpreted in a limited manner due to the written activity 
that followed the ratings but preceded the assessment of all other dependent variables. 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 2 Variables; Overall 
 M(SD) Listwise N 
Meaning 4.62(1.54) 382 




Positive Feelings 3.19(1.02) 364 
Negative Feelings 2.22(.91) 377 
Satisfaction with Life 4.32(1.45) 383 
Subjective Vitality 4.40(1.55) 379 
True Self Task Preference 62.59(28.79) 379 
Flexible Self Task 
Preference 
55.83(26.31) 376 






Descriptive Statistics for All Study 2 Variables; by Threat and Self-Description Writing Task Assignment 


















Meaning 4.78(1.54); 50 4.33(1.52); 46 4.50(1.48); 45 4.55(1.58); 30 4.64(1.49); 49 4.71(1.43); 47 4.87(1.75); 47 4.32(1.58); 33 4.80(1.50); 35 
Meaning 
Searching 




3.54(0.79); 48 3.32(0.88); 40 3.19(1.01); 43 3.50(0.80); 27 3.48(0.81); 47 3.53(0.88); 45 3.69(0.91); 42 3.17(1.03); 32 3.43(1.06); 32 
Positive 
Feelings 
3.35(0.94); 48 3.10(0.98); 41 2.96(1.11); 44 3.20(0.98); 28 3.21(0.88); 48 3.25(1.00); 47 3.46(1.06); 43 2.83(1.11); 33 3.25(1.13); 32 
Negative 
Feelings 
2.20(0.77); 50  2.46(0.97); 44 2.40(1.08); 44 2.12(0.73); 31 2.12(0.84); 48 2.06(0.84); 46 2.00(0.83); 45 2.30(0.99); 34 2.27(1.06); 35 
Satisfaction 
with Life 
4.38(1.50); 50 4.09(1.50); 45 4.22(1.45); 44 4.52(1.22); 32 4.49(1.33); 49 4.22(1.18); 45 4.51(1.49); 48 3.89(1.69); 35 4.54(1.66); 35 
Subjective 
Vitality 












64.12(27.58); 49 68.30(18.09); 46 61.64(25.14); 45 69.50(27.98); 32 62.14(26.54); 48 62.92(29.32); 48 67.19(22.26); 48 55.85(32.64); 34 67.03(24.04); 35 




Descriptive statistics for all Study 2 variables; by Threat (Low, Moderate, High) 
 Low Moderate High 
Meaning 4.54(1.51); 141 4.65(1.48); 126 4.69(1.63); 115 
Meaning Searching 5.05(1.30); 136 4.96(1.22); 129 4.80(1.38); 116 
Psychological Need 
Fulfillment 
3.36(0.90); 131 3.50(0.83); 119 3.45(1.01); 106 
Positive Feelings 3.14(1.01); 133 3.22(0.95); 123 3.20(1.12); 108 
Negative Feelings 2.35(0.94); 138 2.10(0.81); 125 2.17(0.95); 114 
Satisfaction with Life 4.24(1.48); 139 4.40(1.25); 126 4.34(1.61); 118 
Subjective Vitality 4.27(1.53); 140 4.44(1.51); 123 4.48(1.62); 116 
True Self Task 
Preference 
63.49(28.36); 138 60.61(30.22); 126 63.67(27.83); 115 
Flexible Self Task 
Preference 
60.88(24.88); 138 51.88(27.55); 125 54.05(25.86); 113 
Everyday Self Task 
Preference 
64.70(24.00); 140 64.27(27.91); 128 63.85(26.45); 117 






Descriptive Statistics for All Study 2 Variables; by Self-Description Task Assignment 
(True Self, Flexible Self, Everyday Self) 
 True Self Flexible Self Everyday Self 
Meaning 4.76(1.62); 127 4.45(1.52); 128 4.66(1.46); 127 
Meaning Searching 5.07(1.31); 126 4.97(1.21); 128 4.79(1.37); 127 
Psychological Need 
Fulfillment 
3.58(0.83); 117 3.34(0.90); 119 3.38(0.98); 120 
Positive Feelings 3.35(0.99); 119 3.07(0.98); 122 3.15(1.07); 123 
Negative Feelings 2.11(0.78); 126 2.29(0.93); 126 2.24(0.99); 125 
Satisfaction with Life 4.46(1.42); 130 4.19(1.50); 129 4.31(1.42); 124 
Subjective Vitality 4.68(1.48); 129 4.13(1.53); 125 4.35(1.60); 125 
True Self Task 
Preference 
64.72(27.86); 127 61.50(28.87); 124 61.52(29.72); 128 
Flexible Self Task 
Preference 
56.25(26.23); 125 52.16(25.91); 125 59.07(26.53); 126 
Everyday Self Task 
Preference 
66.60(25.71); 129 62.69(26.03); 128 63.59(26.39); 128 




Pairwise Bivariate Correlations for All Study 2 Variables 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Meaning ⎯          
2. Meaning 
    Searching 
-.09(376) ⎯         
3. Psychological  
    Need 
    Fulfillment 
.77***(351) -.09(349) ⎯        
4. Positive 
    Feelings 
.78***(358) -.00(357) .96***(356) ⎯       
5. Negative 
    Feelings 
-.59***(372) .22(370) -.87***(356) -.70***(356) ⎯      
6. Satisfaction 
    with Life 
.70***(378) .04(376) .76***(352) .78***(359) -.57***(373) ⎯     
7. Subjective 
    Vitality 
.75***(373) .05(372) .84***(349) .86***(356) -.63***(369) .71***(374) ⎯    
8. True Self 
  Task Preference 
.35***(374) .12*(373) .28***(348) .34***(356) -.13*(368) .27***(374) .35***(370) ⎯   
9. Flexible Self 
  Task Preference 
.19***(370) .13*(369) .18**(345) .22***(353) -.07(365) .20***(371) .27***(367) .42***(373) ⎯  
10. Everyday Self 
  Task Preference 
.27***(379) .10*(378) .22***(354) .25***(362) -.11*(374) .27***(380) .27***(376) .38***(379) .39***(376) ⎯ 
Note. Pearson correlations are presented below the diagonal, with correlation test Ns in parentheses and df = (N-2). *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001. 
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Post-hoc Sensitivity Analysis 
 As in Study 1, using post-hoc sensitivity analyses I determined minimum 
detectable effect sizes as decision criteria in determining whether Study 2 analyses were 
sufficiently sensitive to detect observed effects. For all sensitivity analyses, a desired 
power of 0.80 was used, in addition to by-test Ns reported alongside main analyses. 
When tests’ observed effect sizes were produced in a form other than the test statistic 
indicated in the sensitivity analysis calculator, an online calculator was used to perform 
the conversion to the required statistic, specified in Appendix H. For χ² tests, sensitivity 
for a generic χ² test was computed. For repeated-measures ANOVA, repeated-measures 
within factors test sensitivity was computed, with average correlation among repeated 
measures reported with corresponding analysis. For all other ANOVA applications, fixed 
effects model sensitivity testing special, main effects, and interactions was calculated. 
Post-hoc tests examining both within- and between-subjects mean differences were 
compared against sensitivity criteria determined for t-tests for the difference between two 
independent means using N’s of each comparison group. 
Hypothesis II 
A chi-square test for independence did not find significant support of an 
association between threat assignment and which task participants selected when asked to 
choose the one they would most want to engage in at the time (χ² (4, N = 388) = 6.24, 
p = .18, Cramer’s V = 0.090, Cohen’s w = 0.13; does not meet criterion w = 0.18). A 
Bayes Factor (BF) was obtained by Bayesian analysis of these contingency tables, 
finding that the data was 48.51 times more likely under the null hypothesis (no effect of 




BF01 = 48.51 (see Analysis and Results section Hypothesis IV for discussion of the 
approach to Bayesian analyses employed here). Figure 13 displays by-condition 
participant counts in task choice. 
Figure 13 




Evaluating patterns in by-condition participant choice counts tentatively lends 
additional, but statistically unsupported, information. Consistent with Hypothesis II’s 
Figure 10, fewer participants in the high threat condition chose the true self task than 
participants in the low threat condition, consistent with the idea that highly threatened 
people would seek to avoid true self-connection. However, we did not see the anticipated 
spike in motivation for moderately threatened participants to connect with their true 



























frequent choice to engage with the true self across conditions implies that under all 
degrees of threat imposed here the true self was still seen as an attractive idea. 
We also saw a large drop in participants choosing to describe their self-flexibility 
under moderate and high threat. This does not match Figure 10, which depicts the 
expectation that participants would increasingly prefer thinking about their self-flexibility 
with increasing threat exposure severity. If this corresponds to real effect, two compatible 
interpretations are evident. One on hand, it may be that for people in individualistic 
Western contexts, considering flexibility within oneself is seen as novel and potentially 
uncomfortable, even for nonthreatened people as participants in the low threat condition 
also chose this option less frequently. For people under moderate and high threat, if 
considering self-flexibility were indeed seen as a new or unpleasant idea generally, it 
would make sense that these participants would avoid engaging with it even more due to 
their state of discomfort. The other explanation is rooted in the task differences in 
perceived ease detected in pilot testing. Since the flexible self-description task was 
perceived by pilot testers as sounding significantly more challenging to complete than the 
everyday self task, participants under threat may have avoided this task out of fatigue 
rather than out of its conceptual content as related to their true self-orientations. Further 
research would be required for discerning the extent to which each of these explanations 
holds true.  
Perceptions of ease might also explain why desire to describe the everyday self 
was high in the threatened groups when the predictions shown in Figure 10 were such 
that threatened participants were expected to avoid the everyday self. This prediction was 




and past daily behaviors. The everyday self seemed most likely to be connected to these 
daily behaviors, since theoretically the true self would be protected from blame for these 
actions due to its perceived moral goodness (De Freitas & Alvarez, 2019; De Freitas et 
al., 2017a; Knobe, 2005), and thus I expected the everyday self to be avoided when faced 
with judgments of immorality. In contrast with Hypothesis II, Study 2’s results show that 
across the board people highly chose to engage with the everyday self rather than avoid 
it. It may be that they identified with this self more than expected to the extent that it 
could be conceptually considered part of their true-self-concept, or that they wished to 
defend against the threat by doubling down on standing by who they are day to day. Or, 
choice of the everyday self task may have been so high because it was perceived as an 
easy activity to complete, especially because participants likely felt most familiar with 
and able to describe the person they are on a daily basis. In addition to the everyday task 
being perceived as significantly easier than the other two tasks in pilot testing, it may also 
be that advanced psychology students find describing the true self to also be easier than 
does the general US population. This signifies the potential for the gulf of perceived ease 
between the two tasks as being even wider than pilot testing revealed and justifies the 
relevance for further pilot testing in a wider sample. Due to the lack of a significant chi-
square test result, and the very strong evidence for the null hypothesis in the Bayesian 
framework, the possibilities raised here based on the distribution of task choice by 
condition cannot be taken as conclusive and require further empirical evaluation. 
Hypothesis III 
 To test Hypothesis III, I performed the planned repeated-measures ANOVA 




type of self-description task, and the interaction term in explaining task preference rating 
variance. This analysis detected no significant main effect of the between-subjects 
morality threat level on preference ratings (F(2, 370) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp² = 0.008, 
corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.090, does not meet criterion f = .13 for test N = 373), a 
significant main effect of the within-subjects factor of self-description task on preference 
rating (Mauchly’s W = 1.00, Approximate χ²(2) = 1.90, p = .39; main effect test 
F(2, 740) = 16.73, p < .001, ηp² = 0.043, corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.21, meets criterion 
f = .072 for test N = 373, power = 0.80, average correlation among repeated 
measures = .402, nonsphericity correction ε = 1), and no significant effect of the 
interaction between morality threat level and self-description task (F(4, 740) = 1.62, 
p = .17, ηp² = 0.009, corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.095, meets criterion f = .080). 
Consistent with the less frequent outright selection of the flexible self-description 
task seen in Hypothesis II’s analysis, here post-hoc tests found participants felt the true 
self-description task to be more preferable than the flexible self-description task across 
threat levels (M difference = 6.84, SE = 1.54, 95% CI [3.14, 10.53], t(744) = 4.44, 
pbonf < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.23 (small effect), meets criterion d = .21). Participants also 
found the everyday self-description task to be more preferable than the flexible self-
description task (M difference = 8.37, SE = 1.54, 95% CI [4.67, 12.06], t(744) = 5.43, 
pbonf < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.28 (small effect), meets criterion d = .21), and there was no 
significant difference found for everyday self-description task preference over the true 
self-description task preference (M difference = 1.53, SE = 1.54, 95% CI [-2.17, 5.22], 




repeated-measures ANOVA and the follow-up post-hocs are displayed in Appendix D. 









Under Hypothesis III, people in the low threat condition were expected to rate 
engagement with the true self task as most preferable, engagement with the everyday self 
task as less preferable, and engagement with the flexible self as much less preferable. 
When moderately threatened, people were expected to look even more positively on the 
idea of describing their true selves due to its theorized status as a wellspring of meaning 
and morality. They were expected to decrease their approach to their everyday self due to 
the threat. I expected some people under moderate threat to prefer the flexible self task 
more than in the low threat condition in order to seek threat coping by describing their 
self-flexibility. Finally, highly threatened participants were predicted to strongly prefer 
the flexible self option to neutralize the threat, were expected to be so threatened as to not 
see the true self as able to lend assistance, and expected to strongly avoid the everyday 
self. The analyses described above stand in contrast to these expectations, and Figure 15 









 As becomes evident when visually evaluating each condition’s mean preference 
ratings for the three self-description tasks, task preference varied little by condition for 
the true self task and the everyday self task. This generally matches the distribution of 
participant choice counts discussed in the evaluation of Hypothesis II, and the lack of 
threat response in preference for these tasks limits interpretability. The lower preference 
for flexible self-description across conditions also matches the less frequent choosing of 
this task. To the extent that this means participants across threat found it unpleasant to 
think that aspects of themselves can undergo change, this pattern may be an observation 
of overall positive regard for stable self-views. Interestingly, the by-condition preference 
ratings visualized here suggest a smaller difference between preference for the flexible 
self-description task and the other tasks than the choice counts analyzed under 
Hypothesis II would first suggest. Or, this smaller difference could be a product of the 
impact of the threat induction already fading.  
Hypothesis III does not fit this overall results pattern, as moderately threatened 
participants did not show the expected dramatic increase in true self-approach or decrease 
in everyday self-approach. Highly threatened participants also did not show the expected 
dramatic increase for the flexible self-description task, and only differed from 
participants in the low threat condition overall in their slightly decreased flexible self task 
preference. Participants in the low threat condition exhibited roughly equal preference for 
all tasks. The ramifications of this for Study 2’s overall conclusions are discussed 





 To test the presence of an effect of personal morality threat and writing task 
assignment on well-being and psychological need-related outcomes, separate 3 x 3 
ANOVAs were performed per outcome with the strategy of consulting simple contrasts 
for any detected significant effect. Full test results for all ANOVAs performed are 
included in Appendix E. I planned to follow up any ANOVA that yielded null results 
with a complementing Bayesian 3 x 3 ANOVA using the involved variables to gain 
insight into the amount of evidence for the null hypothesis given by the present data. 
Evidence for a particular model—that proposed by the hypothesis testing the relevant 
research question or the model proposed by the null hypothesis—was judged according to 
widely-used cut-offs (BF of 1–3 = “anecdotal” support for the model, BF of 
3–10 = “substantial” support for the model, BF of 10–30 = “strong” support for the 
model, BF of 30–100 = “very strong” support for the model, and BF of 
100–150< = “decisive” support for the model; Jeffreys, 1961). BF10 and BF01 are the 
inverse of each other. 
The notation can be understood such that the subscript “1” represents the 
alternative hypothesis H1 and the subscript “0” represents the null hypothesis H0. The 
number on the left in the notation is the numerator, and the number on the right is the 
denominator. BF10 expresses how much evidence there is for the alternative hypothesis 
over the null and is used here when discussing evidence in support of the alternative, 
while BF01 expresses how much evidence there is for the null hypothesis over the 
alternative and is used here when discussing evidence that supports the null.  All 
Bayesian analyses were performed in jamovi (2021), using default priors specified by 




can be found in Appendix F. Over the course of this sequence of frequentist and Bayesian 
analyses, a large majority of outcome variables showed no significant explanations for 
the tested model, with strong Bayesian support in favor of the null hypothesis of there 
being no effect. In favor of conceptual organization, this group of null effects will be 
reported separately and discussed together at the beginning of Study 2’s Discussion 
section. Significant and marginal effects are discussed within their corresponding tests in 
keeping with the analytic approach up to this point. 
 Meaning. The 3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat, task assignment, and their 
interaction for explaining meaning found no significant effects in the model (main effect 
morality threat F(2, 373) = 0.26, p = .77, η² = 0.001, f = 0.032, does not meet criterion 
f = 0.16 for test N = 381; main effect task assignment F(2, 373) = 1.27, p = .28, η² = .007,  
f = 0.084, does not meet criterion f = 0.16; interaction F(4, 373) = 0.57, p = .68, 
η² = 0.006, f = 0.078, does not meet criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, 
F(8, 373) = 0.53, p = .84). For assessing variable interactions visually, meaning levels for 













Meaning Levels by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2 
 
In order to understand these null findings in a conceptually meaningful way, a 
companion Bayesian 3 x 3 ANOVA was performed and revealed strong support against 
there being an effect of morality threat on meaning in life, BF01 = 25.29. Put in plain 
language to aid interpretation, this indicates the present data to be 25.29 times more likely 
under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis that the level of personal 
morality threat affected meaning in life outcomes. There was also strong evidence against 
there being an effect of self-description task on meaning in life, BF01 = 10.17, decisive 
evidence against an effect of including both main effects in the model (BF01 = 260.92), 
and decisive evidence against an effect of including the interaction term 




 Meaning Searching. The 3 x 3 ANOVA testing for the effect of morality threat 
and task assignment, and their interaction, in explaining meaning searching did not find 
any significant effects for the model’s predictors (main effect morality threat F(2, 
372) = 1.63, p = .20, η² = 0.007, f = 0.084, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N = 
380; main effect task assignment F(2, 372) = 1.21, p = .30, η² = 0.008, f = 0.090, does not 
meet criterion f = 0.16; interaction F(4, 372) = 0.25, p = .91, η² = 0.003, f = 0.055, does 
not meet criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 372) = 0.91, p = .51). 
Figure 17 depicts the tested variables’ interaction. 
Figure 17 
Meaning Searching Levels by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2 
 
Follow-up Bayesian analysis revealed substantial evidence against an effect of 
morality threat on meaning searching (BF01 = 9.42), strong evidence against an effect of 




explained by including both main effects (BF01 = 93.96), and decisive evidence against 
the interaction term of morality threat and task assignment explaining meaning searching 
variance (BF01 = 4534.82). 
 Psychological Need Fulfillment. No significant main or interaction effects were 
detected by the 3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat, task assignment, and their 
interaction for explaining psychological need fulfillment (main effect morality threat 
F(2, 347) = 0.90, p = .41, η² = 0.005, f = 0.071, does not meet criterion f = 0.17 for test 
N = 355; main effect task assignment F(2, 347) = 2.48, p = .085, η² = 0.013, f = 0.11, 
does not meet criterion f = 0.17; interaction F(4, 347) = 1.07, p = .37, η² = 0.011, 
f = 0.10, does not meet criterion f = 0.19; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 347) = 0.91, 
p = .51). The marginal main effect of task assignment observed here may have arisen 
from the relatively lower psychological need fulfillment means in the flexible self-
description task condition. This raises the interesting possibility that this task is less 
useful for maintaining satisfaction of psychological needs, although it may also be due to 
people’s lower preference for this task detected in testing Hypothesis III. Variables are 












Psychological Need Fulfillment by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 
2 
 
 Examining this null effect from a Bayesian perspective found strong evidence for 
there being no effect of morality threat on psychological need fulfillment (BF01 = 14.69), 
substantial evidence for no effect of task assignment (BF01 = 3.21), very strong evidence 
for no contribution of morality threat and task assignment main effects in predicting 
psychological need fulfillment (BF01 = 33.33), and decisive evidence against the model 
including their interaction term (BF01 = 418.30). 
 Positive Feelings. This 3 x 3 ANOVA, testing morality threat, task assignment, 
and their interaction for predicting positive feelings, did not find significant contributions 
by any model predictor (main effect morality threat F(2, 355) = 0.25, p = .78, η² = 0.001, 




F(2, 355) = 2.39, p = .09, η² = 0.013, f = 0.11, does not meet criterion f = 0.16; 
interaction F(4, 355) = 1.42, p = .22, η² = 0.015, f = 0.12, does not meet criterion 
f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 355) = 0.77, p = .63). The marginal main 
effect of task assignment seen when testing overall psychological need fulfillment was 
observed again here. This seems particularly likely to have been generated by the 
decreased well-being scores (represented by positive feelings) among highly-threatened 
participants who completed the flexible self-description task compared to participants 
who completed the true self-description task. If this signifies a true pattern, it would 
suggest that people who are highly threatened benefit more from approaching their true 
self than considering their self-flexibility, the inverse of what was expected under 
Hypothesis IV.  While marginal effects should only be consulted with care, this may be 
an indication against the theoretical model, or may signify that the high threat condition 
was not sufficiently stressful to cause true self-orientations to be burdensome. Figure 19 














Positive Feelings by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2 
 
Bayesian analysis investigating this null finding revealed strong evidence for no 
effect of morality threat (BF01 = 26.23), substantial evidence for no effect of task 
assignment (BF01 = 3.34), and very strong evidence against these two main effects 
making contributions to positive feelings with together in the model (BF01 = 72.81). The 
analysis also found decisive evidence against the interaction term between morality threat 
and task assignment contributing to positive feelings (BF01 = 566.04). 
 Negative Feelings. No main effects or interaction effects, in the 3 x 3 ANOVA 
testing morality threat, task assignment, and their interaction for explaining negative 
feelings, emerged as significant (main effect morality threat F(2, 368) = 2.64, p = .073, 
η² = 0.013, f = 0.11, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N = 376; main effect task 




f = 0.16; interaction F(4, 368) = 0.42, p = .79, η² = 0.005, f = 0.071, does not meet 
criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 368) = 1.95, p = .051). Judging from 
the marginal effect of morality threat on negative feelings, which again should be 
undertaken lightly, it appears that this difference might lay between the low and moderate 
threat conditions. Interestingly, people in the low threat condition reported the highest 
negative feelings across the board, raising further doubts in the manipulation’s efficacy. 
Variable interactions for this analysis appear in Figure 20. 
Figure 20 
Negative Feelings by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2 
 
I next examined this null finding with a 3 x 3 Bayesian ANOVA with these 
variables and found anecdotal evidence against an effect of morality threat in predicting 
negative feelings (BF01 = 2.95), substantial evidence against an effect of task assignment 




simultaneously (BF01 = 21.03), and decisive evidence against the model including their 
interaction term for explaining negative feelings (BF01 = 720.04). 
 Satisfaction with Life. No significant effects of model predictors emerged in the 
3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat, task assignment, and their interaction in explaining 
satisfaction with life (main effect morality threat F(2, 374) = 0.65, p = .52, η² = 0.003, 
f = 0.055, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N = 382; main effect task assignment 
F(2, 374) = 1.47, p = .23, η² = 0.008, f = 0.090, does not meet criterion f = 0.16; 
interaction F(4, 374) = 1.00, p = .41, η² = 0.011, f = 0.10, does not meet criterion 
f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 374) = 1.75, p = .085). Variable interactions 
for this analysis can be seen in Figure 21. While visually the flexible self-description 
assignment condition showed interesting threat level differences, the test for these effects 
















Satisfaction with Life by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2 
 
 From a Bayesian perspective, there was strong evidence against an effect of 
morality threat on satisfaction with life (BF01 = 20.35) and strong evidence against an 
effect of task assignment as well (BF01 = 11.78). Both the model containing the two main 
effects (BF01 = 212.85) and the model containing the main effects with the interaction 
term (BF01 = 3348.97) were decisively unsupported. 
 Subjective Vitality. In the 3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat and task 
assignment, and their interaction, for predicting subjective vitality, a significant main 
effect of task assignment emerged as the sole predictor (main effect morality threat 
F(2, 370) = 0.52, p = .60, η² = 0.003, f = 0.055, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N 
= 378; main effect task assignment F(2, 370) = 3.87, p = .02, η² = 0.020, f = 0.14, does 




does not meet criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 370) = 1.47, p = .16). 
Post-hoc tests compared all condition levels to examine the significant role of task 
assignment in subjective vitality. These analyses revealed the location of the effect of 
task assignment: Participants assigned to describe their true selves reported significantly 
higher subjective vitality than participants describing their self-flexibility (t(370) = 2.75, 
pTukey = .017, M difference = 0.54 (SE difference = .20), 95% CI [.08, 1.00], Cohen’s 
d = 0.36 (medium-sized effect), meets criterion d = 0.35 with test group N’s = 129 and 
125). Figure 22 displays interactions of variables included in the 3 x 3 ANOVA analysis, 
and Figure 23 shows the main effect of task assignment. 
Figure 22 










Subjective Vitality by Self-description Task Assignment Across Conditions in Study 2 
 
 
Agreeing with the ANOVA, Bayesian analyses revealed anecdotal support for the 
main effect of task assignment in predicting subjective vitality (BF10 = 1.21). This 
represents a positive observation of the ability of actively connecting to the true self for 
producing improved well-being, or possibly signifies the challenging or unfamiliar nature 
of actively exploring self-flexibility among Westerners. This convergence on agreement 
for there being an effect of task on subjective vitality is also an encouraging sign that the 
written tasks designed for this research are partially effective for predicting well-being 
outcome scores. The precise conditions under which this might occur are unclear, but 
adjustments to threat severity or method of delivery might be needed for well-being 
differences to appear. The analysis supported the null for other model contributors, with 




containing both main effects (BF01 = 15.53), and decisive evidence against the model 
containing the main effects along with the interaction term (BF01 = 433.44). 
Discussion 
 With the exception of subjective vitality, and three marginal effects carefully 
explored along with their companion analyses, no outcome exhibited a significant 
response to any model predictor tested under Hypothesis IV including level of threat, task 
assignment, or their interaction. In each of these cases, Bayesian analyses gave 
compelling evidence for the null hypothesis (no effect of model predictors) over the 
alternative hypothesis (a real effect of one or more model predictors). There are a few 
interesting and informative conclusions that might be drawn as a result. 
First, it may be that neither threat nor task are relevant for these well-being 
outcomes, a possibility that would be informed by further pilot testing for materials 
development. If this were the case, the paradigm applied in Study 2 would be insensitive 
for testing Hypothesis IV, leading us very little we can draw from the variable behavior 
here. The fact that all by-threat and by-task means were within one half scale point from 
one-another lends credence to this proposition that the manipulation and task may not 
matter for these variables. Another possibility, explored at greater length in the General 
Discussion, is that providing people with the chance to reflect on what task they would 
prefer complicated the pathway from threat exposure to any well-being response that 
might have been detected without the choice interruption. A third possibility, also 
theoretically and practically explored in the General Discussion, is more relevant for the 




The lack of an effect for any outcome variables besides subjective vitality makes 
the case of subjective vitality all the more interesting. Subjective vitality, the feeling of 
aliveness and energy (Ryan & Frederick, 1997), has been shown to be positively related 
to feelings of state authenticity (Sedikides et al., 2017; Thomaes et al., 2017). It may be 
that subjective vitality is more closely related to feelings of connecting to one’s true self 
than other well-being outcome variables, and was therefore most positively responsive to 
tasks that asked participants to explore their true self and most negatively responsive to 
tasks involving exploration of the transient nature of their important self-aspects. 
To consider Study 2’s overall implications as a complementary sequence of 
investigations. While no there were no significant condition differences in the task that 
people chose following the morality threat manipulation (Hypothesis II analysis), its 
distribution of participant task choice counts by threat level did raise interesting 
possibilities. Across threat, interest in engaging with the true self was generally high, 
supporting the idea that people look upon the true self as positive. Choice count 
distribution under Hypothesis II analyses also paralleled the finding in testing Hypothesis 
III that people across threat levels wished to consider their potential for self-flexibility 
less than they wished to reflect on their true or everyday self-concepts. Hypothesis IV 
analyses paralleled this pattern, in lower subjective vitality among those assigned the 
flexible self-description task. This made the most consistent finding to emerge in Study 2, 
the observation that, across analytic sequences, people appeared to desire and benefit 
from connecting to self-flexibility less than connecting to the true self and the everyday 






Examining Hypotheses and Theoretical Model 
Hypothesis I 
 In Hypothesis I, I predicted that true self-orientations, as captured by scores on 
the continuous self-essentialism variable, would differently relate to well-being variables 
depending on the level of personal morality threat participants were assigned to 
experience. Specifically, I predicted that participants in the low threat condition would 
exhibit a positive relationship between self-essentialism and well-being. Participants 
under moderate threat were expected to show lower well-being than those in the low 
threat condition, due to the stronger threat exposure, but that self-essentialism would still 
positively predict well-being. Finally, under the highest threat participants were 
hypothesized to show a negative relationship between self-essentialism and well-being, 
as true self-orientations were predicted to be burdensome under high morality threat. 
The moderate support for Hypothesis I, as covered in Study 1’s Analyses and 
Results section, indicates that the personal morality threat manipulation functioned 
appropriately to some extent in Study 1. These types of threats seem able to observably 
impact continuous well-being scores as evidenced by the significant role of condition for 
meaning searching and its speculated role for other well-being outcomes judging from 
visual patterns. There was also some support for the idea that self-essentialism would 
protect participants from moderate threat, but expose participants to risk of greater 
destabilization from high threat. Since resounding support was not seen, this indicates the 
possibility that the theoretical model applies only for some well-being outcomes and not 




scale would be necessary to see significant responses on other well-being variables that 
did not respond here. 
Hypotheses II and III 
 Hypotheses II and III were twin investigations into the same question: To what 
extent might people approach or avoid different self-conceptualizations depending on 
their degree of threat exposure? The expected answer to this question, projected by 
Hypotheses II and III onto their corresponding response variables, was that nonthreatened 
participants would most wish to describe their true self due to its positive cultural cachet, 
moderately threatened participants would want to describe their true self even more 
strongly due to prevalent narratives that it is a source of stability during destabilization, 
and that highly threatened participants would be unable to resolve strong morality threat 
with rigid true self-orientations and would look to escape the threat by exploring self-
flexibility. 
There was a lack of statistical support for Hypothesis II, and the sole finding of 
Hypothesis III being the lower preference for the flexible self task across threat levels is 
only generally relevant to the extent that it represents preference for stable self-views. 
The absence of threat effect in either of these analytic sequences suggests that the threat 
manipulation does not motivationally affect people in the ways I predicted. Unlike in 
Hypothesis I, where condition differences for continuous well-being outcome variables 
were partially evident, the manipulation does not seem to be terribly relevant for altering 
people’s orientations to various self-conceptualizations (i.e., true self, self-flexibility, 
everyday self). This holds interesting theoretical implications for true self-orientations’ 




together with Hypothesis I this pattern represents a qualification of the theoretical model, 
in the potential for the model to predict fluctuations in relations between continuous 
variables while the model seems inadequate for predicting behavioral outcomes. 
Hypothesis IV 
 Dovetailing with Hypotheses II and III, Hypothesis IV extended the predicted true 
self approach in moderate threat and flexible self approach in high threat to the 
expectation that participants in each threat condition would show well-being benefits 
after actually completing a task in which they actively engaged with the self-
conceptualization predicted to benefit them. The theoretical model saw some support in 
the form of task assignment’s ability to explain subjective vitality, specifically the 
observation of lower subjective vitality among participants assigned to complete the 
flexible self-description task compared to participants assigned to complete the true self-
description task. This result is a promising sign that, in the right conditions, the tasks 
employed here might be able to improve well-being outcomes, but the lack of a 
contribution of morality threat leaves the precise boundary conditions required to see this 
improvement by task uncertain. Little support for Hypothesis IV emerged, such that with 
the exception of subjective vitality frequentist and Bayesian analytic sequences 
converged to demonstrate strong evidence for the null hypothesis of no model effect in 
explaining measured outcomes. This lack of well-being response to morality threat 
followed by task assignment resonates with conclusions from Hypotheses II and III. 
Specifically, the theoretical model, the paradigm used in Study 2, or both appear 




model is evaluated next in depth in light of these findings, followed by a consideration of 
overall theoretical implications and need for adjustments to methodology. 
Evaluation of Theoretical Model 
 As touched on above, the inconsistencies of confirmation for all of the four 
hypotheses of this research of sequence lend strong critique to the theoretical model’s 
prospects of veridicality. Of course, there is the parallel possibility that it was the 
methodology used here rather than the theoretical model that was lacking, a possibility 
explored at length below. To evaluate the theoretical model apart from methodology, it 
appears that its predictions tentatively hold when concerning how continuous true self-
orientations (i.e., self-essentialism), relate to continuous well-being outcomes following 
threat exposure. So, to the extent this is true, true self-orientations do seem to be related 
to better well-being resilience in the face of threat. This resilience, also in concert with 
the theoretical model, seemed to attenuate or disappear altogether under high threat. The 
theoretical model did not hold for predicting participants’ preference for and subsequent 
well-being responses to different self-description tasks with regards to threat condition, 
suggesting that active use of true self-orientations does not occur, or was ineffectively 
operationalized and captured here. I next take a higher-level approach to these ideas, 
followed by a deconstruction outlining potential methodological issues. 
Theoretical Implications for Self-essentialism and True Self as Resilience Anchor 
Implications for the True Self as a Protective Resource 
Judging from results of the analytic procedure investigating Hypothesis I, true 
self-orientations did seem to positively relate to well-being at low and moderate levels of 




well-being under bivariate correlational approaches. Visual patterns, albeit in the absence 
of statistical support, also supported the predicted boundary condition of this resilience, 
such that highly threatened participants exhibited weakened positive or outright negative 
relationships between self-essentialism and well-being in many cases. This became most 
clear in the statistically-supported finding that higher self-essentialism was related to 
lower reports of the burdensome state of meaning searching in nonthreatened 
participants, but related to higher meaning searching in highly threatened participants. 
These patterns encouragingly signify that in high threat rigid true self-orientations do 
become ineffective for support, but are a valuable resilience resource at lower threat. The 
higher subjective vitality found among participants who undertook the true self-
description task under Hypothesis IV, compared to participants who instead 
deconstructed true-self-orientation ideas by exploring self-flexibility, also agrees with the 
idea that across all threat levels participants may benefit from true self-connection. 
Implications for the True Self as a Resource for Active Coping Strategies 
Generally, Hypotheses II, III, and IV were inconsistently supported. Participants 
did not exhibit expected task choice and preference differences depending on their threat 
exposure, nor did they exhibit expected well-being outcome differences depending on 
both this exposure and their self-description task assignment. To the extent that the 
manipulation was effective in inducing degrees of perceived threat, evaluated below, this 
lack of confirmation may be a sign that people’s various self-conceptualizations are not 
activated and available for agentic coping during moments of destabilization. Several 




Despite this outcome unresponsiveness demonstrated here, people readily report 
the true self as useful for guidance (Rivera et al., 2019; Schlegel et al., 2013a). One 
explanation for this is that they, due to their lack of introspective accuracy and access into 
the causes of their behaviors (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), are erroneous in reporting their 
true self as involved in overcoming obstacles in their lives. Considering that the true self 
is generally assumed from a scientific perspective not to exist beyond our personal 
subjective definitions of it (Strohminger et al., 2017), we already have evidence that 
people are likely in error on this topic. It would not be a large stretch to also posit that 
people only think they reference their true self-concepts when searching for solutions. 
After all, without knowledge of motivation, conditioning, decision-making, emotion, and 
social processes, there are only so many lay-explanations for behavior and choices that 
secular Westerners are offered by society that represent alternatives to the idea of the true 
self as agentic actor. 
Still, I argue that this conclusion is likely not wholly accurate. Given the efficacy 
of meaning-making coping (Larner & Blow, 2011; Park, 2005) and the strong theoretical 
connections between true self-orientations and meaning-making (Schlegel et al., 2013b), 
other implications seem more likely. For one, true self-orientations may not become 
activated and useful for such support until after a problem or threat has been known for 
some time. If so, participants in this sequence of studies would not have had enough time 
to access and be supported by their true self-orientations. 
Another compatible possibility is that participants are more able to utilize their 
true self-concepts effectively if they are aware of the potential benefits of doing so. 




the existence of available strategy options that might be effective for coping, and the 
beliefs in the likely efficacy of any or specific strategies have all emerged as key figures 
for coping and self-affirmation efforts (Scholer & Miele, 2016; Scholer et al., 2018). 
Additionally, people have shown individual differences in their likelihood to 
spontaneously engage in self-affirmation (Harris et al., 2019), while the theoretical model 
here projected the blanket expectation that all participants would generally feel 
motivation to resolve threat. A paradigm for future research might be developed that 
attempts to inform participants of the benefits of self-affirmation rooted in true self-
orientations, controls for self-affirmation individual differences, navigates the difficult 
task of maintaining deception and not neutralizing threat impact, and thereby may yield 
promising results. 
Still another possibility is that active coping via accessing true self-orientations is 
most available to people who have at least some degree of true self-concept accessibility, 
a capacity shown to exhibit individual differences (Schlegel et al., 2009). Follow-up work 
would illuminate this possibility, such that true self-concept accessibility might be 
assessed and integrated as a moderator or covariate when further exploring how trait true 
self-orientations (i.e., self-essentialism) or active true self-orientations (i.e., motivation 
towards and depth of engagement in the true self-concept) might operate on well-being 
outcomes. 
Practical Implications 
A very valuable lesson arising from this research endeavor is that, while true self-
orientations are discussed theoretically with a unified framework of being supportive for 




operationalizations of true self-orientations vary in the degree to which they relate to or 
are relevant for operationalizations of these positive outcomes. This may signify the need 
for re-evaluating the appropriateness of including these true self-orientations under a 
single conceptual umbrella. Or, this may signal the need for careful and reproducible 
measurement and diligent exploration into the exact ways to measure and manipulate 
variables at each step of testing. 
Given the inconsistent confirmation of the theoretical model demonstrated here, it 
seems necessary to refine current manipulations and additionally design new 
manipulations and paradigms that can more closely target and activate specific self-
conceptualizations. Of particular need is the development of pilot testing and 
methodologies that more reliably approximate the levels of threat required for testing the 
theoretical model while maintaining high confidence in the persistence of deception. 
For instance, it is likely that the manipulation would be more successful if applied 
in person with additional techniques to reinforce the deception. If a researcher with the 
air of authority were to ask participants to submit their morality scores as a separate 
survey before beginning a second survey containing written task instructions and/or 
outcome variables of interest, the researcher could administer the false feedback report 
themselves between surveys after pretending to check participants’ scores against all 
others’. Of course, this would introduce the risk of noise due to the added social 
component of this paradigm. A way to remove some noise, also explored in the next 
section, would be the simple adjustment of assigning participants a writing task without 
first asking their preferences. This would serve dual functions: to remove the risk of 




choice, and to preserve the impact of the threat exposure so that the writing task 
experience may operate on it without an intervening step during which the threat might 
fade or be otherwise psychologically reframed. Some additional strategies for making 
methodological changes appear alongside specific corresponding limitations, in the 
following section, that they are intended to address. 
Limitations and Proposed Solutions 
 A major limitation in interpreting the findings presented here is the possibility that 
the manipulation did not achieve the desired feelings of threat, either due to 
miscalibration of strength or due to research designs straining belief. In addition, the 
modifications made to this manipulation between Study 1 and Study 2, and Study 2’s 
relative lack of by-condition outcome differences, make it challenging to directly 
evaluate which form of feedback severity best approximated our desired threat 
inductions. Further, the sample differences between Study 1 (undergraduate) and Study 2 
(national) introduce the possibility that Study 1’s student participants simply found the 
threat more believable than the Prolific workers in Study 2, who conceivably have more 
experience with taking research surveys than university students in a low-level survey 
course in psychology. Additional pilot testing of the manipulation is needed to lend 
greater explanatory insight into the results discussed here. 
 Another limitation of both studies lays in the difficulty in interpreting funnel 
debriefing responses in a manner that guarantees removing all participants who were 
immediately suspicious of the personal morality threat while also retaining all 
participants who only realized the false feedback manipulation during the debriefing. 




response to the first three debriefing segments were able to give the correct answer when 
asked directly why they were showed their morality score as compared to others or to 
subsequent debriefing segments. This was particularly true for Study 2, again suggesting 
a higher familiarity with survey designs among Prolific workers. Of course, it also could 
be the case that people can easily recognize the manipulation when asked directly why 
we used it. More complex in-person administration paradigms may be more successful in 
employing false feedback designs believably. 
Such paradigms would also allow careful regulation of written task behavior 
timing, as here some Study 2 participants still reported surprise at the survey’s automatic 
advancing despite having the chance to prepare for the task on a prior page and being 
informed how much time they were given for writing. Given the implication that many 
participants did not read this information in favor of proceeding through the survey 
steadily, having a researcher present to administer each study portion would allow for 
verbal explanation of paradigm structure. An additional consideration is the possible need 
for excluding participants from Study 2 Hypothesis IV analyses based on the length and 
conceptual relevance of their written responses for the specific task they were assigned to 
complete. Due to the subjective nature of self-definitions and self-orientations, and the 
range of people’s ability to describe their self-definitions (Schlegel et al., 2009), 
participant exclusion based on qualitatively coding for response adequacy in future 
research may yield increased precision and fruitful results thereby. 
Future designs may also address the possibility that the written task segment 
would be more relevant for buffering threat were participants to be assigned to complete 




in connection with a certain self-conceptualization if they did so under their own 
choosing. Contrastingly, a participant who did not receive their task choice might be 
more likely to disengage and seek to finish the study quickly. As there were three 
possible tasks a participant could be assigned to here, it was more likely than not that 
they would be assigned to complete a task they did not select. Participant inclusion 
screening and natural variation in task choice resulted in different concentrations of 
participants who received their task choice and those who did not across the nine possible 
Study 2 experiences, as can be seen in Appendix Table G1. For this reason, it was not 
appropriate to include task assignment concordance with task choice as a moderator in 
the present analyses, but would be easily controlled for in a future study that allowed 
participants to choose their activity in reality. 
Finally, a commentary on the limiting methodological and conceptual factors 
across these studies would be incomplete without acknowledging the ongoing pandemic 
and other stressors that participants in these studies were experiencing. Participants 
completed Study 1 in the height of the 2020–2021 SARS-CoV-2 pandemic’s effects on 
the United States, before vaccinations were made available and while these students were 
engaged in online learning. Participants in Study 1 also participated in conceivably 
heightened or distinctive states of perceived threat to meaning and safety. That is, they 
either contributed data to this research from November 2nd to 17th, 2020—in the midst of 
a contentious and long-undecided national election and the fallout thereof—or from 
January 7th to 20th, 2021—the time immediately following the January 6th Capitol 
Insurrection and subsequent security concerns prior to and during the Presidential 




perceptions of threat, this sample potentially lays outside of the population the theoretical 
model was designed to generate predictions for, i.e., for people not already under 
particular threat and with normative levels of meaning in life, happiness, and need 
fulfillment. It may be that were Study 1 repeated using data collected during more certain 
times, the relationships suggested here by visual trends would emerge clearly. 
Participants in Study 2 were likely experiencing less day-to-day disruption from 
the pandemic and political climate, as they participated in July of 2021 when many states 
had reopened and vaccines were widely accessible. However, especially as Study 2 
contained a national sample, these participants may have had lower levels of trust for 
researchers and educational institutions due to the pandemic and narrative framing 
surrounding it. In my view, the implications of both studies’ and in particular those of 
Study 1 should be considered with care. I feel that this forwards a compelling 
justification for an effort to replicate the findings covered here, using the added 
methodological knowledge and detected relationships as signs for where and how to best 
advance this line of work. 
Future Directions 
I have outlined a variety of theoretical and practical possibilities to explore 
throughout this discussion. Most immediately and coherently, a follow-up sequence of 
three data collections for Study 2 seems likely to yield clearer results that would already 
additionally inform the present work. These would consist of a study that allowed 
participants to indicate their task preference, one where they were randomly assigned a 
task to complete without being first asked their preference, and one where they chose a 




I have also identified the promising prospects of helping participants focus on 
connecting to their true self, with clearer definitions of each self-conceptualization and 
messaging about the benefits of such connection. Spontaneous self-affirmation represents 
a potential covariate to control for, and true self-concept accessibility would be an 
informative moderator to include. In this vein, given the evidence here that these methods 
did not sufficiently activate true self-orientations for the purposes of affecting behavioral 
and self-reported outcomes, a manipulation designed to cognitively activate true self-
orientations may optimally position participants to show patterns of interest. 
Conclusion 
 To conclude, in reflecting on the theoretical perspectives and sequences of 
analyses explored here, it is clear that there is much still to be elucidated in understanding 
how people relate to, utilize, and may be affected by engagement in true self-orientations. 
A rich literature exists to indicate that the true self is a robust source of personal narrative 
possibility and signpost for future aspiration, and cross-cultural evidence indicates that a 
person is likely to meet wide acceptance and enjoy high culture fit if they are to entertain 
the idea of having a true self. The examinations here provide useful elaboration, support, 
and critique for these opportunities. Certainly, many demonstrations of true self-
orientations’ positive well-being link were present to be observed here, while the 
boundaries for observing and affecting this link were less consistently evident. Holding 
these parallel patterns of findings simultaneously, I have endeavored to offer 
illumination, solutions, and direction for how this theoretical area of study might next be 




able to fully discover the ways in which true self-orientations may be used as a resource 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Exploratory Factor Analyses for Study 1 
Table A1 
Meaning in Life Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor 




(P4) My life has a clear sense of purpose. .91 .00 
(P6) I have discovered a satisfying life purpose. .88 .05 
(P1) I understand my life’s meaning. .86 .07 
(P5) I have a good sense of what makes my life 
meaningful. 
.78 .06 
(P9) My life has no clear purpose (reversed). .63 -.18 
(S3) I am always looking to find my life’s purpose. .16 .81 
(S7) I am always searching for something that makes 
my life feel significant. 
.08 .79 
(S8) I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life. .08 .78 
(S2) I am looking for something that makes my life 
feel meaningful. 
-.14 .70 
(S10) I am searching for meaning in my life. -.29 .69 
   
Factor Correlations   
I 4.02(36.93%)  
II -.12 3.09(27.29%) 
Note. The factor correlation appears below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, 
and by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are 
emphasized in bold. (P) = Presence Subscale; (S) = Search Subscale, with 
corresponding original MLQ scale number as published. Solution converged after 4 












(7) I feel energized. .86 
(4) I have energy and spirit. .80 
(5) I look forward to each new day. .79 
(1) I feel alive and vital. .76 
(2) I don’t feel very energetic. (reversed)  .75 
(6) I nearly always feel alert and awake. .68 




Percent variance explained (57.18%) 
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are emphasized in bold. Items appear in order of loading, 
with their original scale number in the published Subjective Vitality Scale in 
parentheses. No rotation was possible as only a single factor was extracted. Solution 
converged after 4 iterations, no additional factors contributing Eigenvalues greater than 













Self-essentialism Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings with Initial Six-Factor Solution 
from Exploratory Factor Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 1 
 Factor 
I II III IV V VI 
Item 
(E3) I am either a 
certain type of 
person or I am not. 
.91 .02 -.04 .02 -.01 .10 
(E2) I either have a 
certain attribute or I 
do not. 
.72 -.03 -.10 -.01 .02 -.02 
(E5) The kind of 
person I am is 
clearly defined, I 
either am a certain 
kind of person or I 
am not. 
.72 .03 .01 .16 .03 .20 
(E4) There are 
certain ‘types’ of 
people and the ‘type’ 
of person I am can 
be easily defined. 
.51 -.08 -.07 .31 -.03 .21 
(E18) I have a true 
self even if I don’t 
always act in 
accordance with it. 
-.04 .84 -.04 -.04 -.07 -.04 
(E16) I have a true 
self. 
.01 .72 -.05 -.11 .17 .10 
(E17) Even if parts 
of me change over 
time, who I really 
am deep down stays 
the same. 




(E20) My actions are 
guided by who I 
really am deep 
down. 
-.03 .45 -.02 .18 -.02 .35 
(BB14) With enough 
scientific 
knowledge, the basic 
qualities that I have 
could be traced back 
to, and explained by, 
my biological make-
up. 
.00 -.07 -.91 -.04 -.02 .02 
(BB13) Whether I 
am one kind of 
person or another is 
determined by my 
biological make-up. 
.14 .05 -.80 -.06 -.08 -.06 
(BB15) The kind of 
person I am can be 
largely attributed to 
my genetic 
inheritance. 
-.11 .12 -.77 .03 -.06 .18 
(BB12) There are 
different types of 
people and with 
enough scientific 
knowledge the 
‘type’ of person I am 
can be traced back to 
genetic causes. 
.18 .06 -.65 .16 .03 -.22 
(I8) It is possible to 
know about many 
aspects of me once 
you become familiar 
with a few of my 
basic traits. 




(I10) Knowing about 
a few of the basic 
traits that I have can 
lead to accurate 
predictions of my 
future behavior. 
.01 .04 -.07 .79 -.04 -.03 
(I7) Generally 
speaking, once you 
know me in one or 
two contexts it is 
possible to predict 
how I will behave in 
most other contexts. 
.05 -.06 .13 .72 -.06 -.02 
(I9) When getting to 
know me it is 
possible to get a 
picture of the kind of 
person I am very 
quickly. 
.02 .07 -.07 .69 -.04 .05 
(E19) The person I 
am deep down 
changes from 
situation to situation. 
(reversed) 
.07 .15 .13 -.10 .74 -.09 
(E6) I have a distinct 
personality type. 
.33 .12 .19 .07 -.04 .44 
(E1) The boundaries 
that define the 
differences between 
myself and others 
are clear-cut. 




(I11) Although I 
may have some 
basic identifiable 
traits, it is never easy 
to make accurate 
judgments about 
how I will behave in 
different situations. 
(reversed) 
-.11 -.23 -.10 .22 .28 .29 
       
Factor Correlations       
I 5.39 
(25.14%) 










   
IV 










.25 .10 -.08 .28 .09 
1.02 
(2.64%) 
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and 
by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .20 are 
emphasized in bold to highlight multiple notable loadings. In cases where strong 
loading here is not in accordance with factor assignment in the four-factor solution, 
underlining will be used to demonstrate factor assignment in the final four-factor 
solution. (E) = Self Entitativity Subscale, (BB) = Biological Basis subscale, and 
(I) = Informativeness Subscale with corresponding original scale number in 
parentheses. Solution converged after 10 iterations. Bartlett’s test χ2 = 1177.01, 




Appendix B: Study 1 Multiple Regression Full Model Estimates 
Table B1 
Meaning Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(123) p 
Intercept 4.23 (0.23) [3.77, 4.68] 18.42 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.42 (0.34) [-0.25, 1.08] 1.24 0.22 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.21 (0.31) [-0.41, 0.83] 0.67 0.50 
Condition Level: High Threat 0.43 (0.31) [-0.19, 1.05] 1.37 0.17 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat 0.26 (0.44) [-0.61, 1.13] 0.60 0.55 
Self-essentialism X High Threat 0.12 (0.47) [-0.81, 1.04] 0.25 0.80 




Meaning Predicted by True Self and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(128) p 
Intercept 4.26 (0.20) [3.86, 4.66] 21.05 < .001 
True Self 0.51 (0.19) [0.14, 0.89] 2.75 0.01 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.28 (0.28) [-0.28, 0.85] 1.00 0.32 
Condition Level: High Threat 0.27 (0.29) [-0.30, 0.84] 0.93 0.35 
True Self X Moderate Threat 0.25 (0.29) [-0.32, 0.82] 0.88 0.38 
True Self X High Threat 0.05 (0.29) [-0.52, 0.62] 0.16 0.87 






Meaning Searching Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(118) p 
Intercept 5.23 (0.19) [4.87, 5.60] 28.19 < .001 
Self-essentialism -0.30 (0.27) [-0.83, 0.24] -1.10 0.27 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.08 (0.25) [-0.43, 0.58] 0.30 0.77 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.07 (0.26) [-0.59, 0.44] -0.28 0.78 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat 0.38 (0.36) [-0.32, 1.09] 1.07 0.29 
Self-essentialism X High Threat 0.82 (0.38) [0.06, 1.58] 2.13 0.03 




Psychological Need Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(115) p 
Intercept 3.41 (0.12) [3.17, 3.65] 27.81 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.25 (0.18) [-0.10, 0.60] 1.41 0.16 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.10 (0.17) [-0.24, 0.44] 0.58 0.56 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.06 (0.17) [-0.41, 0.29] -0.35 0.73 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat -0.07 (0.24) [-0.56, 0.41] -0.31 0.76 
Self-essentialism X High Threat -0.15 (0.25) [-0.65, 0.36] -0.58 0.56 






Comfort Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(122) p 
Intercept 3.23 (0.14) [2.95, 3.51] 22.79 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.41 (0.20) [0.00, 0.82] 2.00 0.05 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.11 (0.19) [-0.28, 0.49] 0.55 0.58 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.08 (0.20) [-0.47, 0.31] -0.39 0.70 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat -0.01 (0.27) [0.55, 0.52] -0.05 0.96 
Self-essentialism X High Threat -0.29 (0.29) [-0.87, 0.29] -1.00 0.32 






Meaning Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(118) p 
Intercept 3.72 (0.15) [3.41, 4.02] 23.96 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.16 (0.22) [-0.28, 0.61] 0.72 0.47 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.09 (0.21) [-0.34, 0.51] 0.41 0.69 
Condition Level: High Threat 0.18 (0.22) [-0.25, 0.61] 0.82 0.41 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat -0.16 (0.31) [-0.77, 0.44] -0.54 0.59 
Self-essentialism X High Threat -0.29 (0.32) [-0.92, 0.34] -0.92 0.36 






Control Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(122) p 
Intercept 3.33 (0.13) [3.07, 3.59] 25.47 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.25 (0.19) [-0.13, 0.62] 1.30 0.20 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.06 (0.18) [-0.30, 0.41] 0.32 0.75 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.24 (0.18) [-0.60, 0.12] -1.30 0.20 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat 0.06 (0.25) [-0.44, 0.55] 0.23 0.82 
Self-essentialism X High Threat 0.21 (0.27) [-0.32, 0.74] 0.79 0.43 




Control Fulfillment Predicted by True Self and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(127) p 
Intercept 3.32 (0.12) [3.09, 3.55] 28.47 < .001 
True Self 0.19 (0.11) [-0.03, 0.40] 1.71 0.09 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.12 (0.16) [-0.20, 0.45] 0.74 0.46 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.28 (0.17) [-0.62, 0.06] -1.65 0.10 
True Self X Moderate Threat 0.20 (0.17) [-0.13, 0.53] 1.17 0.24 
True Self X High Threat 0.12 (0.17) [-0.22, 0.46] 0.71 0.48 








Satisfaction with Life Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(120) p 
Intercept 4.27 (0.23) [3.81, 4.73] 18.42 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.59 (0.34) [-0.07, 1.26] 1.76 0.08 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.09 (0.32) [-0.54, 0.72] 0.28 0.78 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.05 (0.33) [-0.69, 0.60] -0.15 0.88 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat -0.12 (0.44) [-1.00, 0.76] -0.27 0.79 
Self-essentialism X High Threat 0.34 (0.47) [-0.59, 1.28] 0.73 0.47 
Note. Overall model F(5, 120) = 3.01, p = .013, adjusted R2 = 0.074 
Table B9 
Self-esteem Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(122) p 
Intercept 3.07 (0.17) [2.74, 3.41] 18.07 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.28 (0.25) [-0.21, 0.77] 1.14 0.25 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.06 (0.23) [-0.40, 0.52] 0.26 0.79 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.10 (0.23) [-0.56, 0.37] -0.42 0.68 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat 0.10 (0.32) [-0.54, 0.75] 0.32 0.75 
Self-essentialism X High Threat -0.41 (0.34) [-1.09, 0.28] -1.18 0.24 






Satisfaction with Life Predicted by Biological Basis and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(123) p 
Intercept 4.23 (0.22) [3.80, 4.66] 19.51 < .001 
Biological Basis 0.41 (0.19) [0.03, 0.78] 2.14 0.034 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat 0.18 (0.31) [-0.43, 0.80] 0.60 0.55 
Condition Level: High Threat 0.21 (0.31) [-0.40, 0.83] 0.69 0.49 
Biological Basis X Moderate Threat -0.32 (0.26) [-0.83, 0.19] -1.24 0.22 
Biological Basis X High Threat 0.04 (0.25) [-0.46, 0.54] 0.15 0.88 




Subjective Vitality Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1 
Model Predictors B (SE) 95% CI t(118) p 
Intercept 4.47 (0.20) [4.07, 4.87] 22.25 < .001 
Self-essentialism 0.61 (0.29) [0.03, 1.18] 2.08 0.04 
Condition Level: Moderate Threat -0.14 (0.28) [-0.69, 0.40] -0.52 0.61 
Condition Level: High Threat -0.03 (0.28) [-0.58, 0.53] -0.09 0.93 
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat 0.12 (0.39) [-0.64, 0.88] 0.31 0.76 
Self-essentialism X High Threat -0.14 (0.42) [-0.97, 0.69] -0.34 0.73 
Note. Overall model F(5, 118) = 3.10, p = .011, adjusted R2 = 0.079 
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Appendix C: Supplementary Exploratory Factor Analysis for Study 2 
Table C1 





(7) I feel energized. .93 
(1) I feel alive and vital. .92 
(4) I have energy and spirit. .91 
(5) I look forward to each new day. .83 
(6) I nearly always feel alert and awake. .82 
(2) I don’t feel very energetic. (reversed) .78 




Percent variance explained (71.65%) 
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are emphasized in bold. Items appear in order of loading, 
with their original scale number in the published Subjective Vitality Scale in 
parentheses. No rotation was possible as only a single factor was extracted. Solution 
converged after 4 iterations, no additional factors contributing Eigenvalues greater than 
1 were present. 
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Appendix D: Repeated-Measures ANOVA and Post-hoc Tests Investigating 
Hypothesis III in Study 2 
Table D1 
Repeated-Measures ANOVA of Morality Threat and Self-Description Task Type 








F  p  ηp² 
Task Type 14705.39 2 7352.70 16.73 < .001 0.043 
Task Type X Threat 2854.93 4 713.73 1.62 .17 0.009 
Residuals 325198.33 740 439.46    
Between-Subjects 
Factors 
      
Threat 3798.994 2 1899.50 1.43 .24 0.008 















Descriptive Statistics of Preference Ratings per Self-Description Task by Morality 




M SD N 
True Self-Description Task Low 63.58 28.44 137 
 Moderate 60.75 30.15 124 
 High 63.39 28.08 112 
Flexible Self-Description Task Low 61.03 24.90 137 
 Moderate 51.82 27.65 124 
 High 54.37 25.76 112 
Everyday Self-Description Task Low 64.58 24.04 137 
 Moderate 63.44 27.91 124 
 High 64.29 26.84 112 
 
Table D3 
Post-hoc Comparisons of Self-Description Task Type on Task Preference in Study 2 
 
























-8.37 -12.06 -4.67 1.54 -5.43 -0.28 < .001 
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Appendix E: Frequentist ANOVAs Investigating Hypothesis IV in Study 2 
Table E1 







F p η² ω² 
Overall Model 12.71 8 1.59 0.70 0.69   
Morality Threat 1.26 2 0.63 0.26 0.77 0.001 -0.004 
Task Assignment 6.03 2 3.01 1.27 0.28 0.007 0.001 
Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment 
5.43 4 1.36 0.57 0.68 0.006 -0.005 












F p η² ω² 
Overall Model 11.16 8 1.39 0.80 0.60     
Morality Threat 5.45 2 2.72 1.63 0.20 0.007 0.003 
Task Assignment 4.05 2 2.02 1.21 0.30 0.008 0.001 
Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment 
1.66 4 0.41 0.25 0.91 0.003 -0.008 







ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Psychological Need 







F p η² ω² 
Overall Model 9.02 8 1.13 1.48 0.16   
Morality Threat 1.48 2 0.74 0.90 0.41 0.005 -0.001 
Task Assignment 4.05 2 2.02 2.48 0.08 0.013 0.008 
Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment 
3.49 4 0.87 1.07 0.37 0.011 0.001 












F p η² ω² 
Overall Model 11.37 8 1.42 1.45 0.17   
Morality Threat 0.52 2 0.26 0.25 0.78 0.001 -0.004 
Task Assignment 4.95 2 2.48 2.39 0.09 0.013 0.008 
Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment 
5.90 4 1.47 1.42 0.22 0.015 0.005 















F p η² ω² 
Overall Model 8.11 8 1.01 1.30 0.24   
Morality Threat 4.32 2 2.16 2.64 0.07 0.013 0.009 
Task Assignment 2.40 2 1.20 1.47 0.23 0.007 0.002 
Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment 
1.39 4 0.35 0.42 0.79 0.005 -0.006 












F p η² ω² 
Overall Model 17.26 8 2.16 0.97 0.46   
Morality Threat 2.74 2 1.37 0.65 0.52 0.003 -0.002 
Task Assignment 6.16 2 3.08 1.47 0.23 0.008 0.002 
Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment 
8.36 4 2.09 1.00 0.41 0.011 -0.000 















F p η² ω² 
Overall Model 26.16 8 3.27 1.47 0.17   
Morality Threat 2.46 2 1.23 0.52 0.60 0.003 -0.003 
Task Assignment 18.09 2 9.04 3.81 0.02 0.020 0.015 
Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment 
5.61 4 1.40 0.59 0.67 0.006 -0.004 




Post-hoc Comparisons of Task Assignment Predicting Subjective Vitality in Study 2 
 




















-0.23 -0.70 0.23 0.20 -1.19 -0.15 .46 
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Appendix F: Bayesian Analyses Investigating Hypothesis IV in Study 2 
Table F1 
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Meaning in Study 
2 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BFM BF01 Error % 
Null Model 0.20 0.88 28.21 1.00  
Morality Threat 0.20 0.03 0.14 25.29 0.02 
Task Assignment 0.20 0.09 0.38 10.17 0.02 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment 
0.20 0.00 0.01 260.92 1.08 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment + 
(Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment) 
0.20 0.00 0.00 7766.39 1.59 
 
Table F2 
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Meaning 
Searching in Study 2 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BFM BF01 Error % 
Null Model 0.20 0.83 19.77 1.00  
Morality Threat 0.20 0.07 0.31 11.67 0.02 
Task Assignment 0.20 0.09 0.39 9.42 0.02 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment 
0.20 0.01 0.03 96.76 1.03 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment + 
(Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment) 






Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Psychological 
Need Fulfillment in Study 2 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BFM BF01 Error % 
Null Model 0.20 0.71 9.72 1.00  
Morality Threat 0.20 0.05 0.20 14.69 0.02 
Task Assignment 0.20 0.22 1.13 3.21 0.02 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment 
0.20 0.02 0.09 33.33 1.33 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment + 
(Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment) 




Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Positive Feelings 
in Study 2 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BFM BF01 Error % 
Null Model 0.20 0.74 11.34 1.00  
Morality Threat 0.20 0.03 0.12 26.23 0.02 
Task Assignment 0.20 0.22 1.14 3.34 0.02 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment 
0.20 0.01 0.04 72.81 1.52 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment + 
(Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment) 






Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Negative 
Feelings in Study 2 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BFM BF01 Error % 
Null Model 0.20 0.67 8.12 1.00  
Morality Threat 0.20 0.23 1.17 2.95 0.02 
Task Assignment 0.20 0.07 0.30 9.55 0.02 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment 
0.20 0.03 0.13 21.03 1.13 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment + 
(Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment) 




Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Satisfaction with 
Life in Study 2 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BFM BF01 Error % 
Null Model 0.20 0.88 28.77 1.00  
Morality Threat 0.20 0.04 0.18 20.35 0.02 
Task Assignment 0.20 0.07 0.32 11.78 0.02 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment 
0.20 0.00 0.02 212.85 1.15 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment + 
(Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment) 






Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Subjective 
Vitality in Study 2 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BFM BF01 Error % 
Null Model 0.20 0.43 3.01 1.00  
Morality Threat 0.20 0.02 0.09 19.92 0.02 
Task Assignment 0.20 0.52 4.34 0.82 0.02 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment 
0.20 0.03 0.11 15.53 1.01 
Morality Threat + 
Task Assignment + 
(Morality Threat X 
Task Assignment) 
0.20 0.00 0.00 433.44 1.39 
Note: The BF01 for Task Assignment is equivalent to a BF10 = 1.21 
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Appendix G: Participant Manipulation Assignment by Task Choice-Task 
Assignment Concordance in Study 2 
Table G1 
Manipulation Random Assignment Distribution by Task Concordance in Study 2 
  Threat  







True 32 20 28 80 
Flexible 36 42 31 109 
Everyday 31 28 22 81 







True 18 12 20 50 
Flexible 10 7 4 21 
Everyday 13 21 13 47 




Appendix H: Effect Size Conversions 
Calculators 
Between eta squared, Cohen’s d, and Cohen’s f 
https://www.psychometrica.de/effect_size.html 






















Appendix I: Study 1 Materials 
Recruitment 
Study Name: Attributes and Self 
Study Duration: 60 minutes or less; 40 minutes on average 
Study Description: This is a research study designed to investigate your attitudes, 
characteristics, and everyday behavior. Your participation will involve completing 
questionnaires in which you answer questions about your beliefs, tendencies, and well-
being. You will also be asked to provide basic demographic information about yourself 
(e.g., sex, race, age).  
Faculty Sponsor: Verena Graupmann, PhD 
 
Informed Consent page displayed, with consenting participants indicating consent 




Rate the degree to which you agree with these statements. (-3, disagree completely — 0, 
neither disagree nor agree — +3, agree completely) 
1. The boundaries that define the differences between myself and others are clear-
cut. 
2. I either have a certain attribute or I do not. 
3. I am either a certain type of person or I am not. 
4. There are different ‘types’ of people and the ‘type’ of person I am can be easily 
defined. 
5. The kind of person I am is clearly defined, I either am a certain kind of person or I 
am not. 
6. I have a distinct personality type. 
7. Generally speaking, once you know me in one or two contexts it is possible to 
predict how I will behave in most other contexts. 
8. It is possible to know about many aspects of me once you become familiar with a 
few of my basic traits. 
9. When getting to know me it is possible to get a picture of the kind of person I am 
very quickly. 
10.  Knowing about a few of the basic traits that I have can lead to accurate 
predictions of my future behavior. 
11.  Although I may have some basic identifiable traits, it is never easy to make 
accurate judgments about how I will behave in different situations. (Reversed) 
12. There are different types of people and with enough scientific knowledge the 




13. Whether I am one kind of person or another is determined by my biological make-
up. 
14. With enough scientific knowledge, the basic qualities that I have could be traced 
back to, and explained by, my biological make-up. 
15. The kind of person I am can be largely attributed to my genetic inheritance. 
16. I have a true self 
17. Even if parts of me change over time, who I really am deep down stays the same 
18. I have a true self even if I don’t always act in accordance with it 
19. The person I am deep down changes from situation to situation (Reversed) 




Morality Survey  
 
 
Think about your behavior in the past. How many of these behaviors have you ever done? 






1. I have let down people who were 
             counting on me. 
1. I have been true to my word in an  
             important matter.  
2. I have shifted blame to others 
             because it kept me out of trouble.  
2. I have given a stranger directions.  
3. I have stolen something because I 
             was sure I could get away with it. 
3. I have stood up for someone who was  
             being bullied or harassed.  
4. I have kept extra money accidentally 
             given to me by a cashier.  
4. I have returned extra money 
             accidentally given to me by a cashier. 
5. I have lied to my parents about 
             something.  
5. I have donated money to a charity.  
6. I have lied about my age to receive 
             an age-based discount.  
6. I have been kind to someone I knew 
             was having a bad day.  
7. I have snuck into a movie theater  
             without paying.  
7. I have taken responsibility for a 
             mistake that I made.  
8. I have parked in a handicapped  
             parking spot without being 
             handicapped.  
8. I have volunteered my time to help 
             with an important cause.  
9. I have ignored people who had car  
             trouble.  
9. I have assisted an older family 
            member with something.  
10. I have decided to keep money for  
             myself rather than giving to charity.  
10. I have returned a valuable item that I 
            found, rather than keeping it for 
            myself. 
11. I have ignored someone struggling to  
             carry a bag of groceries.  
11. I have helped an animal that was  
             injured, lost, or otherwise distressed 
             or in danger.  
12. I have neglected to offer my seat to  
             an elderly or disabled individual.  
12. I have given up my seat on public 




             needed it more.  
13. I have made an offhanded racist or  
             sexist comment.  
13. I have given a thoughtful gift to a 
            friend.  
14. I have cursed or used profanity  
             around children.  
14. I have been supportive of a friend 
            during a difficult time in their life.  
15. I have cheated on a relationship  
             partner.  
15. I have helped make sure that a fair 
             outcome was reached in a 
             disagreement.  
16. I have done something that went  
             against my values.  
16. I have demonstrated courage in a 
             stressful situation.  
17. I have physically hurt another  
             person.  
17. I have been loyal to my friends and 
             family.  
18. I have threatened people I know.  
18. I have been kind to others without 
             thinking of what they might do for me 
             in return. 
19. I have gotten into arguments when 
             people disagreed with me.  
19. I have been respectful to people 
             whose viewpoints I strongly disagree 
             with.  
20. I have flown off the handle for no       
             good reason.  
20. I have handled a frustrating situation 






Following page notifying of score calculation: 
 
As part of our research, we have calculated your overall moral behavior score based on 
your answers to the previous questions. The next page displays your score on these 






















Morality Survey Results: 
 
Low Threat: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study, you 
scored in the 90th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher on moral 










Moderate Threat: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study, 
you scored in the 45th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral 












High Threat: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study, you 
scored in the 15th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral 









Dependent variables: Each questionnaire appeared on separate pages 
(Groups 1 and 2 were randomly counterbalanced, with within-group questionnaire order 
also counterbalanced.) 
 
Group 1:  
Life Satisfaction  
Rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. (-3, disagree 
completely — 0, neither disagree nor agree — +3, agree completely) 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
3. I am satisfied with my life. 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 








Meaning in Life Questionnaire 
Rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true. Ranging from -3 
(Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True) 
 
1. I am always looking for the purpose of life 
2. I am looking for an answer about the significance of life 
3. I have no idea what makes my life meaningful 
4. I understand the significance of life 
5. I’m always looking for something that makes my life meaningful 
6. I have a clear purpose in life 
7. I am seeking the purpose and mission of life 
8. I am looking for significance in life 
9. I have a good understanding that makes my life meaningful 
10. There is no clear purpose in my life 
 
Group 2: 
Subjective Vitality Scale  
Please rate the following statements in terms of how they apply to you and your life at the 
present time. 
Ranging from -3 (Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True) 
1. I feel alive and vital. 
2. I don’t feel very energetic. 
3. Sometimes I feel so alive I just want to burst. 
4. I have energy and spirit. 
5. I look forward to each new day. 
6. I nearly always feel alert and awake. 
7. I feel energized. 
 
Psychological Need Fulfillment  
 
Please indicate the number that best represents your feelings about yourself: 
 not at all  extremely 
I feel “disconnected” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel rejected 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel like an outsider 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I belong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 









Age (in years):  ________  
 
First language:        
 
acknowledgement 
I feel good about 
myself 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
My self-esteem is high 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel liked 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel insecure 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel satisfied 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel invisible 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel meaningless 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel non-existent 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel important 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel useful 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel powerful 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I have control 
over the current 
situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I have the ability 
to determine my actions 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel unable to 
influence the actions of 
others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel other people 
decide on the events in 
my life. 













 Pacific Islander 
 White 
 Other (Specify:        ) 
 Mixed (Specify:        ) 
 











              
 
 




at all (1) 














Which of the following best describes your religious beliefs? 
 Jewish (1) 
 Protestant (2) 
 Hindu (3) 
 Catholic (4) 
 Buddhist (5) 
 Muslim (6) 
 Spiritual but Not Religious (7) 
 Atheist/Agnostic (8) 
 Other (please specify) (9) ____________________ 
 
Funnel Debriefing 
1 Do you have any initial thoughts or reactions about this study? 
2 Did you notice anything unusual in the study? If so, what? 
3 Did you notice anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors 
questionnaire? 
4 Why do you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire? 
5 What do you remember your morality score being? 
6 Do you think your morality score was accurate? 
7 To what extent did you believe the feedback of your morality score relative to all other 
participants? 
 
Official Debriefing page followed 
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Appendix J: Study 2 Materials 
Recruitment 
Study Name: Attributes and Attitudes 
Study Duration: 30 Minutes 
Study Description: This is an online research study designed to investigate your attributes 
and task-related preferences. Your participation will involve completing questionnaires in 
which you answer questions about your beliefs, tendencies, and well-being in addition to 
completing choice and description tasks. You will also be asked to provide basic 
demographic information about yourself (e.g., sex, race, age). 
Faculty Sponsor: Verena Graupmann, PhD 
 
 
Informed consent process, in which consenting participants select “I consent to 
participate, begin the study” 
 
Page capturing Prolific ID 
Please advance to the next page. 
Your Prolific ID: 
 
 
Prescreening filter confirmation questions 
Before beginning the study, please provide the following information: 
 
Current Country of Residence 
United States 

















I am not fluent in English. 
 
 
Page signaling study commencement 
The study will begin on the next page. Before you begin, please silence electronic devices 
and minimize distractions. 
 
 











Main Study Sequence 
 
Morality Survey  
 
 
Think about your behavior in the past. How many of these behaviors have you ever done? 








I have been true to my word 
in an important matter.  
I have let down people who 
were counting on me. 
I have let down people 
who were counting on 
me. 
I have given a stranger 
directions 
I have shifted blame to others 
because it kept me out of 
trouble. 
I have shifted blame to 
others because it kept 
me out of trouble.  
I have stood up for someone 
who was being bullied or 
harassed 
I have stolen something 
because I was sure I could get 
away with it. 
I have stolen something 
because I was sure I 
could get away with it. 
I have returned extra money 
accidentally given to me by 
a cashier 
I have kept extra money 
accidentally given to me by a 
cashier. 
I have kept extra 
money accidentally 
given to me by a 
cashier.  
I have donated money to a 
charity 
I have lied to my parents 
about something. 
I have lied to my 
parents about 
something.  
I have been kind to someone 
I knew was having a bad day 
I have snuck into a movie 
theater without paying. 
I have lied about my 
age to receive an age-
based discount.  
I have taken responsibility 
for a mistake that I made 
I have made an offhanded 
racist or sexist comment. 
I have snuck into a 
movie theater without 
paying.  
I have volunteered my time 
to help with an important 
cause. 
I have cursed or used 
profanity around children. 
I have parked in a 
handicapped parking 
spot without being 
handicapped.  
I have assisted an older 
family member with 
something 
I have cheated on a 
relationship partner. 
I have ignored people 
who had car trouble.  
I have returned a valuable 
item that I found, rather than 
keeping it for myself 
I have done something that 
went against my values. 
I have decided to keep 
money for myself 





I have helped an animal that 
was injured, lost, or 
otherwise distressed or in 
danger 
I have physically hurt another 
person. 
I have ignored someone 
struggling to carry a 
bag of groceries.  
I have given up my seat on 
public transportation for 
someone who needed it 
more. 
I have threatened people I 
know. 
I have neglected to 
offer my seat to an 
elderly or disabled 
individual.  
I have given a thoughtful 
gift to a friend.  
I have gotten into arguments 
when people disagreed with 
me. 
I have made an 
offhanded racist or 
sexist comment.  
I have been supportive of a 
friend during a difficult time 
in their life 
I have flown off the handle 
for no good reason. 
I have cursed or used 
profanity around 
children.  
I have helped make sure that 
a fair outcome was reached 
in a disagreement. 
I have given a stranger 
directions. 
I have cheated on a 
relationship partner.  
I have demonstrated courage 
in a stressful situation.  
I have donated money to a 
charity. 
I have done something 
that went against my 
values.  
I have been loyal to my 
friends and family.  
I have volunteered my time 
to help with an important 
cause. 
I have physically hurt 
another person.  
I have been kind to others 
without thinking of what 
they might do for me in 
return. 
I have assisted an older 
family member with 
something. 
I have threatened 
people I know.  
I have been respectful to 
people whose viewpoints I 
strongly disagree with. 
I have returned a valuable 
item that I found, rather than 
keeping it for myself. 
I have gotten into 
arguments when people 
disagreed with me.  
I have handled a frustrating 
situation in a mature and 
dignified manner. 
I have helped make sure that 
a fair outcome was reached in 
a disagreement. 
I have flown off the 






Next survey page: 
 
 
The study will proceed to the next page in one moment. 
 






Next survey page: 
 
As part of our research, we have calculated your overall moral behavior score based on 
your answers to the previous questions. The next page displays your score on these 








Next Survey Page: 
 
 
(Morality Survey Results: Low Threat) 
 
Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you scored in 
the 85th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher on moral qualities 
than 85% of Prolific participants. 
  
  
Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study. 
 
 
(Morality Survey Results: Moderate Threat) 
 
Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you scored in 
the 65th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities than 
35% of Prolific participants. 
  
  
Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study. 
 
 
(Morality Survey Results: High Threat)  
  
Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you scored in 
the 40th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities than 
60% of Prolific participants. 
  
  





Next component: Participants read about self-description tasks 
 
 
Next, please choose between the following three options to select what activity you’d 
prefer to complete if you had a choice. Please choose based on what you most want to do 





Option: True Self Description Activity 
  
  
This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then describe your 
true self: 
  
Which aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who are you deep down? 
 
  
   
Option: Flexible Self Description Activity 
  
  
This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then describe 
flexibility within yourself: 
  




Option: Everyday Self Description Activity 
  
  
This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then describe your 
usual self: 
  













Please indicate your activity preference: 
 
o True Self Description Activity 
 
o Flexible Self Description Activity 
 






“Please rate how much you would like to engage in each activity.” 
 
 
True Self Description Activity 
 
 Not           Very 






Flexible Self Description Activity 
 
Not           Very 





Everyday Self Description Activity 
 
Not           Very 



















In this next part of the study, you will be given one of the written description activities to 







Performance of assigned self-reflection task: 
 
 
True self-description writing task 
This activity collects your written thoughts on a topic. 
 
 Specifically, over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your true self. 
 
 Which aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who you are deep down? 
 
 Describe your true self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the aspects of you that you 
feel are most central to who you are at your core, in as much detail as possible. 
 
 After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component. 
  











Flexible self-description writing task 
This activity collects your written thoughts on a topic. 
 
Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on flexibility within yourself. 
 
How might important aspects of you be able to undergo change? How might you as a 
person be different over time? 
 
Describe your self-flexibility as thoroughly as possible, reflect on how even central 
aspects to who you are can change, in as much detail as possible. 
 
After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component. 
 
[Essay box provided] 
 
 
Everyday self-description writing task 
This activity collects your written thoughts on a topic: 
 
Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your usual self. 
 
Which aspects of you do you present to the world and in public? Who are you in 
everyday life? 
 
Describe your everyday self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the parts of yourself that 
you most display publicly on a usual day when you are in usual situations, in as much 
detail as possible. 
 
 
After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component. 
 









Dependent variables: Each questionnaire appeared on separate pages 
(Groups 1 and 2 were randomly counterbalanced, with within-group questionnaire order 
also counterbalanced.) 
 
Group 1:  
Life Satisfaction  
Rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. (-3, disagree 
completely — 0, neither disagree nor agree — +3, agree completely) 
1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal. 
2. The conditions of my life are excellent. 
3. I am satisfied with my life. 
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing. 
 
Meaning in Life Questionnaire 
Rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true. 
Ranging from -3 (Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True) 
 
1. I am always looking for the purpose of life 
2. I am looking for an answer about the significance of life 
3. I have no idea what makes my life meaningful 
4. I understand the significance of life 
5. I’m always looking for something that makes my life meaningful 
6. I have a clear purpose in life 
7. I am seeking the purpose and mission of life 
8. I am looking for significance in life 
9. I have a good understanding that makes my life meaningful 












Subjective Vitality Scale  
Please rate the following statements in terms of how they apply to you and your life at the 
present time. 
Ranging from -3 (Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True) 
1. I feel alive and vital. 
2. I don’t feel very energetic. 
3. Sometimes I feel so alive I just want to burst. 
4. I have energy and spirit. 
5. I look forward to each new day. 
6. I nearly always feel alert and awake. 
7. I feel energized. 
 
Psychological Need Fulfillment 
Please indicate the number that best represents your feelings about yourself: 
 not at all  extremely 
I feel “disconnected” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel rejected 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel like an outsider 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I belong 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel positive 
acknowledgement 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel good about 
myself 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
My self-esteem is high 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel liked 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel insecure 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel satisfied 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel invisible 
 
1 2 3 4 5 









Age (in years):  ________  
 











 Pacific Islander 
 White 
 Other (Specify:        ) 
 Mixed (Specify:        ) 
 
I feel non-existent 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel important 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel useful 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel powerful 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I have control 
over the current 
situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I have the ability 
to determine my actions 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel unable to 
influence the actions of 
others. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel other people 
decide on the events in 
my life. 















              
 
 




at all (1) 








              
 
 
Which of the following best describes your religious beliefs? 
 Jewish (1) 
 Protestant (2) 
 Hindu (3) 
 Catholic (4) 
 Buddhist (5) 
 Muslim (6) 
 Spiritual but Not Religious (7) 
 Atheist/Agnostic (8) 
 Other (please specify) (9) ____________________ 
 
Funnel Debriefing 
1 Do you have any initial thoughts or reactions about this study? 
2 Did you notice anything unusual in the study? If so, what? 
3 Did you notice anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors 
questionnaire? 
4 Why do you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire? 
5 What do you remember your morality score being? 
6 Do you think your morality score was accurate? 
7 To what extent did you believe the feedback of your morality score relative to all other 
participants? 
 
Official Debriefing page followed 
